

BRAHMASŪTRA-CATUḥSŪTRĪ

The First Four Aphorisms of the Brahmasūtras along with
Śaṅkarācārya's Commentary and English Explanation 'Śreyaskari'

The most compassionate God has given every living being three states—*jāgrat*, *swapna* and *susupti*. In the *jāgrat* state, the *jīva* obtains *prajñā* of *viṣayas* which are outside him; hence he is called *bahiṣprajña*. Transacting with *viṣayas* in this way, he gets tired and goes to sleep. In sleep, when the *jīva* is no more in association with his body and the *indriyas*, he experiences the dream state. *Vāsanās* of the objects experienced in the *jāgrat* state serve as *viṣayas* during *swapna*. Since in dreams these *vāsanās* are experienced within, the *jīva* in the *swapnāvasthā* is called *antaḥprajña*. *Prajñā* means knowledge. In *jāgrat*, the *jīva*'s *prajñā* is obtained with the help of external light, but in *swapna* the light is from within.*

In *swapnāvasthā* it is the mind which becomes both the *viṣaya* and *viṣayī* in turns. Constantly becoming *viṣaya* and *viṣayī* in this manner, the mind gets tired and becomes inactive; then the *jīva* loses connection even with the mind and enters *susupti*. In this *nirūpādhic* (adjunctless - without *upādhi*) state, the *śāstra* gives *jīva* the name *prājña* [*jīva* is the name at the individual level (*vyaṣṭi*) and *prājña* is the name at the cosmic level (*samaṣṭi*)]. In this state, the *jīva* is all alone and becomes *ānandamaya*. The light which illuminates the *indriyas* (sense organs) in both *jāgrat*

*Where is the light in the dream coming from? It is not coming from the sun, moon or stars. Some may say that the light is contained in the *vāsanās* themselves. But this is not so because there is a great difference between the external light and its impression on the *vāsanās*. Impressions are photos which have to be exposed to light in order to be seen. Similarly, the mind containing the *vāsanās* has to be illumined to see the dream. This light does not belong to the mind because it is an object for the observer. How? Because its absence is experienced by the observer in deep sleep. So, the dream light is not of the mind. Since its absence is noted by the observer in deep sleep, the light has to be of the observer only.

and *swapna* is that of this *prājña*. Waking up from *susupti* the *jīva* says: "In the absence of the mind and sense organs, I enjoyed the bliss of deep sleep." This proves that the light on the basis of which the *jīva* experiences the absence of the mind and the *indriyas* has to be his *swadharma* (intrinsic feature). Therefore, the *upādhis** mind etc. are inert; they are objects for his knowledge; they are of the nature of *tamas* (darkness). In this way we see that *jñātṛtva* (knowership), *kartṛtva* (doership), *bhoktṛtva* (enjoyership) and luminosity are the features of the *nirūpādhic prājña* only.

This analysis of *jāgrat*, *swapna*, *susupti*, brings out a surprising information: In *jāgrat*, taking the body as Self, everyone very naturally considers himself to be 'a man, a youth' etc. Such an identity, which is on the basis of the body, creates no doubt in anyone's mind. However, when asked about his dream experience, he encounters a difficulty: He says: 'In my dream, I was swimming in the pool'. If you ask him further, 'Who were you when you were dreaming? Were you the one on the bed or the one in the swimming pool?', he would be in confusion. It is very clear that the one swimming in the pool cannot at the same time be the one lying on the bed. In this way, an analysis of the dream state creates a *samśaya jñāna* (doubtful knowledge) about himself, in place of the unambiguous knowledge of *jāgrat* ('I am a man' etc). If you ask him further, 'What were you in your *susupti*? Where were you?'. He would say, 'I do not know what I was during *susupti*, nor where I was.' So it is clear that in *susupti*, when he is not connected with the mind and other *upādhis*, but is all alone, the *jīva* has *ajñāna* (ignorance) about his own Self. But, despite this *ajñāna*, it is at least clear to him that during deep sleep he was free from all *upādhis*

*An unknown object is sometimes recognised through a known object. For e.g., a nearly invisible glass wall is known by a red patch on it. In this connection it is said that the known object is an *upādhi* for the unknown object and the unknown object is the *adhiṣṭhāna* of the known object. Without *adhiṣṭhāna*, there is no meaning in *upādhi* - it does not exist. However, the *adhiṣṭhāna* exists even without the *upādhi*. In *susupti* there is no *upādhi* like the body, *indriyas* or mind. But the observer Self exists, certifying the absence of all *upādhis* in *susupti*. We can only identify the *adhiṣṭhāna* with the *upādhi*, but cannot know what exactly is the nature of the *adhiṣṭhāna*. In fact, we may even get a wrong understanding of it. For e.g., in association with the *upādhis* of the body and mind, we understand the *adhiṣṭhāna* Self as man/woman, active/inactive etc. But everyone knows that the *upādhi*-free Self in deep sleep is neither man/woman nor active/inactive. The only way to understand the Self in deep sleep is through *śruti*.

like the mind, *indriyas*, body etc. and was alone. However, no one says that he was not there during *susupti*. Therefore, when it is explained to him that his understanding of himself in the form of a ‘man or youth’ during *jāgrat* is *mithyā jñāna*, he would have no difficulty in recognising his mistake. It is another matter that it is very difficult for him to give up this *mithyā jñāna*. This is a well known fact.

In this manner, not knowing who he is, is the *ajñāna* or *avidyā* of the *jīva*. On the basis of his own experience in *susupti*, he knows very well that he has no connection with the body etc. Yet in *jāgrat*, he does have the false knowledge that he is the body etc. This false knowledge is *adhyāsa*. On the basis of this false understanding only does he create the difference of ‘I’ and ‘You’, and mixing it up with *rāga-dveṣa*, gets caught up in the cycle of worldly activities (*samsāra*). Although worldly activities are natural, the purpose of *Adhyāsa Bhāṣya* is to show that for all such activities, the basis is only *adhyāsa*.

Without using a word beyond the universal experience of the three states, the *Bhāṣyakāra* presents his summary so that everyone can understand one’s fault of *avidyā*. In this, we get a glimpse of the incomparable teaching skill and utmost compassion of Bhagawān Śaṅkarācārya. By even just listening to the *Adhyāsa Bhāṣya*, an intelligent person understands his grievous mistake. After this, the seeker is naturally desirous of listening to the following *śārīraka mīmāṃsā* (sacred discussion of the *jīva*) whose benefit is *ātmaikatva avagati* (experience of the oneness of the Self). In this way, *Adhyāsa Bhāṣya* is an introduction to *śārīraka mīmāṃsā*.

Some people find fault with the *Bhāṣyakāra* for not having done *maṅgalācaranā* (words invoking auspiciousness), before commencing the *Bhāṣya*. Obviously, they do not understand the context. *Maṅgalācaranā* is meaningful only for the one who has understood his fault of *avidyā* and not for the fool who hasn’t. *Adhyāsa Bhāṣya* is not a part of the main text. It is only a preface which prepares a seeker for the auspicious message thereafter. Further, hearing the *Sūtrakāra*’s word *atha* itself is auspicious for the seeker with *sādhana sampatti*.

Henceforth, the *Bhāṣya Vākyas* would be discussed to the best of our ability:

१. युष्मदस्मत्प्रत्ययगोचरयोः

1. The two (entities) grasped as ‘you’ and ‘I’,

(1.1) The word *pratyaya* means knowledge of an object. When a pot is seen, the

buddhi takes the shape of the pot and this shape is known as *pratyaya*. It is only when the *buddhi* takes the shape of the pot that one says he has got the knowledge of the pot. The pot is the object for this *pratyaya*. All such observed objects are *gocara*, i.e that which is available for 'knowing'. All the objects which can be known are grouped in the word '*yuṣmat-pratyaya-gocara*' and the knower is referred to by the word '*asmat-pratyaya-gocara*'. In the words of Bhagawān Śrī Kṛṣṇa, the meaning of the word '*yuṣmat-pratyaya-gocara*' is *kṣetra* (observable) and the word '*asmat-pratyaya-gocara*' means *kṣetrajña* (observer) [Gītā 13.1].

Question: The word *yuṣmat* means 'you' which is sentient. However, the *kṣetra* is *jada* (inert). So, how can the inert '*kṣetra*' be referred to as the sentient '*yuṣmat*'?

Answer: It is not like that. Since *kṣetra* is insentient, had it been referred to as '*idam -this*' instead of *yuṣmat*, then one would not have understood that the *kṣetra* (including his body) is actually different from himself. We have already seen how the inert body is accepted by the *jīva* as himself which however is not his true Self.

Here the purpose is to convey that the *kṣetra* (which includes his body) and *kṣetrajña* (his true Self) are of very different natures. Unless this difference is conveyed through something the people experience themselves they will not understand it. The experience here is that of *suṣupti*. In his current understanding however, *kṣetra* and *kṣetrajña* are not different. He thinks of himself and others as non-different from their inert-bodies. But at the same time, he very naturally feels himself to be different from others. Therefore, if the *kṣetra* is called *yuṣmat*, it becomes clear to him that it includes all the observable world. He also understands that the *asmat* has to be different from it. But even then, the task of separating the *kṣetrajña* from his own inert body still remains. Therefore, in the very next word, *kṣetra-kṣetrajña* are respectively called *viṣaya* (observable) and *viṣayī* (observer) respectively. In this way, by first including the *kṣetra* in *yuṣmat* and then calling it *viṣaya*, the difference in the nature of *kṣetra-kṣetrajña* is brought to attention in two steps. From this it is very clear that the whole world (including one's body) is *yuṣmat pratyaya gocara* while 'I am *asmat pratyaya gocara**'

*Any observable is *yuṣmat pratyaya gocara*. *Sthūlaśarīra* - the gross body and *sūkṣmaśarīra* - the subtle body, both are observables. The latter consists of 5 *jñanendriyas* (ears, skin, eyes, tongue and nose), 5 *karmendriyas* (motor organs - *vāk*, *pāṇi*, *pāda*, *pāyu*, and *upastha*), 5 *praṇas* (*prāṇa*, *apāna*, *vyāna*, *udāna* and *samāna*) and the four divisions of

२. विषयविषयिणोः:

2. which are respectively the observed and the observer,

(2.1) The word *viṣaya* comes from the root *śiñ bandhane* - 'विस्मिनोति निबध्नाति विषयिणम् इति विषयः' - that which binds the *viṣayī* is called the *viṣaya*.

The one who grasps a *viṣaya* is the *viṣayī*. *Śabda*, *sparśa*, *rūpa*, *rasa* and *gandha* are the *viṣayas*. They get determined only when the different *indriyas* of the *viṣayī* come in contact with their respective *viṣayas*. This is the bond which binds the *viṣayī* to the *viṣaya*. The whole *jagat* belongs to the *viṣaya* category. Who is the *viṣayī* who grasps a *viṣaya*? For the *viṣayas* *śabda*, *sparśa* etc, the respective *indriyas* are the *viṣayis*. For these *indriyas*, the *manas* is the *viṣayī*. For *manas*, the *buddhi* (intellect) is the *viṣayī* and for the *buddhi*, *ahamkāra* is the *viṣayī*. What is *ahamkāra*? It is the feeling: 'I am the knower of the *buddhi pratyayas*'. This *ahamkāra* is clear in *jāgrat* and *swapna*. But now the question arises: 'Is there a *viṣayī* for this *ahamkāra* also? If so, who is it? Indeed, *ahamkāra* is also a *viṣaya*. For whom? For me. 'Who am I?' I am that *Prājña*, who, in *suṣupti*, cognizes the absence of everything starting from *ahamkāra* upto the *jagat* consisting of sound, touch etc.

Question: In *suṣupti*, no one has the experience of identifying the absence of *jagat*. So, how then can it be established that *prājña* is the *viṣayī*

Answer: It is not like that. It is true that during *suṣupti* there is no *anubhava* of any *viṣaya*. But the statement, 'In *suṣupti* there was no *viṣaya*', made after waking up, is the experience identifying the absence of the *jagat*. Keeping this in mind, it is said that *prājña* is the *viṣayī* for *ahamkāra* also. 'भूतभविष्यज्ञातृत्वं सर्वविषयज्ञातृत्वम् अस्य एव इति प्राज्ञः । सुषुप्तः अपि हि भूतपूर्वगत्या प्राज्ञ उच्यते' - He is the *jñātṛ* (knower) of all the *viṣayas* - of the past and the future; therefore, he is called *prājña*. Even though he is in deep sleep (not recognising the presence or absence of anything) he is called *prājña* retrospectively (Mā. Bh. 5).

antahkaraṇa (*manas*, *buddhi*, *citta* and *ahamkāra*). All these are observables. Observer is the *asmat pratyaya gocara*. *Bahiṣprajña* in association with the gross and subtle bodies, and *antaḥprajña* in association with the *antahkaraṇa* are only intermediate observers. Their ranges of observables are limited. It is only the self in deep sleep who is the ultimate observer who is *asmat pratyaya gocara* for *bahiṣprajña*

(2.2) In this way the *bāhyajagat* - *indriya-manas-buddhi-ahamkāra*- *prājñā* form the chain of *jñāna-kriya* (the act of knowing). In this chain, *jagat* is always the *viṣaya* and *prājñā* is always the *viṣayī*. However, each one of the *indriya-manas-buddhi-ahamkāra* is a *viṣayī* for the previous one, but a *viṣaya* for the subsequent one. In fact, they become *viṣayī* only in the presence of *prājñā* - not independently. Since a knower even deeper inside of the *prājñā* is not in anyone's experience, *prājñā* is deemed to be the ultimate *viṣayī*. From the *jagat* to *ahamkāra*, the entire *kṣetra* is its *viṣaya*; therefore, *prājñā* is the *kṣetrajña*.

३. तमःप्रकाशवद्विरुद्धस्वभावयोः:

3. being opposite to each other in their nature like darkness and light—

(3.1) *Kṣetra* is *tamorūpa* (of the nature of darkness) while the *kṣetrajña* is *prakāśarūpa* (of the nature of light)*.

Question: How is *kṣetrajña* of the nature of light?

Answer: In *jāgrat*, an external light, like that of sun etc., is needed to gain the knowledge of an external object. But in *swapna*, the act of recognising shapes continues even in the absence of an external light. Which is the light in *swapna*? It has to be internal because there is no scope for an external light. One who thinks he is the body may deny this and say: 'Since mind alone is there in dreams, the light there should be of the mind only'. However, this is not tenable because even the mind is inert, since its absence is also experienced in *susupti*. Therefore, the mind is also an observable object. It belongs to the category of the observed and hence is *tamorūpa*. It is not of the nature of *prakāśa*. *Prājñā* alone has *prakāśa-dharma* because he is not becoming *viṣaya*.

(3.2) Normally people understand by '*prakāśa*' only the light of the sun etc., which is necessary for identifying the shapes and colours of objects in the external

*Here it is shown that *viṣaya* is of the nature of darkness and *viṣayī* is of the nature of light. The analysis is as follows: An object is identified by light, but not the other way round. Here light is the identifier and object is the identified. Further on, the eye becomes the identifier and the light the identified. Similarly, mind is the identifier and the eye is the identified. Ultimately, it is the Self who is the identifier and all else are identified. So, the ultimate identifier is the *viṣayī* - the Self in deep sleep and all else are *viṣayas* - the identified - so of the nature of darkness. Only the Self is the nature of light.

world. Therefore, they find it difficult to understand the statement of the *sāstra* that *prājña* is *prakāśarūpa*. So what is *prakāśa*? It will be explained: Another word for *prakāśa* is *jyoti* - 'यत् यत् कस्यचित् अवभासकं तत् तत् ज्योतिः शब्देन अभिधीयते' - Whatever illuminates something is called *jyoti* (*Sū. Bh.* 1.1.24). Just as light enables one to identify an object by its *rūpa*, similarly *śabda*, *sparsa*, *rasa* and *gandha* also help one to know an object. For example, even though it may be dark, we are able to reach the village by hearing a dog's bark. Similarly, through touch we are able to recognise a book etc. Therefore, *śabda*, *sparsa*, *rasa* and *gandha* are also *prakāśa*. The *prakāśa* of all these *prakāśas* is of *prājña*.

(3.3) The example of *tamas-prakāśa* is given to explain the opposite natures of *viṣaya-viṣayī*. For making this example completely meaningful, some people say that *tamas* (darkness) is a stuff (*bhāva-rūpa*) like *prakāśa*. This is not correct because: It is only when illuminated by *prakāśa* that the shape of an object is known, and not in darkness. Therefore, *tamas-prakāśa* are indeed opposite to each other. But though *śabda*, *sparsa*, *rasa* and *gandha* are also *prakāśa* and knowledge of objects is obtained through them too, they do not have their opposites. Therefore, there is no use in trying to prove that *tamas* is *bhāva-rūpa*.

Tamas-Prakāśa are only examples for showing the difference in the nature of insentience-sentience of *kṣetra-kṣetrajña*. Confirming this contention the Bhāṣyakāra says '*viṣayini cidātmake*' in the very next sentence, separating the sentient *viṣayī* from the *jada jagat*.

(3.4) Question: Though *prājña* is the *pratyagātman* (the inner atman), the *turiya* / *Śuddhātman* is the *ātman* even inside the *pratyagātman* This being so, is it not proper to take the *Śuddhātman* himself as the ultimate observer?

Answer: No. Because the one who is caught in the mire of *adhyāsa* is the *kṣetrajña* only and not the *turiya Śuddhātman*. That is why Bhāṣyakāra takes *kṣetrajña* as the *viṣayī*, and not the *turiya*. This has been clearly stated in the *Gītā Bhāṣya*. 'क्षेत्रक्षेत्रज्ञयोः विषयविषयिणोः भिन्नस्वभावयोः इतरेततद्वर्माध्यासलक्षणः संयोगः क्षेत्रक्षेत्रज्ञस्वरूपविवेकाभावनिबन्धनः । रज्जुशुक्तिकादीनां तद्विवेकज्ञानाभावात् अध्यारोपितसर्परजतादिसंयोगवत् सः अयम् अध्यासस्वरूपः क्षेत्रक्षेत्रज्ञसंयोगो मिथ्याज्ञानलक्षणः' - *Kṣetra-kṣetrajña* are *viṣaya* and *viṣayī* and of different natures. In them the features of one are mixed up with those of the other due to *adhyāsa*. This is the coupling of *kṣetra* and *kṣetrajña*. The reason for this coupling is the lack of knowledge of their intrinsic natures. Therefore, this *adhyāsa* is *mithyā jñāna* (false understanding).

[G. Bh 13.26]. This is the same sentence as the first sentence of the *Adhyāsa Bhāṣya*. ‘युष्मदस्मत्प्रत्ययगोचरयोः विषयविषयिणोः तमः प्रकाशवत् विरुद्धस्वभावयोः इतरेतरं भावानुपपत्तौ सिद्धायाम्’, which is under consideration here. This should be noticed. Therefore, who should be kept in the place of *viśayī* should not be decided on the basis of our limited *buddhi*. The serious consequences of considering *Śuddhātman* as the *viśayī* will be analysed later*.

(3.5) Question: No *viśayī* is its own *viśaya*. Therefore, the *pratyagātman prājña* cannot also become its own *viśaya*; so, how can he be the object of understanding as “I” i.e. *asmat pratyaya gocara*? If he is *gocara*, he becomes an object.

Answer: That is right. Unlike *jāgrat* and *swapna*, there is no “I” awareness in *susupti*. That is why *prājña* is not *viśaya* for *prājña* himself. But for the *bahiṣprajña* who

*In deep sleep, *prājña* does not recognise anything. Nevertheless, Bhāsyakāra says that he (*prājña*) is the knower in the wakeful and dream states. The reason is: *Kṣetrajña* is the knower of the *kṣetra*. He has to be different from *kṣetra*; otherwise, the action of knowing the *kṣetra* is impossible. The *jīva* gets totally separated from the *kṣetra* only in *susupti*. Therefore, the *jīva* in *susupti*, viz. *prājña*, is the *kṣetrajña* - the knower.

Answer: True. But he can know only the external world, but not his own body with which he is associated.

Question: But he can know his eyes and ears?

Answer: But when he is knowing them, he is different from them, but associated with mind and so on. Therefore the true observer of the *kṣetra* has to be different from it totally.

Objection: The assertion that *prājña* who is asleep and who is not knowing is the *jñāta* and the denial that *Ātman* who never sleeps and who is always knowing is not the *jñāta* - both statements are wrong.

Resolution: That ‘*prājña* is asleep and therefore he is not knowing anything’ are mutually contradictory. If *prājña* were asleep, he cannot know that he was not knowing anything. Since he was knowing that he was not knowing anything, he could not have been sleeping. This contradictory statement of *bahiṣprajña* is a consequence of his *adhyāsa*, which is itself a contradiction. Next, it is true that *Ātman* never sleeps. But He cannot be *jñāta*. A *jñāta* is one who observes something other than himself. But there is nothing other than *Ātman*. So, He is not a *jñāta*. Therefore, what is right is only asserted and what is wrong is only denied.

is able to get a *buddhi pratyaya*, *prājña* becomes an object. How? Listen: Anyone getting up from *suṣupti* says, ‘न किंचिद्वेदिषं सुखमहमस्वाप्सम्’ I slept well. I did not know anything’, pointing to the *prājña* only. Since he (*prājña*) is grasped in this way in the wakeful state, he is indeed experienced as an object. ‘बीजावस्थापि न किञ्चिद्वेदिषम्’ इति उथितस्य प्रत्ययदर्शनात् देहेऽनुभूयत एव’ (Mā. Kā. Bh. 1.2). This is everyone’s experience. However, just as *bahiṣprajña* knows himself clearly (as ‘male’, ‘youth’ etc.), he does not know the *prājña* clearly. Therefore, anyone will be naturally interested in knowing about him. Let us leave this issue here. Later we will analyse how the *prājña* who is not a *viṣaya* becomes a *viṣaya*.

(3.6) In this way it is well known that the *kṣetra*, which is *viṣaya* and *tamorūpa* is very different from the *kṣetrajña* who is *viṣayī* and *prakāśarūpa*. It is also well-known that the *prājña* and the *jagat* are *pratyaya gocara*. In this way, there is only one similarity between the two, that they are both *viṣaya*.

४. इतरेतर भावानुपपत्तौ सिद्धायां तद्वर्मणामपि सुतराम् इतरेतरभावानुपपत्तिः ।

4. are known to be mutually dissimilar; so the features of one can never be of the other.

(4.1) *Jñānakriya* (the activity of knowing) is possible only when the *viṣaya* and *viṣayī* are different from each other. If they are not different, *jñānakriya* is impossible. Everyone knows that *kṣetrajña* is *viṣayī* and *kṣetra* is *viṣaya*. Therefore, it is well known that one becoming the other or the features of one being the features of the other is impossible.

५. इत्यतः अस्मत्प्रत्ययगोचरे विषयिणि चिदात्मके युष्मत्प्रत्ययगोचरस्य विषयस्य तद्वर्मणां च अध्यासः ।

5. Therefore, *adhyāsa*, the superimposition of the entity ‘you’ and its features on the conscious observer ‘I’,

(5.1) Nevertheless the *kṣetra* and *kṣetrajña* are mixed up. Man, woman etc. are the properties of the body; listening etc. are the properties of the *indriyas*; *jñānakriya* is the property of the *buddhi*; All these are the *kṣetra* and its properties. *Jāntrītva* is the property of the *kṣetrajña*. In this way the properties of the *kṣetrajña* are very different. It is everybody’s experience that the *jñāta prājña* has no connection with

the *kṣetra*. No one is unfamiliar with this. Yet sometimes one says, 'My *buddhi*, my eyes, my body etc', separating himself from the *buddhi-indriyas*-body etc. and at other times says, 'I am intelligent, I am blind, I am a man', identifying himself with the *buddhi-indriyas*-body respectively and correspondingly carries out his transactions (*vyavahāra*) with the world. In other words, he wrongly thinks of the *kṣetra* as himself. In the same way, by identifying with the *buddhi-indriyas*-body etc., he says, 'I decide, I see, I am dark complexioned' etc. Not only this -

६. तद्विपर्ययेण विषयिणः तद्वर्मणां च विषये अध्यासः

6. and conversely, the superimposition of the observer and its features on the observed,

(6.1) Conversely, *dharma* of the *pratyagātman* is also superimposed on the *kṣetra*. How? It is not unknown that in *suṣupti* the *ānanda* is without any *viṣaya*. Therefore, it is clear that *ānanda* is the inherent feature of the *prājña*. Instead of knowing this through *viveka*, one argues: 'In *suṣupti*, I was not aware of any *ānanda*. How then can I say that I was in *ānanda* at that time? It could be just a *dukha*-free state?' Thus he doubts his own experience and after getting up seeks *viṣaya sukha* in *jāgrat*. He considers himself happy when he gets enjoyment through *viṣayas*, otherwise considers himself unhappy. The import is that *ānanda*, which is actually the *dharma* of the *viṣayi*, is superimposed on the *viṣaya*. Similarly, even though *sarva viṣaya jñātṛtva* is the *svadharma* of *prājña*, he says, "I did not know anything in *suṣupti*. So how can I be the *jñāta*?" With this doubt, he superimposes the *jñātṛtva* on the *buddhi*. He considers himself a *jñāta* only when connected with the *buddhi*; when not connected with the *buddhi* he thinks he is non-existent. In this way, he does *adhyāsa* of his *jñātṛtva dharma* on the *buddhi*. From this it is clear that *adhyāsa* of *viṣaya- viṣayī* in both the directions is not done unknowingly, but knowingly. That is, even after the Guru explains where the mistake lies, he is still unable to correct himself. Therefore this *adhyāsa* has to be *mithyā-jñāna* only.

७. मिथ्या भवितुं युक्तम्।

7. can rightly be deemed illusory.

(7.1) Just as even after being told that 'This is not silver, but shell', instead of making an effort to examine it and understanding it as shell, the continuation of

the wrong idea that it is silver would be an obstinate wrong knowledge; so is this *adhyāsa* also very obstinate. To see in *prajña* the *dharma*s of the body etc. which are not in him (*prajña*) or to see *sukha* and *jñātṛtva* in the *viṣaya* and *buddhi* which are not in them - are all *mithyā-jñāna* only. The object of *mithyā-jñāna* is *mithyā* i.e., even though seen, it is *asat* (does not exist). For example, silver not existing in the shell but seen, is *mithyā*, i.e. *asat*. Here it is important to remember that the object silver per se is not *mithyā*; but the silver seen in the shell is *mithyā*. Water seen in a mirage is *mithyā* - it is *asat*. Here the mirage is *prātibhāsika satya*, water is *vyāvahārika satya*. Both are *satya* - not *mithyā*. Therefore, understanding that which is in front of us is not actually water but a mirage which appears like water is right knowledge. To know it as water is wrong knowledge. The object of this wrong knowledge viz. water - is *asat*, because there is no water there. In the same way, world and its *dharma*s or *prajña* and his *dharma*s - they are *vyāvahārika satyas*, not false. But seeing the *dharma* of the world in the *pratyagātman* and seeing the *dharma* of the *pratyagātman* in the world is *mithyā* only, because the world is not in the *pratyagātman* nor is *pratyagātman* in the world. On the other hand, if it is asserted that all superimposed things are *mithyā* as a rule, and that the world seen in *pratyagātman* is *mithyā*, it is wrong. The reason being that in the reverse *adhyāsa* where the *pratyagātman* is *adhyasta*, he (*pratyagātman*) will become *asat*, which is impossible. It should be remembered that the statement ‘अध्यासः मिथ्या भवितुं युक्तम्’, implies only that *adhyāsa* is *mithyā-jñāna*; that is, only the *adhyāsa* between the observable and the observer is *mithyā*, not the observer-observable themselves.

८. तथापि अन्योन्यस्मिन् अन्योन्यात्मकताम् अन्योन्यधर्मश्च अध्यस्य इतरेतरा-विवेकेन अत्यन्तविविक्तयोः धर्मधर्मिणोः मिथ्याज्ञाननिमित्तः सत्यानृते मिथुनीकृत्य “अहमिदम्”, “ममेदम्” इति नैसर्गिकोऽयं लोकव्यवहारः।

8. Nevertheless, superimposing one entity and its features on the distinctly differing other entity and its features indiscriminately due to wrong understanding, mixing up the changing and the unchanging, there is this natural usage in people ‘I am this’, ‘This is mine’.

(8.1) In this way, when *adhyāsa* is taking place in both directions, at least this much is clear: just as ignorance of the shell is the cause for the silver being superimposed on it, the ignorance of the *swarūpa* of the *pratyagātman* is the cause of

the *adhyāsa* of the body on him and the ignorance of the *swarūpa* of the *jagat* is the cause of the *adhyāsa* of the *pratyagātman* on it. This means that the *jīva* does not know the *swarūpa* of either the *pratyagātman* or the *jagat*. Without knowing their *swarūpa*, he recognises them through their activity only. Although the activity cannot exist without the *swarūpa*, the *swarūpa* does exist without the activity. It is essential to know the *swarūpa* to get rid of *adhyāsa*. There is no doubt that even the *ajñānī* knows that *prājña* has no activity. In spite of this, he does the *adhyāsa* of the activity of *jāgrat* and *swapna* on *prājña*. Even though activity leaves him, he does not leave activity.

Following this, *sāstra* also talks of his knowership etc for the purpose of teaching etc. ‘तेनेव हि अहंकर्ता अहंप्रत्यय विषयेण प्रत्ययिना सर्वाः क्रियाः निर्वर्त्यन्ते, तत्फलं च स एव अश्नाति’- It is only by him who has the conceit ‘I’, who is the object of ‘I-awareness’, who is the knower that all actions are performed. He alone enjoys their fruit (Sū. Bh. 1.1.4). Here change, inertia, limitation and the activity based on them are the *dharma*s of the world, while the world is the *dharmī*. Knowership, doership and enjoyership are *dharma*s of *prājña* and *prājña* is the *dharmī*. Here *dharma-dharmī* relation is not of non-difference as in fire and heat. It is in the sense that ‘कार्यस्य कारणात्मत्वं न तु कारणस्य कार्यात्मत्वम्’ - The effect is not different from the cause but the cause is different from the effect (Sū. Bh. 2.1.9). That is, the *dharma* does not exist without the *dharmī*, but *dharmī* does exist without the *dharma*. The *dharma* is seen in the *dharmī* only through an *upādhi*. In *nirupādhic dharmī*, there is no *dharma*. Both the *jagat* and the *pratyagātman* appear with activity only through their *upādhis*. In their *nirupādhic* state they are actionless. For action in *jagat*, shapes (*vikāras*) are the *upādhi*. In its *nirupādhic* state, *jagat* is *Ātman* only. For action in *pratyagātman*, the body and senses etc. are *upādhis*. Without them, *pratyagātman* too is nothing but the actionless *Ātman*. The cause for this mixing up of *satya* (unchanging) with the *anṛta* (changing), leading to the *adhyāsa* of ‘me and mine’, is not knowing their inherent *nirupādhic* nature and seeing them only with *upādhis*.

(8.2) What is *satya*? That which does not change. ‘यद् रूपेण यन् निश्चितं तद् रूपं न व्यभिचरति तत् सत्यम्’ - Known in one form, that which does not change from it, is *satya*. What is *anṛta*? That which changes. ‘यद् रूपेण यन् निश्चितं तद् रूपं व्यभिचरत् अनृतम् इति उच्यते’ - Known with one form, that which changes from it is *anṛta* (also called *asatya*). (Tai. Bh. 2.1). Here *prājña*'s unchangingness and the *jagat*'s changefulness are well known.

One who knows the meanings of the words *satya* and *anṛta* will not contest this because there is no *vikāra* in *prājña* which could cause change in him.*

(8.3) Question: How can *prājña* be *satya*? Everyone is *prājna* in *susupti*, *antahprajña* in *swapna* and *bahiṣprajña* in *jāgrat* that is, he is changing. Not only this. Even at any one time, *jīvas* are in different states—if one is in *susupti*, another is in *swapna* and yet another in *jagrat*. This also contradicts the claim that *prājña* is unchanging.

Answer: It is not so. *Prājña* is always *prājña* only. Through the *upādhi* of mind alone he becomes *antahprajña* and with the *upādhi* of mind and body becomes *bahiṣprajña*. Though he appears different when he is with *upādhis*, his inherent nature never changes. For example, seeing a cook preparing food with the *upādhi* of a ladle, no one says ‘without the ladle, he is not a cook’. Further, even with the difference in bodies, there is no difference in *prājña*. The reason is this: Following the bodies, there is difference in the experience of *bahiṣprajña*. In *jagrat*, the experience of one person cannot be understood by another person without asking him. To know the experience, one has to ask the experiencer, that is, in *bahiṣprajña*, there is multiplicity. Similarly, the experiences of *antahprajña* are also different. One’s experience in *swapna* cannot be known by another without asking him. But it is not so in the case of *prājña*. One understands the experience of *susupti* of another person without asking him. Therefore, unlike in the case of *puruṣa* of the Sāṃkhyas, there is no multiplicity in *prājña*, he is only one. Therefore, *prājña* is *satya*.

*At this point it would be important to understand the definitions of *satya*, *anṛta*, *mithyā*, *sat*, *asat* and *anṛta*. *Satya* means unchanging, *asatya* means changing. *Sat* means existence, *asat* means that which does not exist (example given is of a barren woman’s son which is impossible). *Satya* and *sat* are used interchangeably by some. But this creates confusion. Whatever is *satya* is undoubtedly also *sat* because that which does not change definitely has to exist. But whatever is *sat* (exists), it could be either *satya* (unchanging) or *asatya* (changing). Thus Brahman is both *satya* and *sat*, while the *jagat* is *sat*, yet *asatya*. Many people define Brahman as *sat*, but if only this is said, the problem is that the *jagat* also is *sat*; so, we will not be able to differentiate Brahman from the *jagat*. Therefore, it would be proper to say that Brahman is *satyam*. But afterwards, we will see that Brahman is not only *satyam*, but also *jñānam* and *anantam*. Therefore to say that Brahman is ‘real’ is not enough, because this definition takes into account only one feature of Brahman and not the other two. *Mithyā* means that which is seen, but does not exist. *Anṛta* in the *bhāṣya* means *asatya* and not *mithyā*. *Jagat* is not *mithyā* but *anṛta* or *asatya*.

(8.4) Inspite of this, the mixing up of *prājñā* who is *satya* with the body which is *anṛta*, and saying, 'I am a man, I am a woman' etc. and 'He is my friend, he is my enemy' etc, and acting on the basis of this wrong understanding is well known. The mixing of *satya* and *anṛta* is what constitutes *adhyāsa*. The *vyavahāra* taking place on the basis of this is spontaneous and natural (नैसर्गिकः); i.e it is not done after being taught by someone.

९. आह। कोऽयमध्यासो नाम इति? उच्यते। स्मृतिरूपः परत्र पूर्वदृष्टावभासः।

9. If asked 'What is this thing called *adhyāsa*?' the reply is 'it is the memory of a previously seen (object) appearing as another (object)'.

(9.1) This sentence gives the definition of *adhyāsa*. It can be understood by the silver-shell example. Silver is *pūrva-dṛṣṭa*, i.e. seen earlier. When a shell is seen on the road, one gets an elementary knowledge that it is something, but not exactly what it is. Its shine brings the memory of silver. Without bothering to examine the shell, one concludes that it is silver. This wrong knowledge is *adhyāsa*. That which is not seen previously cannot come to memory, and that which does not come to memory cannot be superimposed. That is, for *adhyāsa*, it is necessary that one should have seen the superimposed thing previously. If silver had not been seen previously, it would not have come to memory and one could not have superimposed it on the shell. Not only this. The *adhiṣṭhāna* in which it is superimposed should also have been seen previously; otherwise, after examining the shell, one will only know that it is some object, but not that it is shell.

(9.2) The memory of a previously seen object appears only as a mental modification, the corresponding object will not be there physically before a person. The word '*smṛtirūpa*' in the *bhāṣya* above means such a mental modification of a previously seen object. When the object is actually in front, then the knowledge is produced 'This is that object only'. This knowledge is called *pratyabhijñā*, which is of two types—*individual pratyabhijñā* and *category pratyabhijñā*. When the cow named Kālākṣī, whom one has seen previously, is seen again at some later time, one recognises her and the knowledge is produced that 'this is the same Kālākṣī seen earlier'. This is *individual pratyabhijñā*. When one sees another cow named Swastimati and recognises that this is also a cow like Kālākṣī, this knowledge is known as *category pratyabhijñā*. Here, Kālākṣī is the previously seen cow and Swastimati is another cow. Therefore, recognising Swastimati as Kālākṣī is wrong knowledge.

But, recognising Swasthimati as another cow like Kālāksī is not wrong knowledge, it is right knowledge. The reason being that for this knowledge the object is not the individual cow but 'cowness'. The 'cowness' in Kālāksī is recognised in Swastimati also. This is *category pratyabhijñā* and not *adhyāsa*. In this way, if *pratyabhijñā* is right knowledge of a previously seen object, *adhyāsa* is wrong knowledge of a previously seen object. Therefore, *adhyāsa* is also called *avabhāsa* meaning the rejection of incorrect knowledge after examining the *adhiṣṭhāna*.

(9.3) Question: Even a small child has *category pratyabhijñā*. When the mother shows a cow to her child, calling it as 'cow', the child recognises another different looking cow also as a 'cow'. Through one individual cow, how does the child come to know the 'cowness' in another cow?

Answer: Yes, it is true that even a small child has category recognition. This is due to the impressions of previous births. Brhadāraṇyaka Śruti calls this '*pūrva prajñā*'. (Br. 4.4.2)

(9.4) Question: The body one gets in this birth has not seen previously. Therefore, in this new body, how does *adhyāsa* arise such as 'this is me'? Is not *adhyāsa* in the body one with a beginning?

Answer: Yes. *Adhyāsa* in the present body has to happen now; that is, it has a beginning; it is not beginningless. But the *vāsanā* of *deha-adhyāsa* is beginningless. 'अयम् अपि बुद्धिसम्बन्धः शक्त्यात्मना विद्यमान एव सुषुप्तिप्रलययोः पुनः प्रबोध प्रसवयोः आविर्भवति । एवं हि एतत् युज्यते, न हि आकस्मिकी कस्याचित् उत्पत्तिः संभवति' - This connection with the *buddhi* remains potentially in *suṣupti* and *pralaya* and manifests again in *jāgrat* and *sṛṣti* because nothing can be produced accidentally (Sū Bh. 2.3.31). Even though children have *adhyāsa* in *buddhi*, there is no *adhyāsa* in the new body. It can be understood like this: When a child is beaten by its mother, it does not feel insulted; its behaviour with her continues as before. The thought of wearing clothes or decorating oneself are not entertained. There is no desire related to sex. These things show clearly that there is no *deha-adhyāsa* in children. That is why the śruti also tells the *jñāni* 'बाल्येन तिष्ठासेत्' - Stand in childhood (Br. 3.5.1), i.e. he must have the same innocence as that of a child.

If children have no *deha-adhyāsa* when they are born, how then does the *deha-adhyāsa* develop in them later? It is like this: When there is an injury to the body, the *buddhi* understanding and then feeling the pain are the acts of *prakṛti* 'इच्छा द्वेषः

सुखं दुःखं सङ्घातश्चेतना धृतिः एतत् क्षेत्रम् - Desire, aversion, pleasure, grief, body, consciousness and *dhṛti* (the quality in *buddhi* which firms up the body when it is falling for some reason) - all these are *kṣetra* (*Gītā* 13.6). Since in the child, the relation with the *buddhi* is beginningless, it feels that the injury is to itself. When such experiences coming through the gross body happen frequently, a child's body consciousness starts growing.

After this *adhyāsa* is firmly established, and by a misfortune if one loses any part of the body, he continues to have *adhyāsa* in that part for quite sometime even after losing that part. For example, when somebody's leg starts decaying due to gangrene, it is amputated to save the rest of the body from getting infected. Even after this amputation, a person continues to feel itching and pain in that area even though the leg is not there. This is called phantom pain. For nearly a year the person gets the imaginary sensation of itching and pain. As the realisation of the absence of the leg becomes firm in the experience, the pain also goes. It is based on such *adhyāsa* in the body that the *śāstras* prescribe post-death rites.

(9.5) Question: How does the connection with *buddhi*, which is snapped during *susupti*, come back on waking up?

Answer: Since the *buddhi* rests in the *nādīs* during *susupti*, the *jīva* cannot engage in the act of knowing. The *jīva* merges in *Īśwara* while retaining his knowership (potential to know).

That is, even at the time of *susupti* there is *avidyā*, but no *adhyāsa*. Following this indicator, *Īśwara* once again connects him with the same *buddhi*.

(9.6) Question: But in *pralaya*, all modifications are destroyed and only *Īśwara* remains. How then can the *jīva* get connected to the same *buddhi* in the next cycle of creation?

Answer: The creation of the world by *Īśwara* each time is as it was in the previous creation - 'सूर्यचन्द्रमसौ धाता यथापूर्वमकल्पयत्' (Rg Veda 10.190.3). The omniscient and omnipotent *Īśwara* creates the necessary *upādhis* like *buddhi* etc. for the *jīva* along with the rest of creation and gives the connections to the corresponding *jīvas*.*

*'How is that each *jīva* gets up in the same body after sleep, even though as per the *śāstras* he had merged in Brahman?' The process of wakefulness starts as follows -*Jīva* is asleep as long as his *karma* permits. Then he will get up according to his *karma*.

In the foregoing, the sequence of how *adhyāsa* gets created in the new body was explained. Presently, how the different schools define *adhyāsa* will be analyzed. The three schools, according to their definition of *adhyāsa* are: *anyathā khyāti*, *ākhyāti* and *asat khyāti*.

१०. तं केचित् अन्यत्र अन्यथास इति वदन्ति।

10. Some (say), it is superimposing of the features of the one on another;

(10.1) *Anyāthakhyāti*: This is the one agreed upon by the *Naiyāyikas* and the *Bhāṭṭas*. According to them, the *adhyāsa* of silver on the shell happens in the following steps: On seeing the shell, an elementary knowledge i.e. ‘it is something’ is produced and not the unique knowledge that ‘it is a shell’. Because of the similarity of glitter, the previously seen silver comes to memory. It is the nature of the mind to get memory of a previously seen object whenever something similar is seen. This is not the memory of a silver vessel seen earlier in a shop; it is the memory of the category ‘silver’. Then the shell is wrongly understood as silver. After examining the shell, the correct knowledge that ‘this is not silver, it is shell’ - arises. Then the realisation occurs that the silver seen is non-existent. By non-existent it does not mean that ‘there is no silver anywhere’; it only means that ‘there is no silver in the shell’. If silver were nowhere, its *adhyāsa* in the shell would not have been possible because it would not have been previously seen and so it couldn’t have come to memory at all.

११. केचित् तु यत्र यदध्यासः तद्विवेकाग्रहनिबन्धनोभ्रम इति।

11. it is the delusion resulting from not discriminating the two.

‘But how does he get connection with his body?’ Brahman is *sarvajña* (omniscient) and *sarvaśakta* (omnipotent); so, even though the *jīva* cannot recognise, Brahman can. Like the swan has the ability to separate milk from water, Brahman can separate the *jīvas*. This is called *harīsa-kṣīra nyāya*. What happens in *pralaya* is more complicated because in deep sleep, even though the connection with body and mind is lost, yet they are there; but in *pralaya* all *vikāras* (forms) are gone; therefore, there is no *buddhi* to connect to. So how is it again connected? It is as follows: *Īśwara* remakes the universe just like the previous one - ‘सूर्याचन्द्रमसौ धाता यथापूर्वमकल्पयत्’ (Rg Veda 10.190.3). The omniscient and omnipotent *Īśwara* creates the *buddhis* and the bodies at the end and connects them with the respective *jīvas*.

(11.1) *Akhyāti*: This is propounded by Prābhākara School. As in *anyathākhyāti* here also there are two *jñānas* - elementary *jñāna* of the shell (the *adhiṣṭhāna*), and the memory of silver. Both are correct. But because of non-discrimination between the two, an illusion is created that 'it is silver'. This illusory knowledge is *adhyāsa*. That is, it is not wrong to see the shell as silver, but understanding the shell as silver without separating the two is wrong.

(11.2) Question: Even though yellow conch is never seen, how is that to some a white conch appears as yellow?

Answer: Only the one who has jaundice sees the white conch as yellow. Here also, two knowledges are involved. The knowledge of the conch derecognizing its whiteness and the knowledge of yellowness without knowing that one has jaundice. Not differentiating the two knowledges leads to the wrong knowledge of yellow color in the white conch. Ignorance of one's jaundice is the fault here. When he comes to know that he has jaundice, he gets the right the right knowledge that 'this is a white conch, appearing as yellow only to me.'

१२. अन्ये तु यत्र यदध्यासः तस्यैव विपरीत धर्मत्वकल्पनाम् आचक्षते।

12. Others say, wherever there is *adhyāsa* of one on another, it is imagination of the opposite features of the other on the one.

(12.1) *Asatkhyāti*: Because of the elementary knowledge of the shell and the memory of silver similar to it - imagining the feature of silver in the shell is *adhyāsa*. This is called *dharma adhyāsa*. Understanding the shell itself as silver is *dharma adhyāsa*. Some reject this saying that this is the Buddhist's *asatkhyāti*. Their thinking is this: 'Though the object is not there it is seen due to *saṃskāra*', this is what the Vijñānavādī Buddhists say. Here, if the silver is *asat* in the sense of 'rabbit's horn' which cannot be found anywhere, then it could be the Vijñānavādī's view. But if we understand it just to mean the 'silver which is not in the shell' then it could be renamed as *mithyā khyāti*.

Bhagawan Bhāsyakāra would not have mentioned it if it were wrong. The *bhāṣya vākyā* which justifies it is 'शुक्तिकां रजतम् इति प्रत्येति इति अत्र शुक्तिवचन एव शुक्तिकाशब्दः । रजतशब्दः तु रजतप्रतीतिलक्षणार्थः । प्रत्येति एव हि केवलं रजतम् इति, न तु तत्र रजतम् अस्ति' - In the sentence 'shell is understood as silver', the word shell means shell itself but the word silver refers only to the apparent silver because it is the object of wrong knowledge. There is no silver at all in that place (Sū. Bh. 4.1.15).

१३. सर्वथापि तु अन्यस्य अन्यधर्मविभासतां न व्यभिचरति।

13. Whatever it be, there is no deviation (from the rule) that the dharma of one is seen in another,

(13.1) Now it is being told that the essential meaning of all the three definitions is the same, the difference is only in delineating how the *mithyājñāna* is produced. None of them deviates from the definition of *adhyāsa* viz; 'स्मृतिरूपः परत्र पूर्वदृष्टावभासः' and the description of *adhyāsa* viz, formulated by Bhāsyakāra in the sentence 'अन्यस्य अन्यधर्मविभासतां न व्यभिचरति' in this sentence.

१४. तथा च लोके अनुभवः "शुक्तिका हि रजतवत् अवभासते", "एकश्चन्द्रः सद्वितीयवत्" इति।

14. and it is in the universal experience that 'shell appears like silver', 'one moon as if with a second'.

(14.1) Bhāsyakāra has given two examples for *adhyāsa*. It is important to remember that both of them describe the situation after the imposed *dharma* is rejected as a result of having obtained the right knowledge of the *adhiṣṭhāna*. After examining the shell and even after understanding that it is not silver, the shell continues to look like silver. Therefore, the knowledge 'shell looking like silver' is correct, not wrong, because knowledge of the shell separates it from the silver in the memory - 'शुक्तिका हि रजतवत्', 'एकः चन्द्रः सद्वितीयवत्'. In both the examples, 'shell looking like silver' and 'one moon looking like with a second', the 'vat' suffix refers to the rejection of a wrong knowledge after the right knowledge of the *adhiṣṭhāna* has been gained.*

(14.2) Now we should turn our attention to the roles of these two different examples. They are respectively associated with the foretold two types of *adhyāsa*. That is why Bhāsyakāra has used the phrase '*tad viparyayena*' in the beginning and

***(Question)** 'It is clear that the *adhyāsa* of *kṣetra* in *kṣetrajña* is a case of mistaken identity. But is the *adhyāsa* of *kṣetrajña* in the *kṣetra* a case of seeing one in many?' **(Answer)** It has already been shown that *prajña* is not different from person to person like *bahisprajña* and *antaprajña*, but only one in everybody (see sec. 8.3). But due to *adhyāsa*, even though there is one *prajña* only, a different *prajña* is associated with each person. This is a case of seeing many in one.

also in the end of the this introduction. The cause of the first *adhyāsa* from outside to inside is the ignorance of the nature of *pratyagātman*. When one gets the knowledge that he is the fourth *Ātman*, then there arises in him the following realization: Though he appears to be transacting in the proximity of the upādhis, he is actually the transactionless *Ātman*. The purpose of the shell-silver example is to confirm this only. ‘Even though it looks like silver, it is only shell’, is correct knowledge. Similarly, understanding that ‘even though he appears as if coupled with the features of the *kṣetra*, the *kṣetrajña* is actually different from the *kṣetra*. He is *turiya* only’ is the correct knowledge.

The cause of the second *adhyāsa* from inside to outside, is the ignorance of the real nature of the *kṣetra*. Multiplicity is seen in the *kṣetra* when viewed through forms, but in its true nature *kṣetra* is also the fourth *Ātman* only. ‘एतैः प्राणादिभिः आत्मनः अपृथग्भूतैः अपृथग्भावैरेष आत्मा रज्जुरिव सर्पादि विकल्पनास्तैः पृथगेवेत्यभिलक्षितो निश्चितो मूढैः । विवेकिनां तु रज्ज्वामिव कल्पिताः सर्पादयः नात्मव्यतिरेकेण प्राणादयस्सन्ति’ - These forms of *prāṇa* etc. which are not different from *Ātman* are viewed as different by ignorant people. But for the intelligent they are not different from the *Ātman* just as the imagined serpent is not different from the rope (Mā. Kā. Bh. 2.30).

For the one who knows this, the multiplicity seen through the *indriyas* is sublated in the *Ātman* and therefore the *kṣetra* is seen by him as the non dual *Ātman* only. This is *sarvātmabhaवा*, i.e. realising that nothing is different from himself. To confirm this, the example of one moon is given : ‘एकस्मिन् चन्द्रे तिमिरकृतानेकचन्द्रप्रपञ्चवत् अविद्याकृतो ब्रह्मणि नामरूपप्रपञ्चः विद्यया प्रविलापयितव्यः’ - Just as one moon is seen as many due to cataract, the world of multiplicity of names and forms cognised in *Brahman* is due to *avidyā*. This is to be sublated by *vidyā* (Sū. Bh. 3.2.21). One who has cataract in the eye sees two moons even though actually there is only one moon. He who does not have cataract sees only the one moon. In the same way, one who has *avidyā* sees multiplicity in the world of forms. But the realised *jñānī*, who has sublated the multiplicity, understands only oneness. This is because ‘कार्याकारोऽपि कारणस्य आत्मभूत एव’ - The forms of the effect, in their intrinsic nature, are nothing but the cause only (Sū. Bh. 2.1.18). The world is *kārya* and *Ātman* is its *kāraṇa*. Therefore, the *jñānī* sees only the non-dual Self in the *jagat*.

(14.3) In this way, the benefit of the *śārīraka mīmāṃsā* i.e. discussion on the *jīva*—is the obtainment of the *vidyā* of the oneness of *Ātman*. That is, from the point

of view of the effect, it is only *Ātman* which is appearing in the two forms as *kṣetra* and *kṣetrajña* respectively, through *parā* and *aparā prakṛti*. However, from the point of view of the cause, it is the unchangingly eternal, all pervading (like *ākāśa*), devoid of all modifications, eternally satisfied, without parts, self-illuminated *Ātman*. Obtaining the *vidyā* of the oneness of *Ātman* means realising that this *Ātman* is himself.

(14.4) *Anirvacanīyakhyāti*: This is the *khyāti* propounded by some others. Their thinking is as follows: One sees silver in the shell. If the silver were not there, it would not be possible to see it. ‘Things are seen though they are not present’, is the opinion of the Vijnānavādī Budhists. But this is not acceptable. Since one makes an effort to pick up the silver, it must be there. However, on examination of the shell it is realised that the silver is not there. Therefore, the silver seen in the shell is of the nature which cannot be described unambiguously such as ‘it is’ or ‘it is not’. In the same way the world superimposed on the *pratyagātman* is *sadasadbhyām anirvacanīyā* - that which cannot be described unambiguously as ‘it is’ or ‘it is not’.

This is not in accordance with the Bhāṣya because in the previous section the Bhāshyakara has clearly said ‘प्रत्येति एव हि केवलं रजतम् इति न तु तत्र रजतम् अस्ति’ - That there is silver is wrong knowledge. Silver is not at all in the shell. Therefore, the silver seen in the shell is *asat* and that it is seen is wrong knowledge. This is the unambiguous description of silver. So how can the statement that ‘this is *mithyā* silver about which it cannot be said whether it is there or not’ be made? A thing does not admit of options like ‘thus, not thus’, ‘exists, does not exist’. Options are a product of the *buddhi*. The actual knowledge about an object is not dependent on the *buddhi*, but only on the object itself. Indeed, in respect of one and the same pillar, the true cognition cannot be of the type: ‘It is a pillar, or something else, or a man’. In this case, ‘something else or a man’ is *mithyā jñāna*. ‘It is certainly a pillar’ is the true cognition because this knowledge depends only on the object itself and not the *buddhi* of the viewer - ‘न तु वस्त्वेवम् नैवम् अस्ति न अस्ति इति वा विकल्पयते। विकल्पनाः तु पुरुषबुद्ध्यपेक्षाः। न वस्तुयाथात्म्यज्ञानं पुरुषबुद्ध्यपेक्षम्। किं तर्हि? वस्तुतन्त्रम् एव तत्। नहि स्थाणौ एकस्मिन् स्थाणुर्वा पुरुषो वा अन्यो वा इति तत्त्वज्ञानं भवति। तत्र पुरुषः अन्यो वा इति मिथ्याज्ञानम्। स्थाणुः एव इति तत्त्वज्ञानमं वस्तुतन्त्रत्वात्’ (Sū Bh. 1.1.2). In the objects *jīva* etc. in one and the same *dharmī* there cannot be two opposing *dharma*s simultaneously like existence and non-existence. If there is the *dharma* of existence, there cannot be the other *dharma* of non-existence. Similarly, non-existence cannot be reconciled with existence. So, this

arhata siddhānta is not rational - 'जीवादिषु पदार्थेषु एकस्मिन् धर्मिणि सत्त्वासत्त्वयोः विरुद्धधर्मयोः असंभवात् सत्त्वे चैकस्मिन् धर्मे असत्त्वस्य धर्मान्तरस्य असम्भवात्, असत्त्वे च एवं सत्त्वस्य असम्भवात् असंगतमिदं अहंतं मतम्' (Sū. Bh. 2.2.23). For same reason, this *khyāti* is also irrational.

Therefore *sadasadbhyam anirvacanīyatva* - ambiguity in the description of existence or non-existence - is a meaningless imagination born out of the mixing up of right and wrong knowledge; it is not the knowledge of an existent object. If the silver seen in the shell is of a third variety which is neither existent nor non-existent, then its determination requires a seventh *pramāṇa* (other than the six available *pramāṇas*). For an existent object, its existence is fixed by one of the five *pramāṇas* - direct perception, inference, analogy, presumption or *śruti* and that which is not not an object for any of these five *pramāṇas* is deemed to be non-existent - 'उपलब्धिं लक्षणं प्राप्तस्य अनुपलब्धेः अभावः वस्त्वन्तरस्य' (Sū. Bh. 2.2.17).

For some people, there is another *pramāṇa* which determines the non-existence of a thing - the *anupalabdhi pramāṇa*. Agreeing on this, there are a total of six *pramāṇas*, five for existence and one for non-existence. This ambiguous silver being neither, its existence can be fixed only by a seventh *pramāṇa*. But it is not right to search for a *pramāṇa* to decide the existence of an imagined object. 'न अयं साधुः अध्यवसायः यतः प्रमाणप्रवृत्त्यप्रवृत्तिपूर्वकौ संभवासंभवौ अवधार्येते न पुनः संभवासंभवपूर्विके प्रमाणप्रवृत्त्यप्रवृत्ती' - Such a decision is not proper because it is through the functioning or non-functioning of a *pramāṇa* that the existence or non-existence of an object is established and not vice-versa, i.e. from existence or non-existence the functioning or non-functioning of a *pramāṇa* is to be decided (Sū. Bh. 2.2.28).

'There is no need for a seventh *pramāṇa*; the existence of this ambiguous silver is established through direct perception, inference, presumption and *śruti* also', he thus continues with his obstinate claim.

'This is wrong because, these *pramāṇas* are applicable only to things which exist. If they were applicable to even objects which are neither existing nor non-existing, who will have faith in these *pramāṇas*? Moreover, when the existence of an object is proved through one *pramāṇa*, one does not look for another *pramāṇa* to prove it. Your saying that all the four *pramāṇas* can prove its existence shows that you yourself have doubts about its existence.*

*But Naiyayikas (logicians) say that there could be several *pramāṇas* for the same object; they are therefore called *pramāṇa samplavavādis*.

'For you, there is another question: you say that the *jagat*, superimposed on the *pratyagātman* is *sadasadbhyām anirvacanīya*. Conversely, when the *pratyagātman* is superimposed on the *jagat*, is he also *sadasadbhyām anirvacanīya*? Is *pratyagātman* also subject to the ambiguity whether he exists or does not exist? Such imaginations are absurd.'*

Objection: 'It is well known that the *jagat* is *tatvānyatvābhyaṁ anirvacanīya* (Sū.Bh.2.1.27). Here *tat* is *sat* and *anyat* is *asat*. Therefore, if we say we have not said anything new, then?'

Answer: *Tatvānyatvābhyaṁ anirvacanīyatwa* propounded by Bhāṣyakāra is in no way related to the *sadasadbhyam anirvacanīyatwa* propounded by you. It is entirely different. In Bhāṣyakāra's *kārya-kāraṇa-ananyatva* (the non-difference between effect and cause) *tat* represents the *upādāna kāraṇa* (the material cause) while *anyat* refers to its *kārya* (effect). *Ananyatva* (non-difference) is the relation between the two 'कार्यस्य कारणात्मत्वं न तु कारणस्य कार्यात्मत्वम्' - Effect is not different from cause but cause is different from effect (Sū. Bh. 2.1.19). This *kārya* is not *asat* like the silver seen in the shell; it is only *anṛta*; that is, subject to change; it is *vyavahārayoga* (capable of transacting) and even when its form is changing it is *ananya* from its non-changing (*satya*) cause. That is why at any one moment there are two ways of viewing the same object: from the point of view of the cause and from point of view of the effect. From the causal point of view, a pot is unchanging-*satya*, i.e. it is nothing but clay only. From the point of view of effect it is *anṛta* (changing) pot. That is why Bhāṣyakāra has called the *kārya* pot *tatvānyatvābhyaṁ anirvacanīya* 'तत्त्वान्यत्वनिरूपणस्य अशक्यत्वम्' - meaning thereby that there is ambiguity in expressing whether it is *tatva* or *anyatva* (different from *tatva*). But there is no cause-effect relationship between shell and

***(Doubt):** 'In the Gītā (13.12), it is said that Brahman cannot be described as either existing or non-existing - न सत्तनासदुच्चर्ते. How is this to be understood in terms of the above discussion? **(Answer):** In the shell-silver issue, it is a matter of *pratyakṣa* - in wrong understanding it is silver and in correct understanding it is shell. But Brahman is a matter for śruti only and not any other *pramāṇa*. However, its import can be understood by reflecting on *prajñā* experienced in *suṣupti*. His existence cannot be conveyed through any word representing some category (*jāti*), action (*kriyā*), quality (*guna*) or connection (*sambandha*). However, his existence cannot be denied because it is one's own Self. So, in this sense, it is either *sat* nor *asat*.

silver. The silver seen in the shell cannot be made into different types of ornaments, i.e., it is not *vyavahāra-yogya*. A fool running to pick up that silver does not bestow on it *vyavahāra-yogyata*. ‘कार्यं त्रिषु कालेषु सत्त्वं न व्यभिचरति’ - *Karya* in all the three times never ceases to exist (Sū. Bh. 2.1.16). But the silver seen in the shell never existed. If it did not exist even while seen in the shell, then, when else could it have existed?

१५. कथं पुनः प्रत्यगात्मनि अविषये अध्यासो विषय तद्भर्मणाम्? सर्वो हि पुरोऽवस्थिते विषये विषयान्तरमध्यस्यति। युष्मत् प्रत्ययापेतस्य च प्रत्यगात्मनि अविषयत्वं ब्रवीषि?

15. ‘If so, how can there be *adhyāsa* of an observable or its features on the inner Self which is not an observable? All do *adhyāsa* of an observable on another observable perceived in front. You also assert unobservability of the Self.’

(15.1) Earlier, after defining *adhyāsa*, its feature was described as ‘the *dharma* of one superimposed on another’. Two examples were given, one for each of the two *adhyāsas*. But when these examples are used to explain the *adhyāsa* of the *kṣetra* on *kṣetrajña*, then two objections are raised: In the shell-silver example, both shell and silver are *pratyakṣa*. Therefore, while seeing the shell, the *adhyāsa* of silver on it is possible. But the *pratyagātman prājña*, unlike the shell, is not available for *pratyakṣa*. Therefore, the *adhyāsa* of *kṣetra* on *kṣetrajña* is not possible. This is the first objection. The second objection is as follows: The *pratyagātman* is not a *viṣaya* but only the *viṣayi*. He is unrelated to all *viṣayas*. Therefore, *adhyāsa* is not possible.

१६. उच्यते। न तावत् एकान्तेन अविषयः अस्मत्प्रत्ययविषयत्वात् अपरोक्षत्वाच्च प्रत्यगात्मप्रसिद्धेः।

16. The reply is - Not unobservable as a rule because, it is the well known experience of everyone that he is an object of I-awareness.

(16.1) The *siddhānti* answers: The objection that because the *prājña* is not a *viṣaya* and therefore *adhyāsa* is not possible, is taken up first. It is true that *prājña* is the *viṣayi* and not a *viṣaya* - but not as a rule; because, *prājña* is being known through ‘I - awareness’. It is true that in *suṣupti* there is no awareness of any type. Therefore, when anyone is asked, ‘How were you in *suṣupti*?’ He would only say ‘I do not know’. Indra also said: ‘नाह खल्वयमेवं सम्प्रत्यात्मानं जानाति अयम् अहम् अस्मि इति नो एवमानि भूतानि।

विनाशम् एव अपीतो भवति । नाहमत्र भोग्यं पश्यामि' - At that time he does not know himself nor other things. He gets destroyed. I do not see anything useful here (Cā. 8.11.1). Indra is very intelligent. Therefore, he said to Prajāpati: 'He is not understanding anything' etc., making *prājña* an object. But ordinary people say, 'I did not know anything', making *prājña* an object non-different from oneself. That is, the *prājña* who is not an object for 'I-awareness', is made an object of 'I-awareness'. Thus, *prājña* for the very intelligent is knowable only, but for the unintelligent, he is the knower and also a knowable. Irrespective of the fact that one is intelligent or not, the *prājña* is in the immediate awareness of both. He is *aparokṣa*, i.e., neither directly perceived as an object nor indirectly conjectured; but well known as the inside Self.

(16.2) Question: How can *prājña*, who is the knower, become a known?

Answer: The *jīva* does not know the *prājña* clearly though he is himself. *Jīva* identifies himself as the knower only through his activity of knowing during wakefulness or dreams and enjoys material pleasures or their memories respectively. In *susupti*, there is neither the activity of knowing nor the activity of enjoying. Therefore, he gets the feeling that he does not exist or is destroyed. Actually, knowership in the absence of the activity of knowing and being blissfully happy in the absence of the activity of enjoyment are his natures. Not knowing this, and accustomed to his *adhyāsa* in the *buddhi*, he grasps himself negatively in *susupti* through non-action saying 'I did not know anything. I slept happily'*.

An example for this is as follows: When a person loses his eyes, he will be seeing the loss of the eyes and the consequent loss of the activity of seeing. But due to his habit of the superimposition of the eyes on himself he says: 'I am blind, I cannot see'. In the same way, when he is awake, he understands himself in *susupti* negatively through inaction because of not knowing his inherent nature. As a result of making himself a knowable object in this way, the *adhyāsa* of the body etc. on himself is possible.

**१७. न चायमस्ति नियमः पुरोऽवस्थित एव विषये विषयान्तरम् अध्यसितव्य-
मिति । अप्रत्यक्षेऽपि हि आकाशे बालाः तलमलिनतादि अध्यस्यन्ति ।**

17. (And) there is no rule that an observable can be superimposed only on

*In this way he superimposes knowership and enjoyership on the *prājña*, who is actually neither knower nor enjoyer.

an observable perceived in front; children do *adhyāsa* of (a) surface and impurity on the sky even though the sky is not perceived in front.

(17.1) Even if the *adhiṣṭhāna* is not *pratyakṣa*, *adhyāsa* is possible. For example, *ākāśa* has no shape or colour; so, unlike the shell it is not *pratyakṣa*. Without any *upādhi* (like air), *ākāśa* is not an object for the ear also. Yet, ignorant people superimpose on the *ākāśa* a blue color and the shape of an inverted hemisphere. In actuality, when dust, smoke etc. present in the *ākāśa* scatter the sunlight, only then does the predominant blue color become visible (Mā. Kā. 3.8). Then, just like a transparent crystal appears blue because of a blue flower in the background, this scattered blue color makes the colourless *ākāśa* seem blue. Ignorant people then understand the *ākāśa* to be blue. This is *adhyāsa* because it is actually not blue. Similarly, though the *ākāśa* appears like an inverted hemisphere, it has actually no shape. Therefore, that *ākāśa* is like an inverted hemisphere is also *adhyāsa* only.

१८. एवम् अविरुद्धः प्रत्यगात्मन्यपि अनात्माध्यासः।

18. In this way, there is no contradiction in the *adhyāsa* of the non-Self on the inner-Self.

(18.1) Two objections had been raised about *adhyāsa* on the *pratyagātman*. They are: That *pratyagātman* is not a *viṣaya* and that he is not *pratyakṣa*—and so *adhyāsa* is not possible. After refuting them, it was proved that the *adhyāsa* of *anātman* in *prājña* is possible. Here, *anātman* means the *kṣetra* of body etc, distinctly different from the *prājña*.

१९. तमेतम् एवं लक्षणं अध्यासं पंडिता अविद्येति मन्यन्ते। तद्विवेकेन च वस्तुस्वरूपावधारणं विद्यामाहुः। तत्र एवं सति यत्र यदध्यासः तत्कृतेन दोषेण गुणेन वा अणुमात्रेणापि स न संबध्यते।

19. Scholars consider *adhyāsa* of this nature as *avidyā*. Recognition of its distinctiveness and the determination of the nature of that thing—they call as *vidyā*. This being so, where there is *adhyāsa* of one on another, even an iota of the good or the bad of the one does not stick to the other.

(19.1) The *ajñāna* of the shell is the cause of the *adhyāsa* of silver in it. In the same way, it is the *ajñāna* of the *adhiṣṭhāna* which is the cause of *adhyāsa* anywhere.

Adhyāsa is the effect of this *ajñāna*. But here *adhyāsa* itself is called *avidyā*. How is it possible? It is like this: Just as an act of madness is also called madness, many times a *kārya* is often given the name of its *kāraṇa*. It is in this sense that *adhyāsa* has been called *avidyā* here. However, when it is said that *avidyā* is the *kāraṇa* of *adhyāsa*, it does not mean that it is the *nimitta* or *upadāna*; the word *kārana* is used in the sense of reason. Because of the reason that the inherent nature of the *adhiṣṭhāna* is unknown, one wrongly understands it on the basis of some similarity. Not knowing the inherent nature of the *adhiṣṭhāna* is *ajñāna* - the absence of the knowledge of its inherent nature. This *ajñāna* is lost with the knowledge of the *adhiṣṭhāna*; with this the *adhyāsa* is also lost. Bhāsyakāra conveys this as follows: 'यदि ज्ञानाभावः यदि संशयज्ञानं यदि विपरीतज्ञानं वा उच्यते अज्ञानम् इति, सर्वं हि तत् ज्ञानेन एव निवर्त्यते' - Whether it is the absence of *jñāna*, or doubtful *jñāna*, or wrong *jñāna*, whichever of these is called *ajñāna*, all of them are destroyed by *jñāna* only (Br Bh 3.3.1). Here *jñānābhāva* is the literal meaning of the word *ajñāna*, that it is *jñāna-virodhī* is its intended meaning. Further, *ajñāna* and *avidyā* are one and the same. 'भाव प्रतियोगी हि अभावः' - *Vidyā pratiyogi* is *avidyā*' (Taittriya Bhāṣya Introduction).

(19.2) Next, determination of the *swarūpa* of the object is *vidyā*. Now which is the object spoken of here? That which is the *adhiṣṭhāna* for *adhyāsa*. In the first *adhyāsa*, *prājña* is the *adhiṣṭhāna*, in the reverse *adhyāsa*, *jagat* is the *adhiṣṭhāna*. Both these are the same Ātman. He is the object whose *swarūpa* is to be known to get rid of *adhyāsa*. *Jagat* and *prājña* i.e. *kṣetra* and *kṣetrājña*, are both two forms of this same Ātman. These forms are not superimposed by the *kṣetrājña* on the Ātman; it is impossible for the *jīva* to do *adhyāsa* in Ātman. This will be discussed later (section 25.1). These two are forms willingly taken up by Ātman for the *bhoga* and *apavarga* of *kṣetrājña*. *Kṣetra* is *kārya-rūpa*, while *kṣetrājña* is *akārya-rūpa*. Just as clay appears in the form of pots etc, Ātman manifesting through forms is *kṣetra*. Just as clay continues to be clay though appearing in the form of pots etc, *kṣetra* continues to be Ātman though appearing with forms.

Further, *kṣetrājña* is the manifestation of Ātman, conditioned by the *upādhi* of *prāṇa*. Just as the crystal continues to be transparent though appearing as coloured because of the *upādhi* of a flower, *kṣetrājña* is indeed *nirupādhik-ātman*, though appearing otherwise in association with *upādhi*. This *kṣetrājña* has done the *adhyāsa* of the distinctly different *kṣetra* on himself, due to *avidyā*. This is clearly visible in his activities during *jāgrat* and *swapna*. In *susupti* there is no *adhyāsa* because there is

no connection of the *kṣetrajña* with the *kṣetra*. ‘सुषुप्तकाले स्वेन आत्मना सता संपन्नः सन् सम्यक् प्रसीदतीति जाग्रत्स्वप्नयोःविषयेन्द्रियसंयोगजातं कालुच्चं जहाति’ - During *suṣupti* (the *jīva*) is totally contented because he is merged in his own *sad-ātman*. Therefore, he is free from all faults which appear in *jāgrat* and *swapna* due to his association with *viṣaya* and *indriyas* (Cā. Bh. 8.3.4). However, the absence of the *vidyā* that he is *Ātman* remains. For obtaining the *jñāna* of *Ātman*, this is the only obstruction. ‘तत्त्वं अप्रतिबोधमात्रमेव हि बीजं प्राज्ञत्वे निमित्तम्’ - The only reason for *prājñatva* is the ignorance of *tattva* (Mā. Kā. Bh. 1.11). The moment he understands that he is *Ātman* through *śravaṇa*, *manana* and *nididhysāna* of *śāstra* sentences, his *prājñatva* is also lost. This is the *vidyā* of *vastu-swarūpa-avadhāraṇa* discussed here.

Question: Is not *agrahāṇa* (absence of *vidyā*), a *kṣetradharmā*? How can there be *agrahāṇa* in the *kṣetrajña* who is not at all connected with the *kṣetra*?

Answer: ‘अग्रहणसंशय विपरीतप्रत्यया: सन्निमित्ताः करणस्यैव कस्यचिद् भवितुम् अर्हन्ति, न ज्ञातुः क्षेत्रज्ञस्य’ - The *pratyayās* of lack of knowledge, wrong knowledge and doubtful knowledge are all *dharma*s of some *karaṇas* only and not of *kṣetrajña*. Not only this. The *vidyāpratyaya* which is the destroyer of all these three types of *avidyā*, is also a *dharma* of the *kṣetra* (G. Bh. 2.21), because it is obtained only through the mind ‘मनसैवानुदष्टव्यम्’ (Br.Bh. 4.4.16).

Objection: “No. *Avidyā* is of *kṣetrajña*. Since he is the *jñāta* of *vidyā*, *avidyā* has to be his. For example, when one is unable to see an object in front, he understands that he is blind. Similarly, *kṣetrajña* who is in grief is the one who is having *avidyā*.”

Clarification: It is not like that because, the cause for not seeing the object could be different. If the knower is to be decided as blind when an object in front is not being seen, the connection of the knower with the object is to be determined by the knower himself. It cannot be determined by some other knower. When he is engaged in looking at the object, he cannot simultaneously determine his connection with it also. So, it is not possible to conclude that the knower is blind. If he wants to infer his blindness he must simultaneously engage himself in looking at the eye and his own connection with it. This is again not possible. So, he has to take the next steps of simultaneously engaging himself in seeing the mind and his connection with it, the *buddhi* and his connection with it and so on. This is an endless regression. To avoid it, he has to concede that he is always the seer and the cause for not seeing the object lies somewhere only in the *kṣetra*. Nevertheless, as long as *adhyāsa* is present in his *jāgrat* and *swapna*, *agrahāṇa* in *kṣetrajña* is accepted. (G.Bh. 13.2)

(19.3) Next point we note is this: Just as the shell remains undefiled by the *adhyāsa* of silver in it, the *anātman's adhyāsa* does not bring about even a tinge of defilement in the *swarūpa* of *pratyagātman*. That is, the faults of *anṛtatva*, *jadatva* and *parichinatva* of the *anātman* do not even touch the *pratyagātman*. Similarly, in the reverse case, the *adhyāsa* of the *dharma*s of the *pratyagātman* on the *anātmabuddhi* and outside objects does not bring *ātmatva* in them. That is, the *ānandamayatva* and *jñātr̄va* of the *pratyagātman* are not acquired by them.

२०. तमेतम् अविद्याख्यम् आत्मानात्मनोरितरेतराध्यासं पुरस्कृत्य सर्वे प्रमाणप्रमेय व्यवहारा लौकिका वैदिकाश्च प्रवृत्ताः। सर्वाणि च शास्त्राणि विधिप्रतिषेधमोक्षपराणि। कथं पुनः अविद्यावद्विषयाणि प्रत्यक्षादीनि प्रमाणानि शास्त्राणि च इति? उच्यते। देहेन्द्रियादिषु अहं ममाभिमान रहितस्य प्रमातृत्वानुपपत्तौ प्रमाणप्रवृत्त्यनुपपत्तेः। न हि इन्द्रियाणि अनुपादाय प्रत्यक्षादिव्यवहारः संभवति। न च अधिष्ठानमन्तरेण इन्द्रियाणां व्यवहारः संभवति। न च अनध्यस्तात्मभावेन देहेन कश्चित् व्याप्रियते। न च एतस्मिन् सर्वस्मिन् असति असंगस्य आत्मनः प्रमातृत्वमुपपद्यते। न च प्रमातृत्वमन्तरेण प्रमाण-प्रवृत्तिरस्ति। तस्मात् अविद्यावद्विषयाणयेव प्रत्यक्षादीनि प्रमाणानि शास्त्राणि च।

20. All worldly and Vedic activities involving the valid means of knowledge (*pramāṇa*) and the corresponding objects (*prameya*) are indulged only presupposing this mutual superimposition called *avidyā*; so also the *śāstras* - scriptures - dealing with injunction (*vidhi*), prohibition (*nिषेध*) and emancipation (*mokṣa*). How again, *pramāṇas* like *pratyakṣa*—direct perception etc. and *śāstras* are matters applicable (only) to one with *avidyā*? We say: *pramāṇas* do not work in the case of one who cannot have knowership, because of the lack of conceit of 'I' and 'mine' in the body, in the sense organs etc. Activity of direct perception etc. is not possible without employing the sense organs. Sense organs cannot function without the body. (Therefore) no one without *adhyāsa* (in them) can function through the body. When none of these is present, the unattached *Ātman* cannot become a knower. Without the knower, the *pramāṇa* cannot function. Therefore, *pramāṇas* such as direct perception etc. and the *śāstra* are matters related only to one with *avidyā*.

20.1 The purpose of this section is to show that all *vyavahāra* takes place only on the basis of *adhyāsa*. *Adhyāsa* of what on whom? ‘आत्मानात्मनोः इतरेतराध्यासः’ - of the Ātman on the *anātman* and conversely’. Here it is very clear that the Ātman is *kṣetrajña* and the *anātman* is *kṣetra*. ‘आत्मशब्दस्य निरूपपदस्य प्रत्यगात्मनि गवादि शब्दवत् निरूपत्वात्’ - Like the word cow etc, the word Ātman without any prefix refers only to *pratyagātman*’ (Cā. Bh. 6.8.7). In phrases like Ātma-*anātma viveka* etc the same rule applies. The literal meaning of Ātman without a prefix cannot refer to the *Suddhātman* because, being *sarvātman* there is nothing like *anātman* for him. Every *vyavahāra*, is meant for *hāna*—i.e. rejecting something disliked or *upādāna*—obtaining something which is liked. One who does not have such desires, will not be engaging himself in any *vyavahāra*. Before starting a *vyavahāra*, one has to first decide through *pramāṇa* what is *heya* (that which is to be rejected) and *upādēya* (to be accepted). The one who takes decision about the *prameya* on the basis of the *pramāṇa* is called the *pramāta*. *Pramāṭṛtva* (sense of being the *pramāta*) is born out of *adhyāsa* only. How? In this way: The one who does *adhyāsa* of *karaṇakriya* (activity of the *karaṇas* like eyes, ears mind etc) on himself is the *pramāta* who says ‘I saw, I heard, I decided’ etc. That is, only one who has *abhimāna* (attachment to the body, senses and *buddhi*) can alone become the *pramāta*. The *kṣetrajña*'s *abhimāna* in the *kṣetra* is *adhyāsa*—the union of *kṣetra* and *kṣetrajña*. This is the basis of all *vyavahāra*. That is why all *vyavahāra* is *avidyaka* (due to *avidya*). Therefore, they are only for the ignorant. Later, by comparing with the behavior of beasts, that the *vyavahāra* of human beings is also *avidyaka* is reinforced.*

२१. पश्वादिभिश्च अविशेषात्। यथा हि पश्वादयः शब्दादिभिः श्रोत्रादीनां संबन्धे सति शब्दादि विज्ञाने प्रतिकूले जाते ततो निवर्तन्ते, अनुकूले च प्रवर्तन्ते। यथा दंडोद्यतकरं पुरुषम् अभिमुखमुपलभ्य मां हन्तुमयमिच्छति इति पलायितुमारभन्ते। हरिततृण पूर्णपाणिमुपलभ्य तं प्रति अभिमुखी भवन्ति। एवं पुरुषा अपि व्युत्पन्नचित्ताः कूरदृष्टीन् आक्रोशतः खड्गोद्यतकरान् बलवतः उपलभ्य ततो निवर्तन्ते, तद्विपरीतान् प्रति प्रवर्तन्ते। अतः समानः पश्वादिभिः पुरुषाणां प्रमाणप्रमेय व्यवहारः। पश्वादीनां च प्रसिद्धः

*In this paragraph of the *Bhāṣya*, the meaning of the word *vyutpanna-cittāḥ* is ‘intelligent people with discriminating ability’ and not *jñānīs* - as some say – because of their similarly with beasts in their behavioral pattern.

अविवेकपुरस्सरः प्रत्यक्षादि व्यवहारः। तत्सामान्यदर्शनात् व्युत्पत्तिमतामपि पुरुषाणां प्रत्यक्षादि व्यवहारः तत्कालः समानः इति निश्चीयते।

21. Also because not being different from beasts etc. Just like when the ears etc. come into contact with sound etc. if the cognition of sound etc. is unfavourable they withdraw from it and if the sound is favorable they proceed towards it, just as (when) they see a man with a raised stick in hand they run away thinking 'he desires to kill me', but approach him when they see him with his hand full of green grass. In the same way, men - even the intelligent - recede in the presence of shouting sturdy (people) of fierce looks with raised swords, but approach men of opposite nature. Therefore, the *pramāṇa-prameya* activity of men is the same as that of the beasts. It is well-known that the activity of beasts with regard to direct perception etc, is without discrimination. Because of this apparent similarity, it can be concluded that during the activity of *pratyakṣa* etc of even wise people, the *vyavahāra* is the same.

(21.1) Question: If all *vyavahāra* is due to *avidyā*, how to explain the *vyavahāra* that is seen in a *jñāni*?

Answer: It happens through *prakṛti* and not due to *avidyā*. 'प्रकृतिः च त्रिगुणात्मिका सर्वकार्यकरण विषयाकारेण परिणता पुरुषस्य भोगापवर्गार्थकर्तव्यतया देहेन्द्रियाद्याकारेण संहन्यते' - The *prakṛti* of three *gunas* modifies into the shapes of all the *kārya*, *karana* and objects and manifests as the body, *indriyas* etc for man's worldly enjoyment and *mokṣa* (G. Bh. Introduction to 13th Chapter). 'यदि तावत् भौतिकानि करणानि ततः भूतोत्पत्ति प्रलयाभ्याम् एव एषाम् उत्पत्तिप्रलयौ भवतः' - The physical *karanas* of the body are created along with the creation of the other objects (Sū. Bh 2.3.15). Some people say that the *karanas* are made of *tanmātras*. This is not correct. The *tanmātras* belong to *prakṛti*, while the *karanas* are products of the *trivṛtkṛta vikṛti*. 'Karana and *viśaya* belong to same category, not to different categories' (Br. Bh. 2.4.11). That is why the *karanas* interact only with their respective *viśayas*. When the *anṛta rūpa* and the *anṛta netra* come in contact, the *anṛta pratyaya* of the *rūpa* is born in *anṛta buddhi*. The *pratyayas* of *śabda* etc are also born in the same way. This is an activity of the *prakṛti*, not of the *puruṣa*. *Prakṛtistha puruṣa* i.e. one who thinks he is the *prakṛti*, i.e. the one having *avidyā*—considers himself a *pramāṭa*. But the *jñāni* understands that 'इन्द्रियाणि इन्द्रियार्थेषु वर्तन्ते इति धारयन्' - The *indriyas*

are interacting with their corresponding objects (Gītā 3.28), and remains as a witness for this action. This means that the *vyavahāra* in his body happens without his doership. ‘लोकव्यवहार सामान्यदर्शनेन तु लौकिकैः आरेपितकर्तृत्वे भिक्षाटनादौ कर्मणि कर्ता भवति स्वानुभवेन तु शास्त्रप्रमाणजनितेन अकर्ता एव’ - Since it appears as the *vyavahāra* of common people, in their view, while roaming around for his *bhikṣa*, he too is a doer; But in his personal realization brought about by the *śāstra pramāṇa* he is a non-doer only (G. Bh. 4.22).

21.2 In this way, *prakṛti* is the cause for the execution of *karma*. Further, how the motivation for starting an action is produced in his *karaṇas* is to be told. Motivation to initiate *karma* is due to his *prārabdha*. ‘शरीरारम्भकस्य कर्मणः नियतफलत्वात् सम्यग्ज्ञानप्राप्तौ अपि अवश्यम्भाविनी प्रवृत्तिः वाङ्मनःकायानाम् लब्धवृत्तेः कर्मणः बलीयस्त्वात् मुक्तेष्वादि प्रवृत्तिवत्’ - The *prārabdha* that is the cause for the body, surely brings about its fruit even though there is right knowledge and that is responsible for the motivation seen in his speech, mind and body. This is because the *karma* is more powerful like a released arrow (Br.Bh. 1.4.7).

(21.3) Question: Since motivation is caused by *avidyā*, can it be said that there is a remnant of *avidyā* in *jñānī*?

Answer: It is not so. In the case of the *jñānī*, the motivation occurs only in his *karaṇas*; not in him. As long as the momentum of *prārabdha* exists - i.e., till the present body falls off—the *vyavahāra*, which is *kṣetra dharma* continues. Seeing this, if others think that he may not have *Ātma-jñāna*, it is meaningless. ‘कथं हि एकस्य स्वहृदयप्रत्ययं ब्रह्मवेदनं देहधारणं च अपरेण प्रतिक्षेप्तुं शक्येत? श्रुतिस्मृतिषु च स्थितप्रज्ञलक्षणनिर्देशेन एतत् एव निरुच्यते’ - How can some other person deny the coexistence of *Brahman*-realization with the bodily activity which is his personal experience. It is precisely this situation that is explained as the features of *sthithaprajña* in *śrutis* and *smṛtis* (Sū. Bh. 4.1.15).

(21.4) In this way in *vyavahāra*, whether it is a *jñānī* or an *ajñānī*, *pravṛtti* and *prakṛti* both are there. What is the contribution of each and how much? To decide this we move forward. *Pravṛtti* is the cause for starting of any *karma*. But for the *karma* to happen, *prakṛti* is the cause. That is for the *karma*, *pravṛtti* is the *nimitta kāraṇa* (essential cause) and *prakṛti* is the *upādāna kāraṇa* (material cause). *Avidyā* produces *pravṛtti* in the form ‘I have to do this *karma*’ and, when the *karma* is over, it generates *kartṛtwa* (doership) in the form ‘I have done this *karma*’. But during the process when *karma* is being done *avidyā* is not be the cause, since any *kārya* takes place because of *prakṛti*. ‘प्रकृतेः क्रियमाणानि गुणैः कर्मणि सर्वशः । अहङ्कार विमूढात्मा कर्ता अहम् इति

मन्यते' (Gītā 3.27). Therefore, a *sādhaka* has to decide on the basis of the *śāstras* which *karma* is worth doing ‘तस्मात् शास्त्रं प्रमाणं ते कार्यकार्यव्यवस्थितौ’ (Gītā 16.24). Then for that *karma*, he has to become only the *nimitta* (instrument to carry it out) ‘निमित्तमात्रं भव’ (Gītā 11.33). He should not be attached to the fruits of the *karma* ‘मा कर्मफलहेतुर्भूः’ (Gītā 2.47). As a result of this he gains *citta śuddhi* (purity of mind, *buddhi* and *citta*) which prepares the way for his obtaining *vidyā*.

(21.5) In this way both *avidyā* and *prakṛti* are jointly responsible for any activity. This combination, whether in the activity of *jīva* or *Īśwara*, is called *avidyā-laksāṇa prakṛti* (G. Bh 5.14). Referring to *Īśwara*'s activity of creation etc, it is also called *avidyā-samiyukta prakṛti* i.e. *avidyā* coupled with *prakṛti* ‘अविद्यासंयुक्तम् अव्यक्तम्’ (G. Bh. 7.4). *Īśwara* does not have *pravṛtti* because He has no *avidyā*. Therefore, *śruti* says - ‘अनेन जीवेनात्मना अनुप्रविश्य नामस्ते व्याकरवाणि’ - I will create the names and forms by entering into the *jīva-ātman*' (Cā. 6.3.2). Thus getting *pravṛtti* through *jīva*, *Īśwara* handles the activity of creation etc. This combination of *jīva*'s *avidyā* with *māyā* is known as *Īśwara*'s *ahamkāra*. Incidentally, this demonstrates that *avidyā* and *prakṛti* are not synonymous.

By now it has been established that all worldly activities (*vyavahāra*) are based on *avidyā*. But, the Vedic activities are of a different type; i.e. they are based on an awareness that the *kṣetrajña* is different from the *kṣetra*. In the next section it is demonstrated that though it is of a different type, even Vedic activities are based on *avidyā*.

२२. शास्त्रीये तु व्यवहारे यद्यपि बुद्धिपूर्वकारी न अविदित्वा आत्मनः परलोक- संबंधम् अधिक्रियते, तथापि न वेदान्तवेद्यम् अशनायाद्यतीतम् अपेत ब्रह्मक्षत्रादिभेदम् असंसारी आत्मतत्त्वम् अधिकारे अपेक्ष्यते। अनुपयोगात् अधिकार विरोधाच्च। प्राक्च तथा भूतात्मविज्ञानात् प्रवर्तमानं शास्त्रम् अविद्यावद्विषयत्वं नातिवर्तते। तथा हि “ब्राह्मणो यजेत्” इत्यादीनि शास्त्राणि आत्मनि वर्णश्रिमवयोऽवस्थादि विशेषाध्यासम् आश्रित्य प्रवर्तन्ते।

22. It is true, that one who does not know that he can have contact with other worlds, could get the eligibility to do scriptural activities intentionally. Nevertheless, the eligibility does not require (the knowledge of) the essence

Ātman known only through Vedānta which transcends hunger etc, is free from differentiations of Brāhmaṇa Kṣatriya etc, free from birth and death—because, it is not useful and also opposed to the eligibility (for doing *karma*). Śāstras which operate earlier to the knowledge of the *Ātman*, cannot be the topic of one other than the ignorant. That is why śāstras like ‘Brāhmaṇa shall do *yajña*’ etc proceeds on the basis of *adhyāsa* in the *Ātman* like caste, state of life, age, condition etc.

(22.1) It is very clear that *adhyāsa* in the body is responsible for all worldly activities because they are based on the desire for woman, home etc. But in Vedic activities it is not so; there is some difference. For activities prescribed by the *śruti* like *Jyotiṣṭoma* etc done with the desire of heaven etc and activities prescribed by the *smṛti*s like *śrāddha*, *tarpaṇa* etc done with desire of *pitr-loka* etc, are based on the faith that one is different from the body. This is a faith developed on the basis of *śāstra*. But, that one is different from the body is actually experienced in *suṣupti*. Just as *adhyāsa* continues after waking up inspite of the experience of *suṣupti*, it continues even for him who is having this faith. For that matter, the desire for a superior body which gives greater pleasure and comforts is the basis for performing the activities prescribed by *śruti* and *smṛti*. With a resolution to obtain *swarga* etc one does these activities intentionally. For such people, śāstras prescribe a *karma* for each such desire. The competence for *karma* is prescribed like this - ‘अर्थी समर्थो विद्वान् शास्त्रेण अविपर्युदस्तः’ - One who is desirous of the fruit, capable of performing the *karma*, knows the correct procedures to be followed and one not prohibited by the *śāstra*, can perform that particular *karma*.

Therefore, *karma* is based on differences like one’s *varṇa* (*brāhmaṇa* etc), *āśrama* (*brahmacarya* etc), one’s age, situation etc. For example, a widower is not competent to do many of these activities. A *brāhmaṇa* cannot do the Rājasūya *yajña* etc. Therefore, Vedic *karma* is also based on *avidyā*, i.e. it is meant only for one who has *avidyā*. *Ātma-vidyā* is not useful for *karma*. It is indeed even against *karma*. There is meaning for *karma* till he has not understood that he is the *Ātman*, which is known only through the Upaniṣads, which is free from the problems of the body like hunger etc, above the differences of *brāhmaṇa*, *kṣatriya* etc and free from worldly life; not after he has understood the *Ātman*. To grasp the meaning of these statements, it is sufficient to remember the features of *prājña* during *suṣupti*. He has no instruments,

no coming and going and he is brimful of *ānanda*. How can he do *karma*? Why would he do it? In this way, when one is becoming free from *karma* even by staying in *prājñatva*, how is it possible to have any connection with *karma*, when one stays in the *Ātman* who is *sākṣi* even for the *prājña*. It is impossible.

(22.2) Next is about *niṣkāma karma*. *Karma* done with desire strengthens *adhyāsa*; conversely, *karma* done without desire helps to destroy *adhyāsa*. *Karma* done without a desire to enjoy its fruit and done exclusively for pleasing *Īśwara* bestows the grace of *Īśwara* which is absolutely necessary for *Ātma-vidyā*. From this results *vairāgya*. Later on, *śāstras* prescribe *dhyāna karma* as internal *sādhana*. Though *niṣkāma karma* and *dhyāna* both are *karma*, they purify the *buddhi* and facilitate the obtaining of knowledge. In this way, whatever the *karma*, it concerns only the one with *avidyā*; not the one having *vidyā*.

२३. अध्यासो नाम अतस्मिन् तद्वद्धिः इत्यवोचाम। तद्यथा पुत्रभार्यादिषु विकलेषु सकलेषु वा अहमेव विकलः सकलो वा इति बाह्य धर्मान् आत्मनि अध्यस्यति। तथा देहधर्मान् स्थूलोऽहम् कृशोऽहम् गौरोऽहम् तिष्ठामि गच्छामि लंघयामि च इति। तथा इंद्रियधर्मान् मूकः काणः क्लीबः बधिरः अन्धोऽहम् इति। तथा अन्तःकरण धर्मान् काम संकल्प विचिकित्सा अध्यवसायादीन्। एवम् अहंप्रत्ययिनम् अशेषस्वप्रचारसाक्षिणि प्रत्यगात्मनि अध्यस्य तं च प्रत्यगात्मानं सर्वसाक्षिणं तद्विपर्ययेण अन्तःकरणादिषु अध्यस्यति।

23. We said that *adhyāsa* is the cognition as ‘that’ which it is not. It is like: features of persons outside, like son, wife etc who are ill or well are superimposed on himself (and he says) ‘I am myself ill or well’. Similarly, the features of the body in ‘I am fat’, ‘I am lean’, ‘I am fair’, ‘I stand’, ‘I go’, ‘I jump’. Similarly, the features of the senses in ‘I am dumb, one-eyed, impotent, deaf, blind’. Similarly, the features of the internal organ viz desire, resolve, doubt, determination. In this way, imposes the ‘conceited I’ on the inner *Ātman* which is the witness of all his thoughts and in the reverse way, superimposes the all-witnessing inner *Ātman* on the internal organs etc.

(23.1) {In this section, Bhāsyakāra is pinpointing the *adhyasta*, the *adhiṣṭhāna* and the *adhyāsaka* in the *adhyāsas* of *kṣetra* in *kṣetrajña* and of *kṣetrajña* in *kṣetra*}. Concluding the discussion on the *adhyāsa* which is done in *prājña*, Bhāsyakāra

describes its variety step by step starting from the outside son, wife etc, who literally belong to the *yuṣmat-pratyaya-gocara* class, to the innermost *antahkaraṇa*. ‘Who is doing this *adhyāsa*?’ The *aham-pratyayi*. ‘In whom is he doing it?’ In the *pratyagātman*. ‘Who are these two (*aham-pratyayi* and *pratyag-ātman*)? People have imagined that *ahamkāra* is the *aham-pratyayi* and *pratyag-ātman* is the *Śuddha-ātman*. To justify their imagination, they are putting forward peculiar arguments. Obviously, they are not agreeing with the sentences of the *Bhāṣya*. So, their imaginations are plainly wrong. Though it is true that the *aham-pratyaya* appears in the *antahkaraṇa*, the latter cannot itself become the *aham-pratyayī* because it is *jāḍa*. ‘Them who is the *aham-pratyayī*?—*Atasmin tadbuddhiḥ adhyāsa*. ‘The *buddhi* of that which it is not is *adhyāsa*'. This is a *mithyā pratyaya*. It is born in the *antahkaraṇa*. Therefore, the *kṣetrajña* who is having the *upādhi* of the *antahkaraṇa* with this *pratyaya* is the *aham-pratyayī*. Since all these *pratyayas* are occurring in *jagrata*, he is the *bahiṣprajña*. It is he who is doing *adhyāsa*. ‘In whom?’ In the *aśeṣa-svapracāra-sākṣī pratyagātman*. ‘What is *swapracāra*?’ *Mithyā pratyayas* are freely coming and going in the *antahkaraṇa*. This free movement is *pracāra*. The *aham-pratyayi* considers the *antahkaraṇa* to be himself. Therefore, the *bahiṣprajña*'s desire, volition and doubt is the *svapracāra*—his own *pracāra*. To say that the *pratyāgatman*, who is the *sākṣī* to this is *Ātman*, is not correct because a witness needs something different from him which is to be witnessed. But there is nothing different from the *Ātman*; everything is *Ātman* only. Therefore, *Ātman* cannot be *sākṣī*. Not only this; starting from the external son, wife etc. when *Bhāṣyakāra* is telling in a sequence the body, the *indriyas*, the *antahkaraṇa*, and then pointing out that the *pratyagātman* is the *sākṣī* for all these, then suddenly to jump to the *Śuddhātman* skipping the *prājña* is not proper also. *Prājña* is the *sākṣī* i.e. the *bahiṣprajña* is doing *adhyāsa* of himself in the *prājña*. ‘How is he doing it?’ He does it by saying: ‘I am the knower. I am *prājña*. But during *suṣupti*, there was no *antahkaraṇa*. Therefore, I did not know anything at that time.’ If he had slept leaving his connection with the *karaṇas* intentionally out of his own will, then *prājña* could have been the knower; but it is not so. The *karaṇas*, which cannot even touch *prājña*, have dropped out by themselves. Therefore, to ascribe knowership to *prājña* is not correct. ‘Then, how does *śāstra* ascribe knowership to him?’ Following the *adhyāsa* done by the *bahiṣprajña* due to *avidyā* it tells so for the purpose of teaching. *Prājña* is indeed *Ātman* only; but *avidyā* is the only obstacle in obtaining this knowledge of the oneness of *Ātman*. Due to *avidyā*, the knowership without the action of knowing

is superimposed on *prājñā*. Had the *bahisprajñā* analyzed using presumption (*arthāpatti*) like this: 'Knower should obviously have *jñāna* to know anything. Yet if I did not know anything during *susupti*, what could be the reason? Is it the absence of *antahkarana* or something else?' Then with the help of the *śāstra*, he would have realized the oneness of *Ātman* beyond knowership. But how can the fool who sees pleasure in *adhyāsa* have a peaceful mind necessary to do this higher thinking?

२४. एवम् अयम् अनादिरनन्तो नैसर्गिको अध्यासः मिथ्याप्रत्ययरूपः कर्तृत्वभोक्तृत्व-प्रवर्तकः सकललोकप्रत्यक्षः। अस्य अनर्थं हेतोः प्रहाणाय आत्मैकत्वविद्याप्रतिपत्तये सर्वे वेदान्ता आरभ्यन्ते। यथा च अयमर्थः सर्वेषां वेदान्तानाम्, तथा वयम् अस्यां शारीरकमीमांसायां प्रदर्शयिष्यामः।

24. In this way, the *adhyasā* of the nature of an illusory cognition which has no beginning, no end, is natural, causing doership and enjoyership, is directly noticed by all. It is for the destruction of this cause of all meaningless nonsense by providing the *vidyā* of the oneness of *Ātman* that all the Vedāntas start off. That this is the purport of all the Vedāntas, we will demonstrate in this *Śārīraka Mimāṃsā*.

(24.1) After having shown the *swarūpa* of *adhyāsa*, Bhāskyakāra is now showing the *swarūpa* of *vidyā* which destroys *adhyāsa*. Here *adhyāsa* is said to be beginningless. 'How?' analyzing one's own experience of *susupti* the fault of *adhyāsa* is easily understood. Therefore, experience is the *pramāṇa* for *adhyāsa*. *Karma* is due to *adhyāsa* and birth is because of *karma*. Therefore, the *karma* of the previous lives is the cause of the present birth. The previous lives' *karma* is also due to *adhyāsa*. In this way, however far one may go back, *adhyāsa* is seen to be present. Therefore, *adhyāsa* is both known by *pramāṇa* and is also beginningless. It is also endless. 'How is it endless? Is it not destroyed by the *vidyā* of the oneness of *Ātman*?' Some people answer this question by saying that endless means till one gets *jñāna*. This is not correct because it does not agree with the meaning of the word 'endless'. Even though someone loses *avidyā* by *vidyā*, others still continue to have it. Therefore it is endless.

'Will *adhyāsa* not come to an end when everyone has obtained *vidyā*?' Such a thing can never happen; because, the number of *jīvas* is infinite - 'अयं वै दश च सहस्राणि

बहूनि च अनन्तानि च, प्राणि भेदस्य आनन्द्यात्' - He is himself ten, thousands, many, infinite; because living beings are infinite (Br. Bh. 2.5.19). 'शतं सहस्रमयुतन्यर्बुद्मसंख्येयं स्वमस्मिन् निविष्टम्' - Hundreds, thousands, lakhs, crores, infinite *jīvas* are placed in him (Atharva Samhitā 10.8.24), says the śruti. Therefore, though many *jīvas* get liberated by *vidyā*, the unliberated continue to exist. 'If all *jīvas* are liberated at once?' This is not possible. Had it been possible, it would have already happened in the infinite time that has already passed. Therefore, Īśwara will continue giving births to the *jīvas* with *avidyā*, who will always continue to be there in the world. This takes place due to His *māyā*. Therefore, just as *adhyāsa* is beginningless and endless, *māyā* too should be beginningless and endless.

Naisargika means natural; because it is beginningless it has to be natural.

Sakala-loka pratyakṣa: This *adhyāsa* is *pratyakṣa* i.e., directly perceived because, as already said, experience being the *pramāṇa* for *adhyāsa*, it is immediately understood. This is not possible if *Śuddhātman* is kept in place of *pratyagātman*.

Ātma-Ekātva-Vidyā-Pratipattiḥ: *Adhyāsa* is destroyed only with this. This is because: *Adhyāsa* is the *buddhi* of that which it is not. Therefore, *adhyāsa* expects the duality of 'that' and 'not that'. Here *kṣetrajña* is 'that' and *kṣetra* is 'not that'. In the reverse *adhyāsa* these also get reversed. Since both these are previously seen things (*pūrva-dṛṣṭa*) there is scope for *adhyāsa*. But not so in the case of *śuddha-ātman*. Both 'that' and 'not that' are *Ātman*. 'ग्रहणग्राहकाभासं विषयिविषयाभासं विज्ञानस्पन्दितं स्पन्दितमिवाविद्यया' - *Vijñāna spandita* is the manifestation of the knower and the known, i.e. the immovable *Ātman* himself appears as these two due to *avidyā* (Mā.Kā.Bh.4.47). Therefore, one who understands that he is *Ātman* has no duality. Therefore, there is no *adhyāsa*. Therefore, there is no *karma*. Therefore, there is no birth. This *Ātman* who is synonymous with *mokṣa* is to be understood only through the Upaniṣads. He is Aupaniṣada Puruṣa. The beginning of Veda is *karma kāṇḍa*, which addresses people with *adhyāsa*. The end part of Veda, i.e., Vedānta are the Upaniṣads. These are addressed to those who want to destroy their *adhyāsa*. Knowing that this *Ātman* is oneself is *mokṣa*.

Śārīraka means the *jīva* who has accepted the *śārira* i.e. the body as himself. *Mimāṃsā* means a sacred discussion. It is sacred because it is a discussion about *Brahman*. The purport of *Śārīraka Mimāṃsā* is this: In the first two chapters known as *samanvaya* and *avirodha* respectively, it is established that *kṣetra* is *Brahman*. In the

third chapter entitled *sādhana* it is shown that *kṣetrajña* is also the same *Brahman* and it also tells about *upāsanās* helpful in getting this knowledge. In the last chapter of *phala*, the fruit and features of *mokṣa* are discussed.

(24.2) The steps taken by the *Śārīraka Mimāṃsā* to convey the knowledge of the oneness of *Ātman* are as follows: Through a critical analysis of *adhyāsa* the *kṣetrajña* is separated from the *kṣetra*. With this, the meaning of the word *twam* 'you' in the ultimate lesson *Tat-twam-asī* is determined to be the *pratyagātman* who is *prājña*. It is everyone's experience that *prājña* does not know who he is. To make one realize this fault is the first step.

Similarly, the essence of the *jagat* is to be taught, separating the *kṣetra jagat* from its features of change(*anṛtatva*), inertia (*jadatva*) and finiteness (*parichinatva*). For this purpose, the *śruti* gives the example of pot, clay etc to show the cause-effect relationship between this essence and the *jagat*. The features of change etc are seen in *jagat* through the forms which are mere words—*vācārambhaṇa*. These forms are an effect, and their cause can only be determined through themselves; there is no other way. What are the features of the cause? There are no features of the effect in the cause. To get the knowledge of the cause, it is not possible to destroy the effect nor is it meaningful to say that one should wait till it gets destroyed on its own. Therefore, even when the effect is visible the cause hidden in it has to be separated from the features of the effect. What is meant by 'separating it'?

It means that through the *śruti pramāṇa* one has to understand that the visible form should also be the cause itself; otherwise it cannot come into existence at all - 'कार्यकारोऽपि कारणस्य आत्मभूत एव अनात्मभूतस्य अनारभ्यत्वात्' (Sū. Bh. 2.1.18). This is the non-difference of cause and effect. The asymmetry in this law has to be noted. Namely 'अनन्यत्वेऽपि कार्यकारणयोः कार्यस्य कारणात्मत्वं, न तु कारणस्य कार्यात्मत्वम्' - Though non-difference of effect-cause is told, effect is of the form of cause, but the cause is not of the form of the effect (Sū. Bh. 2.1.9). This understanding comes from *paramārthhadṛṣṭi*, i.e. recognizing the effect as nothing but the cause. The moment this understanding is obtained, one will understand that *kṣetra* is nothing but its *upādāna Brahman* even though the *indriyas* experience the features of change etc in *kṣetra*. The meaning of the word 'tat' in the great sentence *tat twam asi* is this *Brahman*. Though pots are many, they are all one and the same clay, 'ब्रह्मैवेदं विश्वम्' - The whole world is *Brahman*

only (Mu 2.2.12). This *Brahman*, contrary to the effect, is *satyam*, *jñānam* and *anantam*. After this is determined, one has to realize ‘तत्त्वमसि’ - You are that (Cā. 6.8.7) through *nididhyāsana*. This realization of oneness of *Ātman* is *vidyā* ‘बाह्याकार- भेदबुद्धिनिवृत्तिरेव आत्मस्वरूपावलम्बन कारणम्’ - Taking support of the *swarūpa* of the *Ātman*, the sense of difference is lost even when seeing the outside forms (G. Bh. 18.50). It is precisely this *svavātmabhāva*—I am everything—that is *mokṣa* (Br. 4.3.21).

Additional Comments on the *Adhyāsa Bhāṣya*

(25.1) After this commentary on the *Adhyāsa Bhāṣya*, some additional comments have to be made. The *asmat-pratyaya-gocara pratyagātman* told in *Adhyāsa Bhāṣya* cannot be the fourth *Śuddhātman*, i.e. he is not the *pratyagātman* who is in the experience of the *ajñānī*. The reason is as follows: ‘सोऽन्वेष्यः स विजिज्ञासितव्यः’ - He is to be sought after, to be discussed (Cā. 8.7.1). Therefore, he is not *pūrvva-dṛṣṭa*, i.e. not seen earlier. Therefore, he cannot be recalled by memory, hence he cannot be *smṛti-rūpa*. ‘आत्मैवेदं सर्वम्’ - All this is *Ātman* (Cā. 7.25.2). Therefore, there is nothing other than Him. Hence, the sentence defining *adhyāsa* namely *smṛti-rūpa paratra pūrvavadṛṣṭa avabhāsa* ‘स्मृतिरूपः परत्र पूर्वदृष्टावभासः’ - The appearance elsewhere of a recollected form of a thing seen before is not applicable to *Śuddhātman*. The *Śuddhātman* is invisible, actionless, ungraspable, featureless, unthinkable, indescribable (Mā. 7), i.e. He is without any *dharma*. Therefore, the sentence that ‘*adhyāsa* is seeing the *dharma* of one in another’ *anyatra anya dharma avabhāsana* is also not applicable to *Śuddhātman*. As a rule, He is *viśayī* and never *viśaya*. He never becomes *viśaya* for anybody. ‘यः तु आत्मशब्दस्य इतिपरः प्रयोगः स आत्मशब्दप्रत्ययोः आत्मतत्त्वस्य परमार्थतोऽविषयत्वज्ञापनार्थः’ - The use of the suffix ‘*iti*’ for the word *Ātman* is intended to remind that really either the word *Ātman* or the *ātma-pratyaya* cannot represent an object (Br. Bh. 1.4.7). One who is not an object even for a *jñānī*, how can He become an object of ‘I—awareness’ for the *ajñānī*?

Question: 'Due to *adhyāsa*, can he not become an object for 'I—awareness'?'

Answer: No. For *adhyāsa*, *sāmānya jñāna* - just the elementary knowledge of the existence of the *adhiṣṭhāna*, is necessary. *Ajñānī* does not have even that. This is the unobservability (*aviśayatva*) of the *Ātman*. On the contrary, that everyone has this elementary knowledge of the existence of *prājña* is a common experience. Therefore, only he is *asmat pratyaya gocara* (object for 'I—awareness'). On the other hand, the *Ātman* is his witness. *Bhāṣyakāra* has said this directly as follows: ‘ननु आत्मा

अहंप्रत्ययविषयत्वात् उपनिषत्सु एव विज्ञायते इति अनुपपन्नम्? न; तत् साक्षित्वेन प्रत्युक्तत्वात्' - Since Ātman is an object for 'I—awareness' how is it right to say that He is understood only through the Upaniṣads? Not like that. Because, He is witness even for him (Sū. Bh 1.1.4). In this way, the unobservable (*avिषया*)Ātman is as a rule of the nature of light; if He were an *vिषया* He would be of the nature of darkness.

Further, since He is the fourth 'एकात्मप्रत्ययसारः' - *ekātma-pratyaya-sāra* (Mā. 7) He can never be *pratyaya gocara*. Though the fourth Ātman is *pratyagātman* also, He is not in the experience of the ignorant people. Therefore 'प्रत्यगात्मप्रसिद्धेः' - *pratyagātma-prasiddeḥ* the well-known *pratyagātman*' does not apply to Him. Not only that, He is not only *pratyagātman*; He is *sarvātman*, He is everywhere. One easily understands when one is told that *prājña* is not at all related to the body etc, though one is doing *adhyāsa* in the wakeful state. Therefore, *adhyāsa* is obviously known to everybody. But if we make the statement that '*adhyāsa* has occurred in Ātman', it can never be understood by anybody. Therefore, such *adhyāsa* is not *sakala-loka-pṛtyayakṣa*. Hence, this statement does not motivate the seeker to destroy *adhyāsa*; it remains only as the imagination of the person saying it. Not only this, in the *adhyāsa* made in the reverse direction, the body is the *adhiṣṭhāna* and the *pratyagātman* is the *adhyāsta*. If this *pratyagātman* is the fourth Ātman there can be no *adhyāsa* of His *dharma*s on the body etc; because He is without any *dharma*. 'Can't His *jñāna* and *ānanda* be superimposed'? Impossible. They are His *swarūpa*, not *dharma*s which an *ajñānī* can see.

(25.2) In this way, after demonstrating that it is not possible to take the fourth Ātman in place of *pratyagātman*, it is necessary also to discuss what havoc has been wrecked on the *siddhānta* by doing so. With the assumption of *Śuddhātman* in the place of *pratyagātman*, whatever is *adhyasta* becomes *asat* - non existent. If this is agreed upon, only *buddhi*, *indriyas*, body, son, wife etc. being *adhyasta* in the case of *prājña*, only that many become non-existent; however the rest of the world like sun, moon etc., which are not *adhyasta* could be saved from going non existent. But in the case of *Śuddhātman* it is not so. Saying that *Śuddhātman* is the *adhiṣṭhāna* and the whole world is *adhyasta* in Him, they assert that the whole world is non-existent. If one asks, 'How can it be non existent when it is being known through the *indriyas*?' They say, 'Just as the serpent seen in the rope is non existent, the world superimposed in Ātman also is non existent (*asat*). Therefore, in hundreds of places Bhāṣyakāra has referred to the *jagat* as *mithyā*, imagined due to *avidyā* (*avidyā-kalpita*).

This is plainly wrong because, taking the same analogy of rope and snake, Bhāṣyakāra has explained that the *jagat* is not *asat*: - 'तदैक्षत बहुस्यां प्रजायेयेति' - That (*Brahman*) thought of becoming many and being born. Commenting on this śruti sentence he has said—'यथा मृदघटाद्याकारेण, यथा वा रज्जवादि सर्पाद्याकारेण बुद्धिपरिकल्पितेन । असदेव तर्हि सर्वं यदगृह्णते रज्जुरिव सर्पाद्याकारेण? न । सत् एव द्वैत भेदन अन्यथा गृह्णमाणत्वात् न असत्त्वं कस्यचित् क्वचित्' - Just as the rope etc. take birth as the conceived serpent etc., similarly, I will be born in many forms. (**Objection**) If so, the world that is perceived is non existent just like the snake perceived in the rope? (**Answer**) It is not like that. The existent (*Brahman*) itself appears as another because of the sense of duality. Nothing at any time is non existent (Cā. Bh. 6.2.23).

Therefore, the statement that like the non existent serpent in the rope, the world seen is also non existent, is directly opposite to the śruti statement that *Brahman* Itself is standing in the form of the world out of Its own volition and also opposite to the Bhāṣya. When the śruti is saying - 'सद् एव सोम्य इदम् अग्र आसीत्' - Somya! In the beginning, this (world) was *sat* only (Cā. 6.2.1), implying that the world was *sat* even when it was not available for the senses. Does it become *asat* when it is available to the senses?

Objection: Bhāṣyakāra has clearly said that 'जाग्रद् दृश्यानामपि.... असत्त्वं स्वप्नदृश्यवत् अनाशंकनीयम्.....मिथ्यैव ते' - There can be no doubt that the world is *asat* like the world of dreams. It is *mithyā* only (Mā. Kā. Bh. 2.7). How do you reconcile this statement?

Answer: It is true. It is possible to say this after the oneness of the Ātman has been determined. This is because, the world is not different from this Ātman. Therefore, there can never be an observable for the Ātman. However, the *ajñānī* puts forward his doubt after listening to the oneness of Ātman, that he is seeing the world. If he is seeing it then it must be different from the Ātman, because we can only see things which are different from us. Hence, it has to be *asat*. It is *asat* just like the chariots etc. seen in dreams. But before establishing the oneness of Ātman 'तदेतत् सत्यं अवितथम् । किं तत्?...मन्त्रेषु....कर्माणि....' - The *jagat* that is observed is *avatatha*—not *mithyā*, i.e. it is a transactional reality (Mu.Bh.1.2.1). *Jagat* will never be lost; it always exists. 'यथा च कारणं ब्रह्म त्रिषु कालेषु सत्त्वं न व्यभिचरति एवं कार्यम् अपि जगत् त्रिषु कालेषु सत्त्वं न व्यभिचरति' - Just as *Brahman*'s existence is not affected in either of the three times (past, present and future), the existence of the world also is not affected in either of the three times (Sū Bh 2.1.16).

Doubt: If we accept the existence of names and forms, will it not contradict the *advaita śruti*, ‘This is one without a second’, ‘There is not the least multiplicity here’ etc.?

Answer: No. This has already been resolved through the example of pot, clay etc. Seen from the causal point of view, just as the forms of clay are not different from clay, the world of multiplicity is not different from *Brahman*. On the basis of this understanding one gets the realisation, ‘This is one without a second’, ‘There is not the least multiplicity here’ etc. When due to *avidyā* one is seeing only the multiplicity of names and forms then only these transactions occur - ‘यदा तु परमार्थदृष्ट्या..वस्त्वन्तरास्तित्वं व्यवहारः’ (Br. Bh. 3.5.1).

For the knowledge of ‘there is not the least multiplicity here’ (Br. 4.4.19), namely for the oneness of *Brahman*, *śruti* is the *pramāṇa*, not the *indriyas*. For the multiplicity of the world, *indriyas* are the *pramāṇa* and not the *śruti*. ‘One *pramāṇa* does not contradict another *pramāṇa*, in fact, the other *pramāṇa* gives the knowledge of an object which cannot be known by the first *pramāṇa*’ (Br. Bh. 2.1.20). Therefore, for the oneness of *Brahman* taught by *śruti*, the multiplicity seen through the *indriyas* need not be rejected. What exists all through this multiplicity is only *Brahman* in which there is no multiplicity. Therefore, fault is only in viewing the object and not in the object itself. *Brahman* is *Ātman*. Hence, there is no multiplicity in Him. However, even after the realisation of *Ātman*’s oneness, the world does not become invisible for the *jñānī*. Then how does he see it? Before he had obtained *vidyā*, the world appeared as different from him; now the same world appears non-different. So what is lost by *vidyā* is what was produced by *avidyā*. ‘Anotherness, being the result of *avidyā*, can be realised as a non-object by *vidyā*. Is not the non-existence of the second moon the one that is seen by eyes without cataract’ - ‘अन्यस्य च अविद्याकृतत्वे विद्यया अवस्तुत्वदर्शनोपपत्तिः । तद्धि द्वितीयं चन्द्रस्यासत्त्वं यदतैमिरिकेण चक्षुष्मता न गृह्णते’ (Tai. Bh. 2.8). Therefore, what becomes invisible after getting *vidyā* is the one which appeared different from himself because of *avidyā*. One who sees the *jagat* as different from himself is *mithyā-darśī*, i.e., one with wrong knowledge. The *śruti* says that such a person is unfit for *mokṣa*. ‘The one who views *brāhmaṇa*, *kṣatriya* (the worlds, *devatās* etc) as different from *Ātman*, and having existence independent of the *Ātman* is a *mithyā-darśī*; and those objects seen as *mithyā* are *mithyā-dṛṣṭa*. The *mithyā-dṛṣṭa* world rejects the *mithyā-darśī*. In this way, seeing difference in the world is ridiculed and

it is asserted that all objects are non-different from the *Ātman* and all this is *Ātman* itself' - 'यो हि ब्रह्मक्षत्रादिकं जगत् आत्मनोऽन्यत्र स्वातन्त्र्यण लब्धं सद्गावं पश्यति, तं मिथ्यादर्शिनं तदेव मिथ्यादृष्टं ब्रह्मक्षत्रादिकं जगत् पराकरोति इति भेददृष्टिमपेद्य इदं सर्वं यद्यमात्मा (बृ. २.४.६) इति सर्वस्य वस्तुजातस्य आत्माव्यतिरेकमवतारयति।' (Sū. Bh. 1.4.19). Therefore, the statement that the *jagat* is *mithyā* is directly opposite to the *śruti*.

(25.3) Suppose it is asked 'that which is *mithyā* is not available for transaction; but the changing *jagat* is available for transaction. How is this possible?' They say 'Transaction is also *mithyā*.' They do not see any differences in the words *anṛta* (changing), *mithyā* (illusory), *anirvacnīya* (ambiguous for description), *prātibhāsika satya* (apparent reality), *vyāvahārika satya* (transactional reality). *Anṛta* is transactional reality, not illusion. Commenting on Tai. 2.6 Bhaṣyakāra says—'एकम् एव हि परमार्थसत्यं ब्रह्म। इह पुनः व्यवहारविषयम् आपेक्षिकं सत्यं मृगतृष्णिकाद्यनृतापेक्ष्या उदकादि सत्यम् उच्यते। अनृतं च तद् विपरीतम्। किं पुनः एतत् सर्वम् अभवत्? सत्यं परमार्थसत्यम्' - Ultimate reality is *Brahman* only. Water which is transactional reality is compared with the mirage which is apparent reality. Here the water is called *satya* and the mirage which is different from water is called *anṛta*. Both these are in their nature the ultimate reality. Further, transaction is also not *mithyā*. For the *jñānī* 'सदात्मना सत्यत्वं अभ्युपगमात्.....सर्वव्यवहाराणां सर्वविकाराणां च सत्यत्वम्' - All transactions and all forms are real because they are viewed as *Brahman* (Cā. Bh. 6.3.2). 'प्राक् सदात्मविज्ञानात् स्वात्मनः अन्यस्मात् सतः.....उत्पत्तिप्रलयौ अभूताम्। सदात्मविज्ञाने तु सति स्वात्मत एव संवृत्तौ। तथा सर्वोऽप्यन्यो व्यवहारः आत्मनः एव विदुषः' - Prior to *Ātman*'s knowledge creation, destruction etc were happening from someone different from him. But after getting *Ātma-vijñāna* everything is happening from *Ātman* only. In this way, for the *jñānī*, all transactions are from *Ātman* only' (Cā. Bh. 7.26.1).

(25.4) There is indeed a chain of imaginations done to protect the concept that *jagat* is *mithyā*. Firstly, about the pair *māyā-avidyā*: If the world is treated as non-existent, *māyā* which is the cause for the creation, sustenance and destruction of the world as described in *śruti*, *smṛti* and *purāṇas*, loses its place. When it is said that though it is non-existent it is seen due to *avidyā*, the latter usurps the place of *māyā*. To reconcile with this imagined equivalence of *māyā* and *avidyā*, they have to imagine an ambiguous description (*anirvacnīyatva*) for *avidyā* also, mimicking the *anirvacnīyatva* of *māyā*. Then for some, the Śuddha-*Brahman* gets coupled with *avidyā* (*avidyā-śabala*). For some others, *māyā* and *avidyā* are synonyms. For yet others, *māyā* is *avidyā-kalpita*. For some others, when *avidyā* is lost by acquiring *vidyā*, *māyā* is also

lost. Yet others see remnants of *avidyā* even in the *jñānī*. For others, *avidyā* is the effect of *māyā* - it misleads us by using *āvaraṇa-śakti* and *ākṣepa-śakti*. Since it is said that during *pralaya*, *Brahman* alone exists, *māyā* cannot exist in *pralaya*. Therefore for them, *māyā* becomes *anitya*. Since *Īśwara* is coupled with *māyā*, for some, *Īśwara* also goes out of existence during *pralaya* etc. These are the so called *prakriyās*, i.e., alternatives for *siddhānta*. What *siddhānta*? That *jagat* is *mithyā* - not for the *advaita* propounded by Śaṅkara. But none of these statements is correct.

First about *Brahman* being coupled with *avidyā* (*avidyā-śabala*). *Jīva* is the one with *avidyā*. He is not different from *nitya-śuddha-buddha-mukta Brahman*—this is the *siddhānta*. *Paramātman* is different from the *jīva*, but *jīva* is not different from *Paramātman* - 'परमात्मनः जीवाद् अन्यत्वं, जीवस्य तु न परस्माद् अन्यत्वम्' (Sū. Bh. 1.3.19). Further, Bhāsyakāra's commentary for the sentence—'He understood himself as *Brahman*' is as follows: - 'आत्मानम् एवावेत् अहं ब्रह्मस्मि इति...ब्रह्मणि अविद्यानुपपत्तिः इति चेत् न, ब्रह्मणि विद्या विधानात् ।.....न ब्रूमः.....ब्रह्मणि अतद्वर्माध्यारोपणा नास्तीति । किं तर्हि न ब्रह्म स्वात्मनि अतद्वर्माध्यारोपण निमित्तम् अविद्याकर्तृं च इति । भवतु एवं न अविद्याकर्तृं भ्रान्तं च ब्रह्म । किंतु न एव अब्रह्म अविद्याकर्ता चेतनः भ्रान्तः अन्यः इष्यते' - 'How is it right to say that there is *avidyā* in *Brahman*?' It is not like that. *Vidyā* has been prescribed in *Brahman*. 'We are not saying that there is *adhyāropa* of a *dharma* in *Brahman* which is not in It.' Then what are you saying? 'That *Brahman* is not the cause for the *adhyāropa* of this *dharma*. Nor does it create *avidyā* by itself.' Let it be that *Brahman* is not the imposer of *avidyā* and also not confused. But the *jīva* who is the imposer of *avidyā* and confused - he is not different from *Brahman* (Br. Bh. 1.4.10). So, *avidyā śabalam Brahma* is a seditiously wrong imagination.

Further about *māyā* and *avidyā* being synonymous: 'देहादि संघाताः आत्ममाया विसर्जिताः । आत्मनः माया अविद्या, तया प्रत्युपस्थापिताः' - The body etc. are *ātma-māyā-visarjita*. Here *ātman's māyā* means *avidyā*, and the physical body etc are projected by this *avidyā* (Mā. Kā. 3.10) and in the next śloka's commentary 'पर एव आत्मायः पूर्वं सत्यम् ज्ञानमनन्तम् ब्रह्म इति प्रकृतः । यस्मादात्मनः....संघाताः आत्ममाया विसर्जिताः सत्यं ज्ञानं अनन्तं' - *Satyam Jñānam Anantam Brahman* is the *Ātman* in present context. From this *ātman* only, body etc. are created by His *māyā* (Mā. Kā. 3.11). In this way, the same word *māyā* when applied to the *jīva* is called *avidyā* and when applied to the *Brahman* is called *māyā*. In this way, *māyā* and *avidyā* are separated in the *kārikā*. 'अहंकार इति अविद्यासंयुक्तम् अव्यक्तम्' - *Ahamkāra* means *avidyā* coupled with *avyakta* (G. Bh. 7.4); 'अविद्यादि

अनेकसंसारबीजम् अन्तर्दोषवत् माया' - *Māyā* in which the many seeds of *samsāra* like *avidyā* etc are concealed (G. Bh. 7.3); 'प्रकृतिस्थत्वाख्या अविद्या संसारस्य कारणम्' - The coupling with *prakṛti* due to *avidyā* is *samsāra* (G. Bh. 13.20); 'प्रकृत्या.....अविद्यारूपः संयोगः संसारः' - The *avidyā* concealed in *prakṛti*, is the cause of *samsāra* (G. Bh. 13.21) etc. sentences clearly deny the synonymity of *avidyā* and *māyā*.

In order to satisfy the imagined synonymity between the two, an ambiguous description of *avidyā* is also propounded (see 14.4). But after a detailed analysis *avidyā* is described only as 'अविद्याविपरीतग्राहकः संशयोपस्थापकः अग्रहणात्मको वा' - non-comprehension (*agrahāṇa*), doubtful (*samśaya*) and wrong comprehension (*anyathā grahāṇa*) (G. Bh. 13.2). 'यदि ज्ञानाभावः यदि संशयज्ञानं यदि विपरीतज्ञानं वा उच्चते अज्ञानम् इति, सर्वं हि तत् ज्ञानेन एव निवृत्यते' - Whether absence of knowledge or doubtful knowledge or wrong knowledge, whatever is called *ajñāna*, all that will be removed by *jñāna* only' (Br. Bh. 3.3.1). This is the unambiguous description of *avidyā*. Therefore, the *bhāṣya* does not approve of this *avidyā* of ambiguous description.

Next, the idea that *māyā* is misleading the *jīvas* by its two powers of *āvaraṇa* and *vikṣepa*. This is totally unacceptable because it is only through *māyā* that *Brahman* assumes multiple forms. Why? 'रूपं रूपं प्रतिरूपो बभूव, तदस्य रूपं प्रतिचक्षणाय' - For every form, it assumed a co-form in order to make its inherent form known (Br. 2.5.19). The *bhāṣya* comments on this sentence like this - 'यदि हि नामरूपे न व्याक्रियेते, तदा अस्य आत्मनो निरुपाधिकं रूपं प्रज्ञानघनाख्यं न प्रतिष्ठायेत' - Had It not carved out these names and forms, then, that the adjunctless form of the *Ātman* is just solid awareness could never have been understood (Br. Bh. 2.5.19). 'प्रकृतिः च त्रिगुणात्मिका सर्वकार्यकरणविषयाकारेण परिणता पुरुषस्य भोगापवर्गार्थकर्तव्यतया देहेन्द्रियाद्याकारेण संहन्ते' - This *prakṛti* of three qualities gets modified to the forms of *kārya*, *karaṇa* and objects and gets finally organized in the forms of bodies, *indriyas* etc for the purpose of prosperity and/or *mokṣa* of the *jīva*' (G. Bh. Introduction to chapter 13). Therefore, it is unreasonable to hold *māyā* responsible for the *jīva*'s lustful extrovert response to the world.

Next, that *māyā* is non-eternal is clearly opposite to the *bhāṣya*—'नित्येश्वरत्वाद् ईश्वरस्य तत्प्रकृत्योः अपि युक्तं नित्यत्वेन भवितुम्। प्रकृतिद्वयवत्वम् एव हि ईश्वरस्य ईश्वरत्वम्' - Since *Īśwara* is always *Īśwara* His two *prakṛtis* have to be eternal. This is because, being coupled with these two *prakṛtis* is the *Īśwaraness* of *Īśwara* (G. Bh. 13.9). Some people twist the meaning of the word 'eternal' to mean 'a very long time' to suit their imaginations.

This is not possible. However long this time may be, since—‘धाता यथापूर्वकल्पयत्’ - Īśwara created this world just like in previous times (Rgveda Samhitā 10.190.3), *māyā* is necessary for the creation that happens even after this long time. So, saying that *māyā* is non-eternal is wrong.

Then about the remnants of *avidyā* in a *jñānī*: ‘य एव अविद्यादिदोष निवृत्ति फलकृत्प्रत्ययः आद्यः अन्त्यः सन्ततो वा स एव विद्या’ - Whether the first or the last thought, whether it is a result of continuous or discontinuous thinking, the knowledge which removes all the faults of *avidyā* etc. is *vidyā* (Br. Bh. 1.4.10). ‘आत्मविषयं विज्ञानं यत्कालम्, तत् काले एव तद्विषयाज्ञानतिरोभावः स्यात्। अतः ब्रह्मविद्यायां सत्याम् अविद्याकार्यानुपपत्तेः प्रदीप इव तमः कार्यस्य’ - The moment the knowledge of Ātman dawns, that moment itself, its (Ātman's) ignorance is removed. So, with the rise of Brahma-*vidyā*, the effects of *avidyā* vanish just as darkness vanishes the moment light comes (Br. Bh. 1.4.10). So, there can never be remnants of *avidyā* in a *jñānī*.

(25.5) Then *sarvātmabhāva* spoken by śruti i.e. the awareness that everything is Himself—is an uncomfortable statement for those who proclaim that the world is non-existent. So, they totally abandon it. ‘अहम् अन्नम् अहम् अन्नादः अहं श्लोककृत्’ - I am the food, I am the eater, I am that Īśwara who pairs up the eater and his food (Tai. 3.10). ‘अहं मनुः अभवं सूर्यः च’ - I am Manu, I am the sun (Br. 1.4.10), ‘विद्याविनयसम्पन्ने ब्राह्मणे गवि हस्तिनि । शुनि चैव श्वपाके च पण्डिताः समदर्शिनः’ - *Jñānīs* view the learned and gentle *brāhmaṇa*, the cow, elephant, the dog, and the *cāṇḍāla* all equally (Gītā 5.18)—such are the sentences of *sarvātmabhāva*. If the food, the eater, Īśwara, Manu, Sūrya, *brāhmaṇa* are all non-existent—there is no meaning for such sentences. For this reason too, the non-existence of the world is absurdly wrong.

(25.6) In this way, a limitless number of ideas are superimposed on the *bhāṣyas* of Śaṅkara, damaging what is heard from there and imagining the unheard. They have assumed such importance that common people think that this is what has been taught by Śaṅkara. Therefore, a study of the *bhāṣya* is not producing the correct understanding in seekers. Such ideas have created opponents for the otherwise blemishless *bhāṣya*. Moreover, they are mutually contradictory also. Some people offer solace by saying ‘he says like this, the other one says like that; but these are all only alternative proofs for arriving at the one and the same conclusion’. But this pacification does not achieve its intended purpose; on the other hand, it creates more confusion, because ‘this’ and ‘that’ proofs are opposite to each other. In some

intermediate steps of *śāstra*, one could perhaps say ‘*pañcikarāṇa* is one way and *trivṛtkarāṇa* another of arriving at this result’. But for the ultimate message (*siddhānta*) there can never be alternative proofs, that too proofs contradicting each other.

Therefore, for the *advaita* propounded by the *śruti*, there is only one proof and that is, given by Śaṅkara himself. ‘न अन्यः पन्था अयनाय विद्यते’ - There cannot be another proof. True. Though the *bhāṣyas* of Śaṅkara are pleasant to study, the meaning in a certain place may be difficult to understand because they are guiding a wide spectrum of seekers—like people doing *karma*, intelligent students, *sannyāsis* etc; doubts can arise. To get the right answer for any doubt, the point to remember is the following: the topic is vast. Solutions for all doubts cannot be available in a single place for everyone. But, for each and every doubt, there is certainly the solution somewhere else in the *bhāṣyas*. There is no exception to this rule at all. This is the omniscience of Bhagavan Bhāṣyakāra. In the Vedas, it becomes necessary in several places to interpret passages going against other *pramāṇas*. That is done by treating them as *arthavāda* in praise of injunctions. But in the Śaṅkara *Bhāṣya*, one never comes across such situations where an interpretation is necessary, because their very purpose is to explain things clearly without any ambiguity. Therefore, one should never subject the ununderstood words and sentences to squeezing, bending and twisting or adding and dropping ideas to extract the meaning one wants. This is unacceptable. One should understand their meaning only by the other sentences of the *bhāṣya* said in that context. If one does not follow this concept and introduces new ideas therein, they will invariably be damaging what is heard or they will only remain unheard imaginations.

It is extremely regrettable that one such painful example should be there in the very first word of *Vedānta Śāstra*. Who would interpret the word ‘*asmat -I*’ in ‘युष्मदस्तप्रत्ययगोचरयोः विषयविषयिणोः’ - *yuṣmat asmat pratyaya gocarayoh* in *Adhyāsa Bhāṣya* as the Śuddhaātmā when he has read and remembers the sentence *kṣetra-kṣetrajñayoh* ‘क्षेत्रक्षेत्रज्ञयोः विषयविषयिणोः’ in *Gītā Bhāṣya*? Is it not because of this Himalayan blunder that the world had to become ‘*asat*—non-existent’? After assuming that the world is non-existent, who would not drop the assumption when he notices the negative reply to the objection ‘असद् एव तर्हि सर्वं यत् गृह्णते.....’ - Then, is the whole world non-existent like the serpent seen in the snake? Is it not because of continuing with this assumption instead of dropping it that *māyā* and *avidyā* became synonyms? Who

will continue with this synonymity the moment he reads the sentences like 'अहंकार इति अविद्यासंयुक्तम् अव्यक्तम्' - *Ahamkāra* is *avidyā* coupled with *māyā* etc? In this way, making a new imagination to cover up or justify the damage done by the previous imagination, has led to a limitless cascade of fanciful imaginations of the *bhāṣya*. The purport of the *bhāṣya* has gone out of sight and heated debates between the so called alternative proofs have occupied its place. If the word 'asmat-I' in *Adhyāsa Bhāṣya* had been interpreted as *kṣetrajña* in accordance with *Gītā Bhāṣya*, only difference between the world and its knower *kṣetrajña* could have been demonstrated and the idea of the non-existence of the world could have been avoided. Is it not so? Consequently, would not the whole of the cascade of consequent imaginations been avoided? In this way, these imaginations have wrought havoc in the *śāstra* instead of making it intelligent. Śaṅkara Bhāṣya is pure and complete in itself. It does not suffer from any faults which need to be removed, nor does it require the addition of any virtues. Śaṅkara is Para-Brahman, and his *bhāṣyas* are the Vedas. This must never be forgotten.



A Birds' Eyeview of the Brahmasūtras

(1) Bhāsyakāra has clearly stated at the end of the *Adhyāsa Bhāṣya* that getting the knowledge of the oneness of Ātman is the purport of Śārīraka Mīmāṃsā. There is advantage in knowing the sequence of steps followed by the śāstras for this purpose. This is only a brief pointer, just enough to meet the goal of this book:

'*Tat*' in the great sentence '*Tat twam asi*'—That you are' is only pure existence—i.e. *Brahman* alone. To know that as one's self is the knowledge of the oneness of Ātman. True. It cannot be gotten by speech, mind, eyes or any other sense. Though it is so attributeless, it does exist because it is known to be the cause of the world—'नैव वाचा न मनसा न चक्षुषा न अन्यैः अपि इन्द्रियैः प्राप्तुं शक्यते इत्यर्थः । तथापि सर्वविशेषरहितः अपि जगतः मूलम् इति अवगतत्वात् अस्ति एव (ब्रह्म)' (Ka. Bh.2.3.12).

So, *Brahman* has to be understood only through the world. Therefore, the discussion of *Brahman* starts with 'Creation etc.' *sūtra*. Though *Brahman* as the material cause of the world is implied in this *sūtra*, its main discussion is in the first *pāda* of the second chapter. Using the examples of clay etc, it is shown there that the 'world is *Brahman*', but *Brahman* is different from the world' through the law of non-difference of effect and cause (*kārya kāraṇa ananyatva nyāya*). With this, the oneness of *Brahman* who is *Satyam*, *Jñānam* and *Anantam*, is established. Next about its efficient causeness: In order to teach that the Ātman is the *Satyam- Jñānam -Anantam Brahman*, all the transactions like becoming many, creation, entering (in *jīva* form), obtaining pleasure, fearlessness, *saṃkramāṇa* (higher knowledge) etc. are conceived of in *Brahman* - 'सत्यं ज्ञानम् अनन्तं ब्रह्म इति यथोक्तलक्षणं आमप्रतिपत्त्यर्थमेव बहुभवन सर्ग-प्रवेश-रसलाभ-अभय-संक्रमणादि परिकल्प्यते ब्रह्मणि सर्वं व्यवहार विषये' (Tai. Bh. 2.8).

In this way, in the first step of teaching *Brahman-Ātman* oneness, transaction (*vyavahāra*), which is not actually in *Brahman*, is conceived in *Brahman*. This is called *adhyāropa*. The moment *Brahman* is understood through this, *adhyāropa* becomes *apavāda*. i.e. withdrawn; the conceived transaction is withdrawn.

'Does it mean that the *vyavahāra* which is conceived in *Brahman* is imagined

due to *avidyā* (*avidyā -kalpita*)?' No; what is *avidyā -kalpita* has already been explained (*Adhyāsa Bhāṣya* 25.2). From the causal point of view, even *vyavahāra* is true (Cā. Bh. 7.26.1), not false. It should never be forgotten that nothing is *asat* - non-existent, at any time - 'न असत्त्वं कस्यचित् क्वचित्' - (Cā. Bh. 6.2.23). 'If so, how is the *vyavahāra* of creation etc. possible in *Brahman* who is only pure existence? It is wrong to ask this question when the *śruti* tells us it is so. 'This was the one only without a second *sat*' 'सदेव सोग्येदमग्रासीत् एकमेवाद्वितीयं.....तदैक्षत बहुस्यां प्रजायेयेति तत्त्वेजोऽसृजत' - That (*Brahman*) reflected to be born in many forms. It created fire (Cā. 6.21.23) says the *śruti*, which should be understood as such.

'Saying that other *pramāṇas* also apply to *Brahman* since it is an existent object, is wishful thinking. *Brahman*, like *dharma*, can be understood only through *śruti*.' 'Who knows clearly? Who can say from where this multifaceted creation has come out from?' says the *śruti* that even highly evolved souls have difficulty in understanding the cause of the world. So there is no scope for dry logic here. *Prājña* detached from the world becomes *sat-ātman* in deep sleep. This worldless Ātman Himself is creating (the dream world. How?). Though world born out of *Brahman* is not different from it, is not *Brahman* even now the same as it always is? - 'यत् तु उक्तं परिनिष्पन्नत्वात् ब्रह्मणि प्रमाणान्तराणि संभवेयुः इति तदपि मनोरथमात्रम् ।आगममात्र समधिगम्य एव तु अयम् अर्थः धर्मवत् ।को अद्वा वेद क इह प्रवोचत्, इयं विसृष्टिर्यत आबभूव इति चैते ऋचौ सिद्धानाम् अपि इश्वराणां दुर्बोधतां जगत्कारणस्य दर्शयतःन अनेन मिषेण शुष्कतर्कस्य अत्र आत्मलाभः संभवति'स्वप्नान्तबुद्धान्तयोरुभयोः इतरेतरव्यभिचारात् आत्मनः अनन्वागतत्वम् । संप्रसादे च प्रपञ्चपरित्यगेन सदात्मनासंपत्तेः निष्प्रपञ्च सदात्मत्वं प्रपञ्चस्य ब्रह्मप्रभवत्वात् कार्यकारणानन्यन्यायेन ब्रह्माव्यतिरेक' (Sū. Bh. 2.1.6).

(2) Continuing this discussion of *Brahman* being the cause of the world and refuting the view of those who oppose this causality, later *sūtras* deal with the process of creation. Afterwards comes the discussion of 'twam-you'. Just as *Brahman*'s nature was determined by starting with the creation of the world, the *jīva*'s inherent nature is fixed by starting from his doership etc.

So first comes the discussion of the doer *jīva*. Next, in the second *pāda* of the third chapter, 'twam-you' is decided as *prājña*, using the *mahā-tarka* (great logic) of the three states* of universal experience. This *prājña* does not know who he is. To provide this knowledge, his deep sleep experience of 'I did not know anything, I

*waking, dreaming and deep sleep

slept happily' is investigated. It is shown that the reason for his happiness and not knowing anything is the oneness that he obtained with *Brahman* in his deep sleep. So the *sūtras* decide that *prajña* is indeed *Brahman*. By reflection and contemplation of this message 'That you are', one gets the realisation of *Ātman*'s oneness. When this realisation illuminates the intellect, it shows up in the wakeful and dream states as the feeling 'Everything is myself', because everything is *Brahman*. The rest of the Brahma Sūtras discuss the methods of obtaining *vidyā*, its fruit *mokṣa*, the destruction of all *karma* in a *jñānī* and his *pāpa* and *puṇya* etc.

There are four chapters in the Brahma Sūtras: Reconciliation - समन्वयाध्याय, non-conflict-अविरोधाध्याय, practice - साधनाध्याय, fruit - फलाध्याय. In each, there are four *pādas* - sub-chapters and in each *pāda* several *adhikaranas* (groups of *sūtras* dealing with a single topic). There are 192 *adhikaranas* in total. Some *adhikaranas* have only one *sūtra*; the total number of *sūtras* is 555. In each *adhikarana*, there are five steps:

- (1) *Saṅgati*: Meaning connection with the previous topic. For example, the *saṅgati* for the first *sūtra* is *Adhyāsa Bhāṣya*.
- (2) *Viṣaya*: The subject under discussion.
- (3) *Samśaya*: Doubts about the subject.
- (4) *Pūrvapakṣa*: Opposite views
- (5) *Siddhānta*: Final decision derived after refuting the opposite views.



जिज्ञासाधिकरणम्

Jijñāsādhikaraṇam

At the beginning of every book are delineated four things - Its topic (*viṣaya*); Its use (*prayojana*) connection, i.e. how the *viṣaya* and *prayojana* are connected; competence (*adhikārī*), i.e. the one who is entitled to study the book. These are known as *anubandhacatuṣṭaya*. Here *Brahman* is the topic; *mokṣa* - total liberation is the use of studying this topic (*Adhyāsa Bhāṣya* has the purpose of motivating the student for *mokṣa*). The connection between *Brahman* and *mokṣa* is *Brahma-Jñāna*. The one who is competent (for this text *adhikārī*), should have the following qualities: (a). *Viveka*: Discrimination between the eternal and non eternal; (b). *Vairāgya*: Dispassion towards pleasure here or in the other worlds; (c). A group of six qualities: *śama* - control over mind, *dama* - control over sense organs, *uparati* - enjoying the intimacy of God, *titikṣā*—forbearance, *śraddhā* - faith in God, Veda and guru, *samādhāna* - keeping the mind balanced. (d). *Mumukṣā* - Intense desire for *mokṣa*. All these are contained in the *bhāṣya* to the first *sūtra*.

अथातो ब्रह्मजिज्ञासा (१.१.१)

atha = afterwards, *ataḥ* = therefore, *Brahma-jijñāsā* = discussion of *Brahman*

१. वेदान्तमीमांसाशास्त्रस्य व्याचिख्यासितस्य इदम् आदिमं सूत्रम्। तत्र अथ शब्दः आनंतर्यार्थः परिगृह्यते न अधिकारार्थः। ब्रह्मजिज्ञासायाः अनधिकार्यत्वात्। मंगलस्य च वाक्यार्थे समन्वयाभावात्। अर्थान्तर एव हि अथशब्दः श्रुत्या मंगल प्रयोजनो भवति।

1. This is the first *sūtra* of the Vedānta *mimāṃsā śāstra* which is being commented upon. Here the word 'atha' is used in the sense of 'after' not in the sense of 'commencement'; because *Brahma-jijñāsā* is not something which can be commenced. And 'maṅgala' meaning auspicious has no syntactical relation

with the meaning of the sentence. Besides, 'atha' used in another sense can achieve the purpose of auspiciousness by its mere sound.

(1.1) The word 'atha' has four meanings, three of which are: beginning, auspiciousness, and after the study of *dharma*. The fourth will be explained at the end. Which of the first three meanings are implied in this word? The study of Grammar starts with the *sūtra* 'atha śabdānuśāsanam'. The study of Yoga starts with 'atha yoganuśāsanam - beginning of the discipline of yoga'. Similarly, does the *sūtra* here mean 'beginning *Brahma-jijñāsā*'? No; because *jijñāsā* means 'desire to know'. Such a desire is either there or not there. 'Beginning a desire' has no meaning.

Next, auspiciousness also cannot be the meaning of the word 'atha' here, because then the *sūtra* would become 'auspiciouness *Brahma-jijñāsā*', which are two disconnected phrases. But traditionally, great writers commence their books with auspicious words. here also it is true. However, though used for a different purpose, the very utterance of 'atha' plays the role of auspiciousness. *Smṛti* says it like this:

ॐकारश्चाथशब्दश्च द्वावेतौ ब्रह्मणः पुरा । कण्ठं भित्वा विनिर्यातौ तस्मान्माङ्गलिकावुभौ ॥

Before creation 'Om' and 'atha' by themselves emanated from the throat of Brahma; so, both are auspicious'.

२. पूर्वप्रकृतापेक्षायाश्च फलतः आनंतर्याव्यतिरेकात् । सति च आनंतर्यार्थत्वे यथा धर्मजिज्ञासा पूर्ववृत्तं वेदाध्ययनं नियमेन अपेक्षते एवं ब्रह्मजिज्ञासाऽपि यत् पूर्ववृत्तं नियमेन अपेक्षते तद्वक्तव्यम् । स्वाध्यायानन्तर्य तु समानम् ।

2. The reference to what has gone before, does not contradict the meaning 'afterwards'. When the meaning is 'afterwards', just as the desire to know *dharma* is preceded by the learning of the Vedas, what precedes the desire to know *Brahman* is to be said. However, 'after learning of one's own Veda' is common to both *dharma-jijñāsā* and *Brahma-jijñāsā*.

(2). Here *pūrvaprakṛtāpekṣāyāḥ* means with respect to the previous discussion of *dharma* i.e. some people say that '*Brahma-jijñāsā* is to be done only after *dharma-jijñāsā*'. Here only the word 'after' is acceptable to us - but not 'after *dharma-jijñāsā*'. The reason for this becomes clear in the fourth *sūtra*. Of course, learning the Vedas is mandatory before *dharma-jijñāsā*. Similarly, we have to say 'after what' does *Brahma-jijñāsā* have to start? This will be specified later. However, the study of

Vedas is mandatory for *Brahma-jijñāsā* too. *Dharma-jijñāsā* is based on the *Samhitā* and the *Brāhmaṇa* parts of Vedas and *Brahma-jijñāsā* is based on the *Āranyakas* and *Upaniṣads*.

Question: There are some who are not authorised to study the Vedas. How can they get knowledge of *Brahman*?

Answer: They can get it through the *purāṇas* and *itihāsas* (Sū. Bh. 1.3.34-38). Any common man becomes entitled for this knowledge through special duties like *japa*, *upavāsa* and *arādhana* (worship of God) - ‘पुरुषमात्रसम्बन्धिभिः जपोपवासदेवताराधनादिभिः धर्मविशेषैः अनुग्रहः विद्यायाः सम्भवति’ (Sū. Bh.3.4.38).

३. नन्विह कर्मविद्बोधानन्तर्य विशेषः? न, धर्मजिज्ञासायाः प्रागपि अधीत वेदान्तस्य ब्रह्मजिज्ञासोपपत्तेः। यथा च हृदयाद्यवदानानाम् आनन्तर्यनियमः क्रमस्य विवक्षित-त्वात्, न तथा इह क्रमो विवक्षितः। शेषशेषित्वे अधिकृताधिकारे वा प्रमाणाभावत्।

3. Could ‘the knowledge of *karma*’ qualify the word ‘*atha*’? (i.e, *Brahma-jijñāsā* is to be done after acquiring the knowledge of *karma*). No. Even prior to the discussion of *karma*, discussion of *Brahman* is possible for one who has learnt *Vedānta*. For example, just as there is an intention to tell a sequence in the cutting of the heart etc, there is no intention of telling any sequence here. There is no evidence for a sequential relationship of (the type of) subsidiary (*karma*) and principal (*karma*) or of (the type of) eligibility of the person already eligible.

(3). The opponent’s point of view, with respect to the previous discussion of *dharma-jijñāsā* etc. left unfinished, is picked up again here. The opponent’s argument is: ‘Learning the Vedas is necessary for both *dharma-jijñāsā* and *Brahma-jijñāsā*. After getting the knowledge of *karma* from *dharma-jijñāsā* based on the *Samhitās* and *Brāhmaṇas*, *Brahma-jijñāsā*, based on the *Āranyakas* and *Upaniṣads* has to start.’

It is not so. He who has studied the *Upaniṣads* - i.e. *Vedānta* - can start *Brahma-jijñāsā* even prior to *dharma-jijñāsā*. *Bhāsyakāra* gives three arguments for this: In cutting the body of an animal sacrificed in Vedic *yajñas*, the *śruti* says: First the heart, next the tongue and then the chest is to be cut – ‘हृदयस्य अग्ने अवद्यति अथ जिह्वाया अथ वक्षसः’ (Tai. Sam. 6.3.10.10). No such sequence is said anywhere in the *śruti* for *dharma Brahma-jijñāsā*. *Jābāla* *śruti* says that one can go straight from *brahmacarya* to

sannyāsa without passing through the *gr̥hastha* stage (Jā. 4). This means that one can commence *Brahma-jijñāsā* earlier to knowledge of *karma* which is to be got as a *gr̥hastha*.

Similarly, there is no *pramāṇa* for *śeṣa-śeṣitva* also. *Śeṣa* means main *karma* and *śeṣi* is *karma* subsidiary to it, helpful to the *śeṣa karma*. For example, *Darśapūrṇamāsayāga* is the main, *prayājayāga* is the subsidiary. Main *karma* is incomplete without the performance of the subsidiary *karma*. However, there is no *pramāṇa* for a similar sequence between *dharma-Brahma-jijñāsā*. Again, there is no *pramāṇa* for *adhikṛta-adhikārī* type also. *Adhikṛta* is one who is authorised for a particular *karma* because he has the necessary competencies for it. One who is entitled for the main *karma* alone is entitled for subsidiary *karma* also. For example, 'Camasa' is a wooden vessel. Filling it with *ap* (water) is known as *ap-praṇayana*. *Go-dohana* is vessel in which cow's milk is milked. Doing *ap-praṇayana* in *go-dohana* is subsidiary *karma* in *darśapūrṇamāsayāga*. One who is *adhikṛta* for *darśapūrṇamāsayāga* only is competent for doing *ap-praṇayana* in *go-dohana* if he desires to have a lot of cows. There is no such *pramāṇa* in the *śāstras* saying that the *adhikārī* of *karma* alone is *adhikārī* for *Brahman*'s knowledge.

४. धर्मब्रह्मा जिज्ञासयोः फलजिज्ञास्य भेदाच्च। अभ्युदयफलं धर्मज्ञानम्, तच्च
अनुष्ठानापेक्षम्। निःश्रेयसफलं तु ब्रह्मज्ञानम्, न च अनुष्ठानान्तरापेक्षम्। भव्यश्च धर्मो
जिज्ञास्यः न ज्ञानकाले अस्ति, पुरुषव्यापारतन्त्रत्वात्। इह तु भूतं ब्रह्म जिज्ञास्यं, नित्यत्वात्
न पुरुषव्यापारतन्त्रम्।

4. Between the discussion of *dharma* and *Brahman*, there is also difference in the fruits and objects of enquiry. The result of *dharma* is prosperity which depends on any performance of (*karma*). But the knowledge of *Brahman* has *mokṣa* as its fruit and it does not depend on any performance. The topic in *dharma* discussion (viz, *karma*) is not there at the time of knowing, because, it is dependent on the person's performance (of *karma*). But here the topic of discussion is existent *Brahman* which does not depend on human performance.

(4). To refute the rule that '*Brahma-jijñāsā* is only after *dharma-jijñāsā*' the second reason is given. For example, the knowledge of the *karma* of *jyotiṣṭomayāga* is obtained through *dharma-jijñāsā*. The fruit of *jyoīṣṭomayāga* is heaven, which depends on the

performance of the *yāga* by the person. However, this fruit is not obtained by the mere knowledge of the *karma*; it depends only on the performance of the *karma* (*yāga*). The fruit is also not obtained immediately after the *yāga*, one has to wait for it. This fruit is also short-lived. But *Brahma-jijñāsā* is the exact opposite of this. Its fruit is *mokṣa*, which does not depend on any performance by the person after he has received the knowledge of *Brahman*. There is no waiting time either; *mokṣa* is the immediate fruit of *Brahma-jñāna*. *Mokṣa* is eternal. Therefore, knowing this difference through *śruti pramāṇa*, the one desirous of *mokṣa*, will not be interested at all in *dharma-jijñāsā*. Next comes the third reason:

५. चोदनाप्रवृत्तिभेदाच्च। या हि चोदना धर्मस्य लक्षणम्, सा स्वविषये नियुज्ञानैव पुरुषम् अवबोधयति। ब्रह्मचोदना तु पुरुषम् अवबोधयत्येव केवलम्। अवबोधस्य चोदनाजन्यत्वात् न पुरुषोऽवबोधे नियुज्यते। यथा अक्षार्थसन्निकर्षेण अर्थावबोधे, तद्वत्। तस्मात् किमपि वक्तव्यं यदनन्तरं ब्रह्मजिज्ञासा उपदिश्यते इति।

5. There is also difference in the response (on listening) to the Vedic sentences. The features of the sentence explaining *dharma* is that it engages the person in its topic (of *karma*). But *Brahman*-related sentences merely inform the person (about *Brahman*). Since knowledge is produced from the sentence itself, the person is not directed to get the knowledge. This is as in the case of knowing an object when it is in contact with the sense organ. Therefore, it is to be told, what is it after which (we are) instructed to take up the discussion of *Brahman*.

(5.1) It is the difference in the motivation generated by *codanā*. *Codanā* is a Vedic sentence and *lakṣaṇa* is *pramāṇa*. The sentences which are a *pramāṇa* for *dharma* direct one towards injunction and prohibition (*vidhi-niṣedha*). But the sentences of the *Upaniṣads*, which are *pramāṇa* for the knowledge of *Brahman*, just narrate the *Brahman-Ātman* oneness; they do not direct a person to do anything. Really speaking, no *pramāṇa* - except the *karma* part of the Vedas - orders or motivates a person to do anything. For example, following the contact of the eye with an object, the eye only informs that 'the object is so and so'; it does not direct a person to do anything.

(5.2) Some other objections and refutations are as follows:

Objection: Some sentences from *śruti* and *smṛti* say that *jñāna* should be attempted only after doing *karma*. For example, ‘तमेतं वेदानुवचनेन ब्राह्मणा विविदिषन्ति यज्ञेन दानेन तपसानाशकेन’ - *Brāhmaṇas* desire to know him after *Vedānuvacana*, *yajña*, *dāna*—gifting and the penance called *anāśaka* (Br. 4.4.22), ‘न कर्मणाम् अनारम्भात् नैष्कर्म्यम् अशनुते’ - By not doing *karma*, man does not get *mokṣa* (*Gītā* 3.4) etc. One has to do *karma* to know that its fruit is not eternal.

Answer: It is not like that. As the result of the *karma* performed in previous lives, one can get the eligibility for knowledge of *Brahman* without performing *karma* again in this life.

(5.3) Objection: Is it not mandatory that one should free oneself from the three debts: gods, *r̥sis* and the manes (*pitṛas*)?

Answer: Repaying the three debts is mandatory for the householder. Since the previously quoted *Jābāla śruti* allows for *sannyāsa* straight from student life, this duty is not inevitable for getting *jñāna*.

(5.4) Objection: In *upāsanās* like *udgīta* etc, one has to view them as *Brahman* by injunction. *Brahma-jijñāsā* is necessary for that. So, *Brahma-jijñāsā* is subsidiary to *upāsanā*.

Answer: No. These *upāsanās* need the knowledge of *saguṇa Brahman*. If these *upāsanās* are done without desire, the intellect becomes clean and so help in getting knowledge of *nirguṇa Brahman*.

This *sūtra* is however discussing the *nirguṇa Brahman* (determined in the second chapter of the *Brahma Sūtras*). This can never be subsidiary to *karma*. Bhāsyakāra proves this in the fourth *sūtra*.

६. उच्यते, नित्यानित्यवस्तुविवेकः इहामुत्रार्थभोगविरागः शमादिसाधना संपत् मूमुक्षुत्वं च। तेषु हि सत्सु प्रागपि धर्मजिज्ञासायाः ऊर्ध्वं च शक्यते ब्रह्म जिज्ञासितुं ज्ञातुं च, न विपर्यये। तस्मात् अथशब्देन यथोक्तसाधनसंपत्त्यानन्तर्यम् उपदिश्यते।

6. It will be told: discrimination of things eternal and non-eternal, dispassion for things of enjoyment here and in other worlds, the wealth of practices such as control of mind, control of senses etc., and desire for *mokṣa*. If they are present, it is possible to discuss *Brahman* and also know It even prior to the discussion of dharma and after it too; not otherwise. Therefore, the word

'after' intimates that 'after (the possession) of the wealth of practices mentioned above'.*

(6) In this way, after giving three reasons, the objection that *Brahma-jijñāsā* should come only after *dharma-jijñāsā* - is refuted. Since it has been accepted that the meaning of the word 'atha' is afterwards, the question arises 'after what?' The answer is:

७. अतः शब्दो हेत्वर्थः। यस्मात् वेद एव अग्निहोत्रादीनां श्रेयः साधनानाम् अनित्यफलतां दर्शयति “तद्यथेह कर्मजितो लोकः क्षीयते एवमेवामुत्र पुण्यजितो लोकः क्षीयते” (छां. ८.१.६) इत्यादिः। तथा ब्रह्मविज्ञानादपि परं पुरुषार्थ दर्शयति “ब्रह्मविदाप्नोति परम्” (तै. २.१) इत्यादिः। तस्मात् यथोक्त्साधनसंपत्यनन्तरं ब्रह्मजिज्ञासा कर्तव्या।

7. (The word) 'therefore' signifies reason. Veda itself shows that *agnihotra* etc which are means to prosperity have an impermanent fruit (by saying that) "As here (the enjoyment) acquired by *karma* perishes, that acquired elsewhere through *karma* also perishes" etc. Similarly, it shows also that the supreme goal of man results from the knowledge of *Brahman* (by saying) "One who knows *Brahman* attains the Supreme" etc. Therefore, after acquiring the aforesaid wealth of means, discussion of *Brahman* is to be done.

(7) There are some sentences like 'after sipping *soma*, we become deathless', meaning that the fruits of heaven etc are eternal. Veda itself clarifies by saying that they are in praise of that *karma*; but the fruit of that *karma* is certainly not eternal. On the other hand *mokṣa*, which is the fruit of the knowledge of *Brahman*, is indeed

*Section 6 refers to four qualifications required for receiving *Brahma-jñāna*. They are 1. *Nityānitya vastu viveka* ability to discriminate eternal and ephemeral things, 2. *Ihāmutrartha bhogavirāga*—disinterest in the pleasures of this world and other worlds like heaven etc., 3. *Śamādi ṣaṭsampatti* (six kinds of wealth). They are : (a) *Śama* - controlling the mind from wandering outwards, (b) *Dama* - Controlling the sense organs from contact with their respective sensuous object and the motor organs from indulging in unnecessary activity (c) *Uparati* - Enjoying intimacy with God alone (d) *Titikṣā* - putting up with three types of troubles viz, *ādhyātmika* - bodily and mental, *ādhidaivika*—due to nature like heat/cold etc, *ādhibhoutika* - caused by other creatures. (e) *Śraddhā* - Total faith in God, scriptures and the guru, (f) *Samādhāna* - mental poise in the midst of ups and downs of life and finally 4. *Mumukṣutva* - an urgent desire for *mokṣa*.

eternal. Therefore, one with the qualities of *viveka* etc (mentioned above in 2.1) should get into *Brahma-jijñāsā*.

८. ब्रह्मणो जिज्ञासा ब्रह्मजिज्ञासा। ब्रह्म च वक्ष्यमाण लक्षणम् “जन्माद्यस्य यतः” इति। अत एव न ब्रह्मशब्दस्य जात्याद्यर्थान्तरम् आशङ्कितव्यम्।

8. *Brahma-jijñāsā* is discussion of *Brahman*. *Brahman* is defined by the feature to be specified later as '(That) by which the creation etc of this (world)'. For this very reason, there cannot be the doubt of any other meaning like *jāti* etc for the word '*Brahman*'.

(8) The word *Brahman* has several meanings in *śruti* and *smṛti* like the brahmin caste, the four-headed Brahmā, Vedas and even *jīva*. Here the word is not used in any of these senses. It is used for the cause of the creation, sustenance and destruction of the world, indicated in the next *sūtra*.

९. ब्रह्मणः इति कर्मणि षष्ठी न शेषे, जिज्ञास्यापेक्षत्वात् जिज्ञासायाः जिज्ञास्यान्तर अनिर्देशाच्च। ननु शेषषष्ठीपरिग्रहेऽपि ब्रह्मणो जिज्ञासाकर्मत्वं न विरुद्ध्यते, संबंध सामान्यस्य विशेषनिष्ठत्वात्? एवमपि प्रत्यक्षं ब्रह्मणः कर्मत्वम् उत्सृज्य सामान्यद्वारेण परोक्षं कर्मत्वं कल्पयतो व्यर्थः प्रयासः स्यात्। न व्यर्थः, ब्रह्माश्रित अशेषविचार-प्रतिज्ञानार्थत्वात् इति चेत्? न। प्रधानपरिग्रहे तदपेक्षितानाम् अर्थाक्षिप्तत्वात्। ब्रह्म हि ज्ञानेन आप्नुमिष्टतमत्वात् प्रधानम्। तस्मिन् प्रधाने जिज्ञासा कर्मणि परिगृहीते यैर्जिज्ञासितैर्विना ब्रह्म जिज्ञासितं न भवति तानि अर्थाक्षिप्तान्येव इति न पृथक् सूत्रयितव्यानि। यथा “राजासौ गच्छति” इत्युक्ते सपरिवारस्य राजो गमनम् उक्तं भवति, तद्वत्।

9. 'Of *Brahman*' is in the Sixth Case in accusative sense and not in the residuary sense—because, discussion requires what is desired to be known and nothing else is indicated for discussion. 'Even accepting the Sixth Case in the residuary sense, *Brahman* being the object of discussion is not violated because, the general relationship has to end in the principal object itself'. Even thus, discarding the direct objectness of *Brahman* and imagining indirect objectness is a vain effort. 'It is not in vain if it is said that it has the premise of enquiring into everything dependent on *Brahman* without exception.' No. with

the acceptance of the principal, whatever is dependent on it will also be covered. *Brahman* is the principal because it is most desired to be attained by knowledge. If the principal is accepted as the object of discussion, those things without discussing which the discussion of *Brahman* will not be complete, will all be implied; hence, they need not be stated separately in the sūtra—just as, when it is said ‘Here goes the king’, the going of the king along with his retinue is implied.

(9) ज्ञातुम् (to know) इच्छा (desire) is जिज्ञासा *jijñāsā*. In *Brahmaṇo jijñāsā*, the word *Brahmaṇo* stands for ‘of *Brahman*’. This is in the sixth case, which is used in two contexts: (a) The desire to know things related to *Brahman*; this is called *śeṣaṣaṣṭhī*; (b) The desire to know *Brahman* itself directly; this is called *karmaṣaṣṭhī*. The question is: In this sūtra, the sixth case is used in which sense? Is it *śeṣaṣaṣṭhī* or *karmaṣaṣṭhī*? i.e., is the *jijñāsā* for things related to *Brahman*? or *Brahman* Itself?

The Opponent’s View: In the first sense, *Brahman* is also included in things related to *Brahman*. So, there is nothing wrong in accepting *śeṣaṣaṣṭhī* here.

Vedantin: What you say is true. But in *śeṣa*, the related things become important and *Brahman* secondary. In *karmaṣaṣṭhī*, it is not like that. The importance is for the knowledge of *Brahman* Itself and related things are secondary but do not get included. It is because with the knowledge of *Brahman*, the knowledge of related things are also obtained. But with the knowledge of related things, the knowledge of *Brahman* is not obtained. So, by taking the second sense, unnecessary effort is avoided.

Question: What are the things related to *Brahman*?

Answer: We say the objects of the world. In the example given by Bhāsyakāra above, the king is *Brahman* and objects of the world are his retinue. This is explained in Bṛhadāraṇyaka bhāṣya like this: ‘Not knowing being common, Ātman is to be known and also *unātman*. When it is so, why is stress given (in śāstra) to contemplate on Ātman only? We reply that Ātman which is our concern is what we have to obtain and not the other. The phrase ‘of all this’ is used in the sixth case of fixing (the object of the desire to know) amongst all this. This Ātman - this Ātmatattwam - the inherent nature of the *jīvātman* (is the one to be known). ‘Is not the other thing to be known?’ It is not like that. Though it is to be known, its knowledge does not

need anything other than *Ātman*'s knowledge. 'How?' It is because, knowing *Ātman*, one will know the un-*Ātman* also - everything. अनिर्जातत्वसामान्यात् आत्मा ज्ञातव्यः अनात्मा च। तत्र कस्मात् आत्मोपासने एव यत्त आस्थीयते 'आत्मेत्येवोपासीत' इति? न इतरं विज्ञाने इति?

अत्र उच्यते—तत् एतत् एवं प्रकृतं पदनीयं गमनीयं न अन्यत्। 'अस्य सर्वस्य' इति निर्धारणार्था षष्ठी। अस्मिन् सर्वस्मिन् इति अर्थः। 'यदयमात्मा' यदेतदात्मतत्त्वम्। किं न विज्ञातव्यम् एव अन्यत्? न। किं तर्हि? ज्ञातव्यत्वे अपि न पृथगज्ञानान्तरम् अपेक्षते आत्मज्ञानात्। कस्मात्? अनेनात्मना ज्ञातेन हि यस्मात् एतत् सर्वम् अनात्मजातम् अन्यत् यत् सर्वं समस्तं वेद जानाति (Br. Bh. 1.4.7). *Ātman* in these sentences is *prājña* (who is really *Brahman*) and *un-Ātman* is the world which is also *Brahman*. It is because of not knowing these two that one is doing *adhyāsa* - superimposing in both directions. The world indeed is *Ātman* only, but the ignorant person thinks it is *un-Ātman*. So its *un-Ātmanness*, imagined due to *avidyā* is illusory - 'अविद्ययैव अनात्मत्वं परिकल्पितं, न तु परमार्थतः आत्म व्यतिरेकेण अस्ति किंचित्' (Br. Bh. 2.4.14). So, the knowledge of things related to *Brahman* is not the big desire; the big desire is to know *Brahman* itself.

In this way, since knowledge of *Brahman* subsumes the knowledge of things related to it, the *sūtra* does not have to say it separately. The features of a *sūtra* are described as follows:

अल्पाक्षरमसन्दिग्धं सारवद् विश्वतोमुखम्। अस्तोभमनवद्यज्ञ सूत्रं सूत्रविदो विदुः॥

Without using unnecessary words (*astobham*), giving scope to see the issue from different angles (*viśwatomukham*) a *sūtra* speaks about a very significant matter (*sāravat*), in a faultless way (*anavadyam*), unambiguously (*asandigdham*) and in a few letters (*alpākṣaram*).

१०. श्रुत्यनुगमाच्च। “यतो वा इमानि भूतानि जायन्ते” (तै. ३. १) इत्याद्याः श्रुतयः “तद्विजिज्ञासस्व, तद्ब्रह्म” (तै. ३. १) इति प्रत्यक्षमेव ब्रह्मणो जिज्ञासाकर्मत्वं दर्शयन्ति। तच्च कर्मणि षष्ठीपरिग्रहे सूत्रेण अनुगतं भवति। तस्मात् ब्रह्मणः इति कर्मणि षष्ठी।

10. This is also in conformity with *śruti*. *Śrutis* like "from where these beings originate" etc explicitly show that *Brahman* is the principal object of discussion (by saying) 'Discuss that; that is *Brahman*'. That will conform to the *sūtra* if the Sixth Case is accepted in the accusative sense. Therefore, 'Of *Brahman*' is in the Sixth Case in the accusative sense.

११. ज्ञातुम् इच्छा जिज्ञासा। अवगतिपर्यन्तं ज्ञानं सन्वाच्याया इच्छायाः कर्म।
फलविषयत्वादिच्छायाः। ज्ञानेन हि प्रमाणेन अवगन्तु इष्टं ब्रह्म। ब्रह्मावगतिर्हि पुरुषार्थः।
निश्शेष-संसारबीज-अविद्याद्यनर्थ-निर्बहृणात्। तस्माद्ब्रह्म विजिज्ञासितव्यम्।

11. *Jijñāsā* is the desire to know. The knowledge culminating in experience is the object of desire expressed by the *san*-suffix, because the fruit is the object of desire. The knowing of *Brahman* is the *pramāṇa*—i.e., the valid means of knowledge—through which experience is desired. The experience of *Brahman* is the human goal because it destroys tracelessly all the evil seeds of *samsāra*—transmigration or worldly life in general—like *avidyā* etc. Therefore, *Brahman* has to be discussed.

(11.1) Desire to know is *jijñāsā*. The *sā* here is called *san* suffix. So, the meaning of this suffix is desire and knowledge is the object of this desire. What is knowledge? It is the modification of the intellect in accordance with the object. This has been said even in the beginning. The knowledge of all limited objects generates a corresponding modification in the intellect. When this is so, the question that arises in knowing *Brahman* is: *Brahman* is formless. So how can a corresponding modification occur in the intellect? Following this objection, *śruti* also says ‘अप्राप्य मनसा सह’ - Unapproachable even by mind (Tai. 2.4). However, another *śruti* says ‘मनसैवानुदृष्टव्यम्’ - It has to be grasped by the mind alone (Br.4.4.19). These two sentences are contradictory. How to reconcile them? The sentence in the text ‘अवगतिपर्यन्तं ज्ञानं सन्वाच्याया इच्छायाः कर्म’ - The knowledge culminating in *avagati* is the object of desire indicated by the *san* suffix shows the way.

(11.2) In order to know them, the intellect is constantly interacting with changing, inert and limited objects. This has been happening since the infinite past. So, the intellect has become dirty, coloured and blunt. Such an intellect cannot grasp *Brahman* which is unchanging, conscious and unlimited. However, a competent person - i.e. with the qualities of *viveka*, *vairāgya* etc. mentioned in the beginning of this *sūtra* - can get the knowledge of *Brahman* when his intellect becomes clean, transparent and sharp by constant practice. That is, his intellect becomes as formless and motionless like *Brahman* with Its understanding (G. Bh. 6.20) - ‘अत्यन्तनिर्मलत्वं अतिस्वच्छत्वं अतिसूक्ष्मत्वं उपपत्तेः आत्मनः बुद्धेः च आत्मसमनैर्मल्यात् उपपत्तेः आत्मचैतन्याकाराभासत्वं उपपत्तिः’ - *Ātman* is totally clean, transparent and extremely sharp.

If the intellect also is equally clean etc, the intellect does reflect *Ātman's* features (G. Bh. 18.50) (The *Ātman* in this sentence is *Brahman*)*.

This formless, motionless 'modification' of the intellect represents the knowledge of *Brahman* 'अकल्पकं सर्वकल्पनावर्जितं...ज्ञानं-ज्ञेयेन परमार्थसत्ता ब्रह्मणा अभिनं...सत्यं ज्ञानं अनन्तम् इत्यादि श्रुतिभ्यः' - This formless knowledge is not different from the object *Brahman*. That the śruti says *Brahman* is *satyam*, *jñānam* and *anantam* is the *pramāṇa* for this (Mā. Kā. 3.33).

Next, what is *avagati*? How is *avagati* obtained starting from this knowledge? These questions need answers.

(11.3) The answer to these questions is shown by the sentence: 'ज्ञानेन हि प्रमाणेन अवगन्तुम् इत्यं ब्रह्म' - The desire is to realize *Brahman* through the *pramāṇa* of Its knowledge'. For this *pramāṇa*, what is the *prameya* - object? Who is the *pramāṭa* - knower? The object has to be *Brahman* because, when the aspirant was in search of the unchanging, conscious and limitless *Brahman*, this extraordinary modification of the intellect occurred. At least, during that time, this modification is changeless and timeless. It also has the feature of consciousness, because: Any modification of the knowledge of finite objects has an adjective and a noun. For example, in the 'knowledge of the pot', 'of the pot' is the adjective and 'knowledge' is the noun. These qualified knowledges are changing according to the objects. But the noun 'knowledge' is unchanging. This is called 'consciousness' which is the second characteristic of *Brahman* - also called *jñapti* (Tai. Bh. 2.1) by Bhāsyakāra. This formless, motionless 'modification' being attributeless is not different from *jñapti*. Therefore, the object of this knowledge is *Brahman*. 'ब्रह्म ज्ञेयं यस्य स्वस्य तदिदं ब्रह्म ज्ञेयम्' - *Brahman* which is the object for him is the object-*Brahman* (Mā. Kā. 3.33). Next, who Is the knower of this *Brahman*? The extrovert wakeful aspirant (*bahisprajña*) who is having this special modification is the knower.

*Here 'clean' means free from universally accepted bad qualities like lust, anger, greed etc. This cleanliness is not sufficient for *Brahma-jñāna*; the intellect should be 'transparent' also, i.e. without any prejudice or bias. Only then it would know anything as it is. Further, it also needs 'sharpness'. The intellect loses its ability to grasp subtle ideas - becomes blunt - if it is used for understanding crude things. *Brahman* is the subtlest. So, to grasp it, the intellect must be extremely pure, extremely transparent and extremely subtle - like *Brahman* Itself.}

(11.4) What is *avagati*? It is the experience of the oneness of *Brahman-Ātman*. The aforesaid knowledge is the *pramāṇa* for it. Himself is the knower and *Brahman* is the known. Therefore, in this transaction of knower and the known, there is oneness. How to obtain oneness starting from this duality? It is like this: *Brahman* is always *jñapti* - consciousness. But the 'modification' of the intellect corresponding to *Brahman* is a reflection of *Brahman* in the intellect - not *Brahman* Itself, not consciousness itself. Since it does not always stay in formlessness, it is not immutable. So, it is not right to know it as Oneself. It is also impossible for a knower to feel oneness with the known. But the *prājña*, who is between the knower and the known, is Himself and also *Brahman*. 'How?' It is like this: *Prājña* has all the features of *Brahman*, he is not an image of *Brahman*, he is *Brahman* itself. 'He is clean like water, he is without a second. Therefore, this is fearless, this is *Paramātman*. This is the ultimate goal the *jīva* has to reach, this is the greatest wealth, this is the greatest heaven. This is the greatest bliss - 'सत्त्वं एको द्रष्टाद्वैतो भवति.....एषास्य परमागतिः एषास्य परमासंपत् एषोऽस्य परमो लोकः । एषोऽस्य परम आनन्दः' (Br. 4.3.32).

Further, *prājña* is himself also, because he has *avidyā* which is the absence of the realisation that he is *Brahman*. Indeed, he is the *Brahman* who is yet to realize 'he is *Brahman*'. Since he has already understood *Brahman* directly through *jñāna-pramāṇa* and also since all the features of *Brahman* are being experienced in *susupti*, it is not impossible to realise his oneness with *Brahman*. It is being experienced within the body - 'देहेष्वेव विभाव्यमानत्वात्' (G.Bh. 13.16).

'तेन आत्मस्वरूपेण अजेन ज्ञानेन अजं ज्ञेयम् आत्मतत्त्वं स्वयमेव बुध्यते' - From that unborn consciousness which is his inherent nature *ātmatattwa*—i.e, *prājña* - realizes himself as the unborn *Brahman* (Mā. Kā. 3.33). Therefore, the aspirant should keep his intellect continuously flowing towards *Ātman* with the awareness 'I am *Brahman*' generated by *śruti*. This is called *nididhyāsana* or *jñāna-niṣṭhā*. With this, the relationship of *adhyāsa* with the intellect drops off; along with this, *prājnata* also drops off. Proceeding in this way, when *jñāna-niṣṭhā* which started with *jñāna-pramāṇa* culminates in the realization of *Brahman-Ātman* oneness, the aspirant settles down in the oneness of *Ātman*. Therefore, without feeling tired, one should pursue in *jñāna-niṣṭhā* for realization. Since *Brahman* is the goal of everything, this realisation expresses itself in waking and dreaming states as *sarvātmabhāva* - everything is himself. This may happen very quickly for great people, for others it may require

several lives. The Gītā says: 'बहूनं जन्मनामते ज्ञानवान् मां प्रपद्यते । वासुदेवः सर्वमिति' - The man with *jñāna* reaches me at the end of many lives and realizes that everything is Vāsudev' (Gītā 7.19). With this realization, both the entities grasped as 'you' and 'T' (first words in the *Adhyāsa Bhāṣya*) drop off; all nonsense (*anartha*) comes to an end. Therefore, this is the highest human goal. So, one desirous of Ātman, should discuss about *Brahman**.

(11.5) Another question: In part (7) of the bhāṣya it is said: 'ब्रह्मजिज्ञासा कर्तव्या'- *Brahma-jijñāsā* should be done. In (11), the same is said - 'ब्रह्म विजिज्ञासितव्यम्'। In Taittariya Bhāṣya it is said 'ब्रह्म विजिज्ञासस्व' - Desire the clear knowledge of *Brahman*. The meaning of all these is the same: Do or have the desire for *Brahma-jñāna*. But this does not reconcile with the former sentences because: 'तस्मात् किम् अपि वक्तव्यं यद् अनन्तरं ब्रह्मजिज्ञासा उपदिश्यते इति'- Having said 'therefore it is to be told after what is *Brahma-jijñāsā* to be taught?' (section 5 of text), the answer is given as 'after *sādhana-sampatti*' - i.e., the qualities of discrimination, dispassion etc., which make one competent for Ātman's knowledge (section 6 of text). Desire for *mokṣa* is included in these set of qualities. Hence, to one who is already having desire for *mokṣa*, the advice to have desire for knowledge or *mokṣa* is not meaningful. So, what is the

***Question:** It is a strange situation: While demonstrating that *adhyāsa* is *mithyājñāna*, clear separation is shown between *kṣetra* and *kṣetrajña*, using the shell-silver example. But after realising that *kṣetrajña* is *Brahman*, *kṣetra* is shown to be non-different from *Brahman* (though *Brahman* is different from *kṣetra*) using the gold-ornament example. What exactly is happening?

Answer: *Adhyāsa* is the relation between the *kṣetra* and the Self and effect-cause is the relation between *kṣetra* and *Brahman*. Therefore, either way, during *avidyā* or *vidyā*, Self is different from *kṣetra*. But clarity is needed only in the reverse direction, viz., what is the relation of the *kṣetra* with the Self? The answer is: During *avidyā*, *kṣetra* is **different** from Self - **but not as a rule**; there is a sense of oneness with some selected parts of *kṣetra* - like one's own body and the difference in some other parts - like his enemies. But during *vidyā*, *kṣetra* is **non-different** from Self **as a rule**. To remove the inconsistency in the ignorant person, *śāstra* proceeds as follows: It is clear that *prājña* has all the characteristics of *Brahman*, viz., *satya*, *jñāna*, *ananta*, *ānanda* and oneness. So, *prājña* is *Brahman*. After realising this, he is different from *kṣetra* as he was before. Now with the help of *śruti* he realises that the whole of *kṣetra* is himself and his previous inconsistency is removed.

meaning of the sentences in the beginning of this paragraph? Answer is this: *Jijñāsā* has two meanings: (1). Desire to know and (2). Discussion. The second meaning is in common usage. So the three sentences above mean 'do discuss about *Brahman*'. For knowledge of *Brahman*, Its discussion is necessary. For discussion of *dharma*, *śruti* etc. are the only *pramāṇas*; not so in the case of discussion on *Brahman*. *Śruti* and experience are *pramāṇas* as the occasion arises, because knowledge of *Brahman* has to culminate in its experience and it is an existent object - 'न धर्मज्ञासायाम् इव श्रुत्यादयः एव प्रमाणं ब्रह्मज्ञासायाम् किन्तु श्रुत्यादयः अनुभवादयः च यथासम्भवम् इह प्रमाणम्। अनुभवावसानत्वाद् भूतवस्तुविषयत्वात् च ब्रह्मज्ञानस्य ।' (Sū. Bh.1.1.2)

१२. तत् पुनर्ब्रह्म प्रसिद्धमप्रसिद्धं वा स्यात्। यदि प्रसिद्धम्, न जिज्ञासितव्यम्। अथ अप्रसिद्धम्, नैव शक्यं जिज्ञासितुमिति। उच्यते। अस्ति तावद् ब्रह्म नित्य-शुद्धबुद्धमुक्तस्वभावम्, सर्वज्ञम्, सर्वशक्तिसमन्वितम्। ब्रह्मशब्दस्य हि व्युत्पाद्यमानस्य नित्यशुद्धत्वादयः अर्थाः प्रतीयन्ते। बृहतेर्थातोः अर्थानुगमात्। सर्वस्य आत्मत्वाच्च ब्रह्मास्तित्वप्रसिद्धिः। सर्वो हि आत्मास्तित्वं प्रत्येति, न नाहमस्मि इति। यदि हि नात्मास्तित्वं प्रसिद्धिः स्यात् सर्वो लोको नाहमस्मि इति प्रतीयात्। आत्मा च ब्रह्म।

12. 'That *Brahman* again could be well-known or unknown. If well-known, it need not be discussed; if unknown, it cannot be discussed.' We say: There does exist *Brahman* which is by nature eternally pure, enlightened and free, omniscient and endowed with all powers. If the word *Brahman* is extracted in conformity with the meaning of the root 'Brahm', the meanings of eternal purity etc. will emerge. Also because of being the *Ātman* of all, the existence of *Brahman* is well known. Everyone indeed cognizes his existence, None says 'I do not exist'. Had not the existence of *Ātman* been well known, everyone would have said 'I do not exist'. That *Ātman* is *Brahman*.

(12.1) It has been said that discussion of *Brahman* has to be done. This leads to the following objection: If *Brahman* is famous i.e., already known to everyone, then discussion is unnecessary. If It is not famous i.e., unknown to everyone, discussion is not possible. So how can discussion be done?

Answer: *Brahman* is not famous; so discussion is necessary and *Brahman* is famous, so discussion is possible. It is famous in the sense that everyone has some

faint knowledge that 'there is some such thing'. It is not famous in the sense that there is no clear knowledge of *Brahman*.

Objection: Common people will not have even heard of the word *Brahman*. How do you say It is famous?

Answer: This is the answer to those who know the word *Brahman*. The origination of the world itself establishes an eternal, clean, enlightened, free *Brahman*'s existence. Starting from the root 'बृहि वृद्धौ' - Grown unrestrictedly if the word is constructed as 'बृहणाद् ब्रह्म' - It means that *Brahman* is limitless, grown without damaging its inherent nature. This leads to Its features: After growth also, It remains as It was before growth, so It is eternally clean. Since It grows by Itself, It has to be a conscious activity. So, It is eternally enlightened. Though grown unrestrictedly, It has not left Its cleanliness and enlightenment. So, It is eternally free. Therefore, it follows that there is the object *Brahman* following the meaning of the word *Brahman*.

(12.2) Next, it is shown that *Brahman* is famous amongst all - those who know the meaning of the word *Brahman* or those who do not know, whether scholars or laymen: *Prājña*, the inner *Ātman*, is in the experience of all. No one says that he is not existing 'though he is not understanding the world or even himself' (Cā. 8.11.1). No one says 'I was dead in *susupti*, I was not alive'. It is true that during *susupti* itself, nobody is aware that he was not knowing anything and that he was happy. Nevertheless, after waking up, everyone says: 'न किंचदवेदिषं सुखमहमस्वाप्सम्' - I was not knowing anything, I slept happily. In this way, *prājña* is famous. This *Ātman* Itself is *Brahman* - '*Ātmā ca Brahma*' - says Bhāsyakāra. This is because, during that time, the reason for not knowing anything and for the experience of extreme bliss is the oneness that he had obtained with *Brahman* - says the *śruti*. So *Brahman* is famous.

(12.3) It is to be noticed that this proof for the fame of *Brahman* (in the form of *prājña*), cannot apply to the fourth *Ātman* because, he is as unknown as *Brahman*. So, it is also wrong to take fourth *Ātman* in place of the entity grasped as 'I' - *kṣetrajna* the *pratyagātman* (inside *Ātman*). Not only that. Even in this section of the *bhāṣya* the *Ātman* referred to is *prājña* only. Just as in the sentences like 'अयमात्मा ब्रह्म' - This *Ātman* is *Brahman* etc, here too, the *Ātman* in 'आत्मा च ब्रह्म' - is *prājña* only: 'ब्रह्म अयम् आत्मा । कोऽसौ? यः प्रत्यगात्मा द्रष्टा श्रोता मन्ता बोद्धा विज्ञाता - This *Ātman* is *Brahman*. Who is He? *Pratyagātman* the seer, the listener, the thinker, the knower (Br. Bh. 2.5.19).

(12.4) Question: How is that in *susupti*, the *pratyagātman*'s oneness was the reason for his not knowing anything and his experience of extreme happiness?

Answer: During the waking state, the mind, eyes and the outside forms are posed as separate due to *avidyā*. Therefore, there are qualified knowledges of forms, i.e., seeing the forms with eyes, grasping them with his mind etc.. But in the case of *Brahman*, none of these is different from It. So, though *Brahman* is of the nature of consciousness, there are no qualified knowledges in It. Therefore, if *pratyagātman* does not have qualified knowledges in *susupti*, the reason is the oneness he had with *Brahman* - 'यद् हि तद् विशेषदर्शनकारणम् अन्तःकरणं चक्षुः रूपं च, तदविद्यया अन्यत्वेन प्रत्युपस्थापितमासीत्। तदेतस्मिन् काले एकीभूतम् आत्मनः परेण परिष्वङ्गात्।अयं तु सर्वात्मना संपरिष्वक्तः स्वेन परेण प्राज्ञेन आत्मना प्रिययेव पुरुषः। तेन न पृथक्त्वेन व्यवस्थितानि करणानि विषयाश्च। तदभावाद् विशेषदर्शनं नास्ति'। (Br. Bh.4.3.23). Further, *Brahman* is also of the nature of bliss (*Paramānanda*). So, during *susupti*, *pratyagātman* experiences that bliss also.

१३. यदि तर्हि लोके ब्रह्म आत्मत्वेन प्रसिद्धमस्ति ततः ज्ञातमेव इति अजिज्ञास्यत्वं पुनरापन्नम्। न। तद्विशेषं प्रति विप्रतिपत्तेः। देहमात्रं चैतन्यविशिष्टम् आत्मा इति प्राकृता जनाः लोकायतिकाश्च प्रतिपत्ताः। इन्द्रियाण्येव चेतनानि आत्मा इत्यपरे। मन इत्यन्ये। विज्ञानमात्रं क्षणिकमित्येके शून्यमित्यपरे। अस्ति देहादिव्यतिरिक्तः संसारी कर्ता भोक्ता इत्यपरे। भोक्तैव केवलं न कर्ता इत्येके। अस्ति तद्व्यतिरिक्त ईश्वरः सर्वज्ञः सर्वशक्तः इति केचित्। आत्मा स भोक्ता इत्यपरे। एवं बहवो विप्रतिपत्ताः युक्ति-वाक्य-तदा-भास-समाश्रयाःसन्तः। तत्र अविचार्य यत्किंचित्प्रतिपद्यमानः निःश्रेयसात् प्रतिहन्येत। अनर्थं च इयात्। तस्मात् ब्रह्मजिज्ञासोपन्यासमुखेन वेदान्तवाक्यमीमांसा तदविरोधतर्कोपकरणा निःश्रेयसप्रयोजना प्रस्तूयते।

13. 'If *Brahman* is well-known to people as the Self, then, since it is already known, the objection that it need not be discussed comes back!' No, because, there are conflicting views as to Its unique nature. Common people and *Lokāyatikas* conceive of *Ātman* as the mere body qualified by animation; others conceive of *Ātman* as animated sense organs; yet others as mind; others as mere momentary cognition; others as void; still others say there is a *samsārī*—(one leading a worldly life)—different from the body who is doer and enjoyer.

Some say that, he is enjoyer alone and not doer. Some say, there is, as different from him, an omniscient and omnipotent Īśwara. He, the Ātman, is the enjoyer, say others. Thus, there are different views based on reasoning, quotations (both sound and) fallacious. Accepting any one of these without enquiry would deprive one of *mokṣa* and one may also end up in grief. Therefore, by saying that discussion of *Brahman* should be done, a holy enquiry into Vedānta sentences is begun with reasoning not inconsistent therewith, and whose purpose is *mokṣa*.

(13) In this way, if it is said that *Brahman* is well-known, once again the objection that it need not be discussed props up. 'If each day, *Brahman* is coming to the experience of everyone, what is there to discuss about *Brahman*?' It is not like that. Everyone experiences only Its existence, no one knows Its nature - what exactly It is. That is, there is only a vague idea of It, not Its full knowledge. So *Bhāṣyakāra* says 'तद्विशेषं प्रति विप्रतिपत्तेः' - Here are contradictory opinions about its characteristics' among thinkers. (Notice that if Ātman is referred to here is not *prājña*, but the fourth Ātman, these sentences cannot be reconciled; nobody has even a vague knowledge of that Ātman). Therefore, non-believers in God, Veda etc, *Vijñānavādis* and nihilists among Buddhists, Logicians, *Mimāṃsakās*, *Sāṃkhya*s etc- describe the *pratyagātman* (who is *Brahman*) in different ways. Dualists who disagree with the statement 'आत्मा च ब्रह्म' - This Ātman is Īśwara, describe that the omniscient and omnipotent Īśwara is different from this Ātman. Some thinkers say He is the enjoyer. All of them use logic and some even śruti sentences for proving their point. Obviously everybody cannot be right, because one and the same thing cannot have mutually contradictory characteristics. Therefore, without discussing, if someone accepts one of them out of blind faith and respect, he will miss *mokṣa*. Not only that; he may end up even in distress. So, people who desire *mokṣa*, should discuss about *Brahman*. How? They should use a logic not contradictory to the śruti. Brahmasūtras and its *bhāṣya* by Śāṅkarācārya do precisely this.



जन्माद्याधिकरणम्

Jammādyadhikaraṇam

१. ब्रह्म जिज्ञासितव्यमित्युक्तम्। किं लक्षणं पुनस्तद्ब्रह्म इति? अत आह भगवान्
सूत्रकारः:-

1. It has been said that *Brahman* is to be discussed. The question now arises what the characteristics of that *Brahman* are. Hence the venerable author of the sūtras says:

जन्माद्यस्य यतः (सू. १.१.२)

(It is that) *yataḥ*=from which, *janmādi* = creation etc, *asya* = of this universe (happen).

(1.1) Question: *Śruti* says that *Brahman* is not an object for knowing - 'एतत् अप्रमयम्' (Br. 4.4.20); It is not visible, cannot be grasped - 'अद्वेश्यम् अग्राह्यम्' (Mu. 1.1.15); inaccessible even to the mind - 'अप्राप्य मनसा सह' (Tai. 2.4). Further, creation etc are features of the world, not of *Brahman*. *Brahman* is absolutely unrelated to the world. How can these features of the world be characteristics - *lakṣaṇa* - of *Brahman*, through which It could be known?

Answer: True. It cannot be grasped by speech, mind, eye or any other sense organ. Though so much featureless, It is known to be the cause of the world. So, it must have characteristics related to the features of the world - 'नैव वाचा न मनसा न चक्षुषा न अन्यैः अपि इन्द्रियैः प्राप्तुं शक्यते । तथापि सर्वविशेषरहितः अपि जगतः मूलम् इति अवगतत्वात् अस्ति एव (ब्रह्म)' (Ka. Bh. 2.3.12)

Question: The fourth Ātman (who is *Brahman*), is said to be without characteristics - *alakṣaṇam*. So, what sort of *lakṣaṇa* are creation etc?

Answer: What we know are features like creation etc and properties like change, inertness, limitedness; these belong to the world. But what we are actually looking at is *Brahman*. If we shift our attention gradually from creation etc to the

world of change and move on to *Brahman*, we can recognise It. In *Brahman*, there are neither creation etc nor change. In this way, though these features are absent in *Brahman*, they are indicators of It - the so called *taṭastha lakṣaṇa*.

(1.2) One definition of *taṭastha lakṣaṇa* is: An accidental occurrence showing the object by separating it from others 'कदाचित्कल्पे सति व्यावर्तकं तटस्थलक्षणम्' - For example, a crow sitting on Devadatta's house is an indicator (*lakṣaṇa*) of the house. But creation etc of the world are not *taṭastha lakṣaṇa* in that sense because they will be occurring periodically from infinite past to infinite future. Śruti says: 'सूर्याचन्द्रमसौ धाता यथापूर्वमकल्पयत्' - God created the universe of sun, moon etc just like previously (Rg. Sam. 10.190.3), 'आत्मनः स्थावरजड़मं जगत् इदम् अग्निविस्फुलिङ्गवत् व्युच्चरति अनिशम्, यस्मिन् एव च प्रलीयते जलबुद्बुदवत् यदात्मकं च वर्तते स्थितिकाले' - The universe of moving and unmoving objects are coming out continuously like sparks of fire from the Ātman, getting dissolved like bubbles in water staying as a form of Ātman during sustenance (Br. Bh. 2.1.20). Another definition of this *lakṣaṇa* is: 'स्वरूपान्तर्भूतत्वे सति इतरव्यावर्तकं तटस्थलक्षणम्' - Any indicator of the object other than its inherent characteristics is *taṭastha lakṣaṇa*. In this sense, creation etc are *taṭastha lakṣaṇas*, because they are not *Brahman*'s inherent characteristics (*swarūpa lakṣaṇa*). 'How can they bring *Brahman* to our attention?' 'रूपं रूपं प्रतिरूपो बभूव तदस्य रूपं प्रतिचक्षणाय' - Because these forms were assumed by *Brahman* to make us recognise It (Br. 2.5.19). Just as man expresses his meaning through speech.

Brahman took up these forms to let us know It. There is a one way identity between the world and *Brahman*, just like that of speech and meaning. It is one way because: Speech is not different from meaning, but meaning is different from speech. So, creation etc and change etc of the world convey *Brahman* though they are not in *Brahman*.

२. जन्मः उत्पत्तिः आदिः अस्य इति तद्गुणसंविज्ञानो बहुव्रीहिः। जन्मस्थितिभंगं समासार्थः। जन्मनश्च आदित्वं श्रुतिनिर्देशापेक्षं वस्तुवृत्तापेक्षं च। श्रुतिनिर्देशस्तावत् “यतो वा इमानि भूतानि जायन्ते” (तै. ३.१) इत्यस्मिन् वाक्ये जन्मस्थितिप्रलयानां क्रमदर्शनात्। वस्तुवृत्तमपि जन्मना लब्ध्यसत्ताकस्य धर्मिणः स्थितिप्रलयसंभवात्।

2. Janma—Creation; adih—etc. (meaning existence and destruction), janma ādi asya is Tadguṇasamvijñāna Bahuvrīhi compound (meaning creation,

existence and destruction taken together). The meaning of the compound is creation, existence and destruction. Creation being mentioned first is according to the śruti and also the nature of things. It is thus stated in scripture 'That from which these beings are created'. In this sentence, the sequence shown is creation, existence and destruction. The nature of a thing is also such that existence and destruction can happen only to a thing which has come into existence through creation.

(2.1) Creation etc mean creation, sustenance and dissolution. Separating the three in any way does not convey the purport of śruti; they have to be taken together as a compound word to imply śruti's purport. 'Creation' is not an adjective of the compound word. If the word is understood without separating the adjective, the compounding is called *tadguṇasaṁvijñāna bahuvrīhiḥ*; if separated, it is called *atadguṇasaṁvijñāna bahuvrīhiḥ*. If the latter is taken, then that could imply one animate cause for creation and another inanimate cause for sustenance and dissolution. The first could be the efficient cause and the second the material cause such as the *pradhāna* of the *Sāṃkhya*s etc. This would not be according to śruti, which says that *Brahman* is both the efficient and material cause of the world. So, the first compounding is accepted. Another point about the sequence of creation, sustenance and destruction is as follows: When the world is not visible, we cannot talk of the latter two. Therefore, the sequence is taken as mentioned. Śruti also speaks of the same sequence with respect to the creatures.

(2.2) This *sūtra* considers the creation etc of both the inert and animate world, i.e., both *kṣetra* and *kṣetrajña*. 'आत्मा ह्याकाशवज्जीवैः घटाकाशैरिवोदितः । घटादिवच्च संघातैः ज्ञातावेतन्निदर्शनम्' - Ātman is born in the form of *jīvas* like *ākāśa* in the form of the space inside pots and also in the form of bodies like pots etc. This is the example for His birth (Mā. Kā. 3.3). The *kṣetra* coming out of *aparāprakṛti* is *Brahman*; 'सत्यं च अनृतं च सत्यम् अभवत्' - Changing unchanging and apparent truth are only forms of the absolute truth (Tai. 2.7) is *pramāṇa* for this. *Kṣetrajña* coming out of *parāprakṛti* is also *Brahman* - 'क्षेत्रज्ञं च अपि मां विद्धि' (Gitā 13.2) 'You are that' (Cā. 6.8.7) etc. are *pramāṇa* for this. Though two pairs viz., *aparā-kṣetra* and *parā-kṣetrajña* are mentioned, Hiranyagarbha appearing through *aparāprakṛti* is the first born *kṣetrajña*, and *kṣetrajñas* appear through *parāprakṛti* i.e. *prāṇa*—which is *kṣetra*.

For creation of *nāma-rūpa* the qualified knowledge (of the forms) and contact with matter is necessary. These two can be found only in a *jīva* with *avidyā*, not *Īśwara*. Hence, motivation for creation is in *jīva* and not *Īśwara*. *Paramātman* is passive in His inherent nature, but motivated in association with *māyā* - 'परमात्मनः तु स्वरूपव्यपाश्रयम् औदासीन्यं मायाव्यपाश्रयं च प्रवर्तकत्वम्' (Sū. Bh. 2.2.7). Here *māyā* means ego- *ahamkāra* - which is the cause of the motivation - which is *avyakta* in conjunction with *avidyā* - 'अहंकारः इति अविद्यासंयुक्तम् अव्यक्तम्...., प्रवर्तकत्वात् अहंकारस्य' (G. Bh. 7.4). In this way, the material cause of creation etc. of effects is the *māyā* of *Īśwara* and the cause for motivation is *avidyā*. That is the reason why *Brahman* enters in *jīva* form to create *nāma-rūpa* - 'अनेन जीवेनात्मना अनुप्रविश्य नामरूपे व्याकरवाणि' (Cā. 6.3.2). With His *icchā-sakti*, *jñāna-sakti* and *kriyā-sakti* (powers of desire, knowledge and action), *Īśwara* enters into the *jīva* through His *parāprakṛti prāṇa* and transacts the creation etc.

Question: Rather than this, why don't we just say that *māyā* is the material cause of the world and Hiranyagarbha the efficient cause and thereby retain *Brahman* in Its essentially passive nature?

Answer: No. Knowledge of *Brahman* is not possible without imposing causeness of the world on *Brahman*. The *vidyā* of the oneness of *Ātman* is not possible without the knowledge of *Brahman*; otherwise *Brahman* will remain *parokṣa*. Therefore, to teach *Brahman*, the imposition of both the efficient and material causeness is inevitable.

Question: If the *vyavahāra* of creation etc, which does not exist in *Brahman*, is imposed on It, does it not amount to telling a lie?

Answer: It is not a lie, since both Hiranyagarbha and *māyā* are not different from *Brahman*. Hiranyagarbha handles the transaction of creation etc only through *Brahman's* power *māyā*. For e.g., though it is only the mason who does the actual building of a house, people point to the owner as the builder. Similarly, in the case of *Brahman*, the imposition of causeness is in the secondary sense; it is *adhyāropa* - imposition done by *śāstra* to teach *Brahman*. Not a lie, it is not even *adhyāsa* - wrong knowledge.

३. “अस्य” इति प्रत्यक्षादिसंनिधापितस्य धर्मिणः इदमा निर्देशः। षष्ठी जन्मादिधर्मसंबंधार्था।

3. (In the expression) "Of this" (the word) 'this' refers to the thing (i.e.,

universe) seen through perception etc. The sixth case refers to its relation to creation etc.

(3.1) Here 'asya' means 'of the world'. Creation etc are the *dharma*s of the world and the world is the *darmi*, i.e. in which the *dharma*s are seen. *Dharma* cannot exist without *darmi*, but *darmi* does exist without *dharma*. This is because the world always exists; when it is not seen, it is only unmanifest - 'कार्यम् अपि जगत् त्रिषु कालेषु सत्त्वं न व्यभिचरति' (Sū. Bh. 2.1.16). Manifestation is creation, existing in the manifest form is sustenance and becoming unmanifest again is destruction. This implies that the *darmi* (world), is independent of the *dharma* (creation etc). Similarly in the next step, change, inertia and limitedness are *dharma*s of the world; and the *darmī* independent of them is its material cause viz., *Brahman*. World is not free from *Brahman*, but *Brahman* is free from the world. It is like the changing pot which is not free from clay, but clay, which is unchanging, is free from the pot. This *dharma-darmi* relation is nothing but effect-cause relation (Sū. Bh. 2.1.9). In this way, creation etc are not free from the world, and the world is not free from *Brahman*; so, creation etc and the world can become features of *Brahman*.

Creation etc are *upa-lakṣaṇa* - more distant features; change, inertia, limitedness of the world are *dharma-lakṣaṇa* - nearer features and immutability (*satyam*), awareness (*jñāna*) and limitlessness (*anantam*) are *swarūpa-lakṣaṇa*, viz., inherent features of *Brahman*. Similarly, birth, living and death of *kṣetrajña* are *upa-lakṣaṇa*, his different levels of pleasures are the *dharma-lakṣaṇa* and bliss is *swarūpa-lakṣaṇa* - of *Brahman*. That is why the Brahma Sūtras start the discussion of *Brahman* from creation etc in the *janmādi* section and then show that the world is non-different from the immutable *Brahman* in the *vilakṣaṇa* (Sū. 2.1 sec3) and *ārambhāṇa* (Sū. 2.1 sec. 6) sections and finally in *ubhayaliṅga* section (Sū 3.2 sec. 5) establish its inherent nature of attributelessness. Similarly, in *tadabhāva* section, the inherent nature of *kṣetrajña* is shown to be *Brahman* (Sū. Bh. 3.2 sec. 2). In this way, the *vidyā* of the oneness of Ātman is to know the inherent nature of the world which is *Brahman*, which is also the inherent nature of the individual soul *kṣetrajña*; *vidya* is not to know that the world is an illusion. In fact, *Bhāṣyakāra* has warned that the one who understands the world as illusory is unfit for *mokṣa* (see *Adhyāsa Bhāṣya* 25.2 end part)*.

*Because: If what is seen by the eyes is to be rejected by the mind as *mithyā*, it needs

Kṣetra (world) and *kṣetrājña* (individual soul) are described as of different natures. If *kṣetra* is non-existent, this sentence does not make sense. If it is non-existent, how could the *Sūtrakāra* and *Bhāṣyakāra* have taken so much pains to establish that the inherent nature of *kṣetra* is *Brahman*? If the features of *kṣetra* are not in *Brahman*, the reason is that *Brahman* is its material cause. This featureless *Brahman* is *prājña*. The characteristic features of *Brahman* viz., immutability, awareness, limitlessness, oneness, bliss are experienced by everyone in deep sleep. Therefore, when informed, anyone easily understands that *adhyāsa* is wrong knowledge.

४. “यतः” कारणनिर्देशः । अस्य जगतः नामरूपाभ्यां व्याकृतस्य अनेक कर्तुभोक्तृ-
संयुक्तस्य प्रतिनियत-देश-काल-निमित्त-क्रियाफलाश्रयस्य मनसाप्यचिन्त्यरचनारूपस्य
जन्मस्थितिभंगं यतः सर्वज्ञात् सर्वशक्तेः कारणाद् भवति “तद् ब्रह्म” इति वाक्यशेषः ।

4. “From which” designates the cause. That omniscient and omnipotent cause from which occur the creation, existence and destruction of this universe; a universe differentiated by name and form, containing many doers and enjoyers, the support of the fruit of action regulated by place, time and causation, the nature of whose design cannot even be conceived by the mind; “that is *Brahman*” is the remaining part of the sentence (in the *sūtra*).

(4.1) The gist of this section is that the omniscient, omnipotent *Brahman* alone is the cause of the world. For confirming it, some comments may be made using inference -

(a) The world of names and forms could not have come from an inert cause. The cause has to be animate. *Śruti* puts it like this: ‘सर्वाणि रूपाणि विचित्य धीरः नामानि कृत्वा अभिवदन् यदास्ते’ - That brave one creating forms, is calling them by their names (Tai. Ar. 3.12.7) ‘सः अकामयत’ - He desires (to create) (Tai. 2.6), ‘सः ईक्षत, सः ईक्षांचक्रे’ - He saw (Ai. 1.1.1) etc.

(b) The world is full of doers and enjoyers. The one enjoying the fruit of *karma* done in this life is both the doer and enjoyer. When enjoying past *karma*, he is not a doer but only an enjoyer. Since doers and enjoyers are included in creation, there cannot be doership or enjoyership in the cause *Brahman*.

knowership in the doer and this separates him from *Brahman*. Knowership is lost only when what is seen by the eyes is accepted by the seer as himself.

(c) The doer's *karma* is his action (*kriyā*). The fruit of *karma* that he enjoys later is the fruit (*phala*) of action. This enjoyment has to follow the rules of space, time and causation. As this space, time and causation are effects, they cannot exist in the cause.

(d) The complexity of the world is beyond imagination. Scientists of extraordinary brilliance have been breaking their heads since centuries to unravel the mystery of the world using inference (*anumāna*). They are succeeding only in discovering some intermediate causes, never the ultimate one. It is impossible to determine the ultimate cause by inference. Why? The reason is: Seeing *vyāpya* (the pervaded), the *vyāpaka* (the pervader) is conjectured on the basis of the knowledge of *vyāpti* (pervasion) in *anumāna pramāṇa*. The knowledge of *vyāpti* is possible in determining an intermediate cause, but it is impossible in the case of the ultimate cause; because neither itself nor something similar to it is already known. Therefore, the ultimate cause never be determined by inference.

(4.2) Question: In (4.1c) above, time has been mentioned as a created item. Time is what is referred to as earlier, now, later etc when the world is being seen; it is the time recognised during sustenance. Dissolution is when it goes unseen. Therefore, creation etc are possible only when time is accepted, i.e. time has to be the cause. How is it that it is included among the created?

Answer: Times are really two: one is countable like earlier, now later etc. This is relative time. Another is its cause, which is uncountable. This is the absolute time. Relative time changes from place to place; it is of decaying type and countable like day and night. Absolute time is immutable, so not countable, so not decaying type - like the time of one on the sun, where there is no setting or rising of sun. Countable relative time is *Brahman* - 'कालः कलयताम् अहम्' (Gītā 10.30). So also uncountable absolute time - 'अहम् एव अक्षयः कालः' (Gītā 10.33). When this appears as standing grown up, it becomes relative time - 'कालः अस्मि लोकक्षयकृत् प्रवृद्धः' (Gītā 11.32). Therefore, relative time is the effect and absolute time is its material cause. Absolute time belonging to the causal category appears like relative time through the event of creation. So also space. Indeed, even space and time are undivided before creation - 'देशकालापरिच्छिन्नं' (Lalitā Sahasranāma 701)*.

*We can show that the space (*desa*), time (*kāla*) and direction (*dik*) are all effects. Space, time and direction are also created along with the *jagat*. Actually, there is no

(4.3) Objection: In accordance with the names and forms already existing in his mind, the pot maker creates the pots etc. But *Brahman* has no mind (Mu. 2.1.2). How then can It be the efficient cause of the names and forms of the world?

Answer: *Jīvas* are *alpajñās* (अल्पज्ञ). For creating anything, they need instruments (*karaṇas*). Based on this, if it is conjectured that the omniscient (*sarvajña*) and omnipotent *Brahman* also needs instruments for creation is not right. It is known that people with special powers (*siddhas*) create things without the usual instruments (Sū. Bh. 2.1.25). Another example is of the dreaming Ātman, which though one, creates the several forms seen in dreams. Knowing all this, it is not right to use the logic of other *pramāṇas* to make objections on śruti. Indeed, śruti tells us only about those things which are not available for other *pramāṇas*. Actually, that the instrumentless *Brahman* is the cause of this mysterious creation shows Its omniscience and omnipotence.

(4.4) Objection: One cannot say that *Brahman* is always knowing something or the other and doing something or the other; because, there is nothing to know or do in *pralaya*. Therefore, how is it possible to say that *Brahman* of mere awareness - *kevala jñānaswarūpa* - is omniscient and omnipotent?

space, time and direction in objects themselves, but we as *jñāta* (knower) see them always together. For example, when we see a pot, we see it along with the space where it is. When something is moving we say 'then' and 'now'. Similarly with direction. Objects belong to one class, while space, time and direction to another. As observers we are aware of the object as well as space, time and direction. For knowing the object we use the sense organs but not so to know space, time and direction. These we get to know only along with the object. If one is grasping the object, they must be there. Similarly, the question arises: 'Where are space, time and direction existing?' Since we get their *pratyaya* in the *buddhi*, they must be existing somewhere. However, if we remove all the objects, then there won't be space, time or direction. But whenever the object is seen, they are also noticed. Therefore, the cause of the objects and space, time, direction should be the same. That is *Brahman*. Therefore, space, time and direction are also effects of *Brahman* and not a cause. Space, time are the shadows of the object in the mind. Originally, space-time are one undivided, but are produced distinctly along with the objects by *Īśwara*. In *Brahman* they are undivided, in creation, they seem to get divided. Since we observe space, time etc, therefore they have to be there. Therefore, there is a time (*kāla*) before creation; it is absolute time (*nirapekṣa kāla*), which is not measurable. We are

Answer: It is omniscient precisely because it is *jñānaswarūpa*. The statement that one which has the eternal capacity of *jñāna* which can illumine (know) everything is not omniscient is self-contradictory - 'यस्य हि सर्वविषयावभासनक्षमं ज्ञानं नित्यम् अस्ति सः असर्वज्ञः इति विप्रतिषिद्धम्' (Sū.Bh.1.1.5), Omniscience is its inherent nature - 'सः सर्वज्ञस्वभावः' (Ai. Bh. 1.1). But it does not have the transaction of omniscience, because transaction is possible only through the adjuncts (*upādhis*) of intelligence etc. Without adjuncts, transaction is not possible and *Brahman* has no adjuncts. However, it is omniscient in its very nature; omniscience is not its attribute. Omnipotence is also to be understood similarly.

(4.5) Objection: Omniscience and omnipotence are in *Brahman*, not *jīva*. Then how is *Brahman-jīva* oneness possible?

Answer: Since the *vyavahāra* of omniscience and omnipotence are not there in *jīva*; so *Īśwara* is different from him. Bhāsyakāra indeed says later that *jīva* cannot engage in the *vyavahāra* of creating the world etc. But in his inherent adjunctless nature, *jīva* is certainly omniscient - 'सर्वज्ञता हि सर्वत्र भवतीह महाधियः' (Mā.Kā.4.89). Therefore, in the case of *jñānī*, creation etc are through him only. This has already been said (*Adhyāsa Bhāṣya* 25.3).

Objection: Then would it not lead to several *Īśwaras*?

Answer: This fault arises only when the *jñānī* is cognised through the adjuncts of body etc. Such a cognition is wrong, because he is the *Ātman* unrelated to the body. That *Ātman* is one and is *Īśwara*.

measuring time with respect to the sun. In sun itself it is not measurable. Absolute time manifests as relative time with respect to objects. Similarly, there is absolute space also that is *ākāśa*; before that it was in the form of *Brahman*.

All divisions are like this. What were previously of the nature of *Brahman*, show up as modifications graspable by the intellect - without losing their inherent nature of *Brahmanness*. This is just like clay appearing like pots etc - not at all different. 'The world which was in an undifferentiated form earlier to creation, was an object for only one word and one concept i.e. *Ātman*. Now, after differentiation of names and forms, it is available for several words and concepts and also for one word and one concept i.e. *Ātman* - 'प्रागुत्पत्तेः अव्याकृतनामरूपभेदम् आत्मभूतम् आत्मैकशब्दप्रत्ययगोचरं जगत् इदानीं व्याकृतनामरूपभेदत्वात् अनेकशब्दप्रत्ययगोचरम् आत्मैकशब्दप्रत्ययगोचरं च' (Ai. Bh.1.1.1). This sentence knocks out the statement that the world is an illusion.

Question: How to know that *Īśwara* is only one ?

Answer: Unchangeability, awareness (*jñāna*) and limitlessness are the characteristics of *Īśwara*. Here *jñāna* is not the qualified *jñāna* appearing in the intellect as a result of the action of knowing. It is mere awareness. This is only one; it cannot be more than one. If it is, the other one becomes the known. Similarly for *ānanda* of *Īśwara*. It is also free of adjuncts; it is not that which is experienced through objects. This oneness of *jñāna* and *ānanda* is directly experienced by everyone in deep sleep. The *Īśwara* of the characteristics of *jñāna* and *ānanda* is one only.

Question: It is said that *parā* and *aparā prakṛtis* are eternal. So they exist even in *pralaya*. Does this not contradict the oneness of *Brahman* in *pralaya*?

Answer: No. Even during existence when multiplicity is seen, there is only one *Brahman* from the causal point of view. What to say during *pralaya*? Even then it is one because *prakṛti* is non-different from *Brahman* - 'सा शक्तिः ब्रह्म एव अहं शक्तिशक्तिमतोः अनन्यत्वात्' (G.Bh.14.27) My *māyā* is of My own nature - 'मम स्वरूपं भूता मदीया माया' (G. Bh. 14.3).

५. अन्येषामपि भावविकाराणां त्रिष्वेव अन्तर्भविः इति जन्मस्थितिनाशानाम् इह ग्रहणम्। यास्क परिपठितानां तु जायते अस्ति इत्यादीनां ग्रहणे तेषां जगतः स्थितिकाले संभाव्यमानत्वात् मूलकारणात् उत्पत्तिस्थितिनाशाः जगतो न गृहीताः स्युः इत्याशङ्क्येत। तन्माशङ्क्ले इति या उत्पत्तिः ब्रह्मणः तत्रैव स्थितिः प्रलयश्च त एव गृह्णन्ते।

5. Creation existence and destruction are to be understood here, because all other modifications of being are included in these three. If (those) enumerated by Yāska viz., 'born, exists' etc were taken, they could occur even during the existence of the universe and there could arise a doubt that the creation existence and destruction of the universe by the ultimate cause are not to be taken here. To prevent that doubt, existence and destruction are also taken in the same *Brahman* from which creation has happened.

(5.1) Creation, sustenance and destruction mentioned in this *sūtra* apply to the world as a whole. Yaska mentions six modifications for things: *jāyate*-born, *asti*-exists, *vipariṇamate*-transforms, *vardhate*-grown, *apakṣiyate*-decays, *vinaśyati*-dies. All these modifications could be observed in things we see during the sustenance of

the world; for e.g. in a plant. For a plant, the cause could be the earth, not necessarily *Brahman*. In that case, the earth would be an intermediate cause. So, a doubt could arise whether this *sūtra* is referring to the ultimate cause or to some penultimate cause like the earth in the example here. In order to rule out an intermediate cause and keep only the ultimate cause, sustenance and destruction are also included as happening from the *Brahman* from which creation happens. This is done by absorbing Yaska's six modifications in sustenance alone.

Question: What is the *pramāṇa* for the ultimate causeness of *Brahman*?

Answer: The *mantra*: 'Īśwara created the sun moon earth (the whole universe) as it was previously—‘सूर्याचन्द्रमसौ धाता यथापूर्वमकल्प्यत् दिवं च पृथिवीं चान्तरिक्षमस्तो स्वः’ (Rg Veda 10.190.3), says clearly that the world as a whole is subject to the cycle of creation etc and that īśwara is its cause.

६. न यथोक्त विशेषणस्य जगतः यथोक्तविशेषणम् ईश्वरं मुक्त्वा अन्यतः प्रधानात् अचेतनात्, अणुभ्यः अभावात् संसारिणो वा उत्पत्त्यादि संभावयितुं शक्यम्। न च स्वभावतः विशिष्ट देशकालनिमित्तानाम् इह उपादानात्।

6. Apart from īśwara having the above mentioned qualities, the creation etc of the universe having the above mentioned qualities can never happen from anything else like the insentient *pradhāna* or atoms or vacuum or *jīva*; nor by its own nature because (it) needs specific space-time-causation (relation).

(6.1) This section tells us that none other than the omniscient and omnipotent īśwara is the ultimate cause of this complex universe. The Sāmkhyas say that their *pradhāna* of the three guṇas changes by itself and gets the form of the world. There is no example of such an inert stuff doing this sort of work. Even agreeing that the inert *pradhāna* could assume the form of the world like milk becoming curd, it can never allot the fruits of *karmas* to the *jīvas* because of its inertness. So, inert *pradhāna* could never be the cause (Sū. Bh. 2.2. sec. 1).

Further, Vaiśeṣikas say that atoms are the material cause of the world and a doer-enjoyer Ātman conceived by them is the efficient cause. It has been shown that this theory is full of contradictions (Sū. Bh. 2.2.12-17).

Next come the nihilist Buddhists. They say 'a plant grows with the death of the seed. So, absence of the seed is the cause of the plant. Similarly, this world too

comes from void.' They have no answer for the question: 'How only absence of mango seed is the cause of a mango tree and not the absence of a tamarind seed?' Moreover, it is directly seen that the sprout of the tree is hidden in the seed and as it starts growing, the seed is lost. So, their logic is irresponsible; no one agrees with it.

Also, the world cannot come from *jīva* either - 'न च गिरिनदीसमुद्रादिषु नानाविधेषु नामस्तपेषु अनीश्वरस्य जीवस्य व्याकरणसामर्थ्यम् अस्ति' (Sū. Bh. 2.4.20).

Next, whether something could spontaneously generate the world by its inherent nature. What is inherent nature working spontaneously? It should be something which works without the expectation of any particular place, time or an animate agent. Even milk cannot become curd without taking recourse to place and time. Even a straw cannot move without an animate agent. An inert thing is that which cannot work by itself. So, without an animate agent, it is impossible for the world to come into existence. Therefore, this mysterious universe can come only from the omniscient, omnipotent *Īśwara*.

(6.2) Question: Starting off with a discussion of *Brahman*, how is it that suddenly an omniscient and omnipotent *Īśwara* is introduced as the cause of the world? Who is He? How is He related to *Brahman*?

Answer: *Brahman* is mere *jñāna* and transactionless. It is impossible to know It. In order to teach It, *śāstras* take the following sequence as steps: *Prakṛti* is actually non-different from *Brahman*. However, it is treated as different, and is supposed to be an adjunct of *Brahman*. This is an imposition (*adhyāropa*) on *Brahman*, made by *śāstra*. With this adjunct, *Brahman* is called *Īśwara*. One part of *prakṛti* called *avyakta*—the inert power—is material cause of the world; the other is *prāṇa*—the action power that activates the world. This sustains the whole world of *kṣetra-kṣetrajña* (Gītā 7.5) This *prāṇa* is the vibrating force in all (Sū. Bh.1.3.39). *Avyakta* contains in it the defects of *avidyā* of *jīvas* - 'अविद्याद्यनेकसंसारबीज रूपमन्तर्दोषवत् माया' (G.Bh.12.3), which creates motivation in *Īśwara*. Creation is meant for *jīvas*' experiencing the fruits of their *karma* and also *mokṣa*. *Brahman* Itself is described as the agent of this activity in the form of *Īśwara*. In the *avidyā* view of *jīvas*, themselves, world and *Brahman* are all different. But from the causal point of view, world is not different from *prakṛti* and *prakṛti* is not different from *Brahman* - 'कारणस्य आत्मभूता शक्तिः शक्तेश्च आत्मभूतं कार्यम्' (Sū. Bh. 2.1.18) including *jīva*.

To teach this oneness of *Ātman* and *Brahman*, a difference is presupposed in the otherwise one and alone *Brahman*: The *prakṛti*, non-different from It, is conceived as Its adjunct to reconcile with the world of *vyavahāra*. This is *adhyāropa*, which if not done, *Brahman* cannot be taught. The moment *Brahman* is understood through the effect-non-difference law, this *adhyāropa* automatically drops off. In this way, *Brahman-Īśwara* difference is just a verbal one (*vācārambhāṇa*)*.

७. एतदेव अनुमानं संसारि-व्यतिरिक्त-ईश्वर-अस्तित्वादिसाधनं मन्यन्ते ईश्वर-कारणिः । ननु इहापि तदेव उपन्यस्तं जन्मादिसूत्रे? न । वेदान्तवाक्यं कुसुमग्रथनार्थत्वात् सूत्राणाम् । वेदान्तवाक्यानि हि सूत्रैः उदाहृत्य विचार्यन्ते वाक्यार्थ-विचारण-अध्यवसाननिर्वृत्ता हि ब्रह्मावगतिः न अनुमानादि प्रमाणान्तरनिर्वृत्ता ।

7. Those who accept Īśwara as the cause, regard this very inference as the proof for the existence of an Īśwara different from *jīva*. ‘Is not the same presented here also in (this) *sūtra* ‘Creation etc?’ No, because the *sūtras* are intended to string together the Vedānta sentences like flowers. *Sūtras* investigate quoting only the Vedānta Sentences. Realization of *Brahman* occurs at the end of the investigation of the sentences, and not by other *pramāṇas* like *anumāna* etc.

(7.1) Till now, the material causeness of *Brahman* is hidden in the acceptance of the *tadguṇasamivijñānabahuurvṛ̥hi* compounding of creation etc, and only Its efficient causeness has been discussed. Since this could be established even by *anumāna*, a doubt arises whether in this *sūtra* also, Īśwara is portrayed using *anumāna*. The answer is no. An Efficient Īśwara, established by *anumāna* is only an object for the knower *jīva* - not accessible for the experience of oneness with the knower. So, such an Īśwara is always indirect. But *Brahman* spoken of by the śruti is not so. Though it is just existence alone - *sanmātra*, it is the cause of the world; though the cause of the world, it is *sanmātra*. This deeply dignified *Brahman* spoken of by śruti is *satyam*, *jñāna*, *anantam* and *ānanda*, which can be experienced by *prājña* as himself. This changelessness separates it from change and limitlessness from limitedness. These two are Its relative characteristics with respect to the world derived by its material

**Apara Brahma*, *Saguṇa Brahma* and *Kārya Brahma* are the other names of Hiranya-garba - the First Born (Sū. BH. 4.3.7 and 4.3.10). This Īśwara is not *Apara Brahma*.

causeness. Change and limitedness are not illusions, they are transactional truths. Further, *jñāna* separates It from the *adhyāropita* - the imposed agency - and *ānanda* from the illusory *ānandamaya* etc *ātmans*; these are absolute characteristics. Through reflection and contemplation, one obtains the knowledge of *Brahman*. When this knowledge culminates in the experience of oneness, the fruit is this: When without thoughts, the intellect stays in existence-alone *Ātman* and when with thoughts, stays in the experience of oneness of *Ātman* with everything. The sense of difference is totally destroyed.

In this way, the gulf of difference between *anumāna* etc and *śruti* is this: Till the end, there will be the multiplicity of knower-knowledge-known and the associated transaction in the former. *Śruti* however, though starting with multiplicity, demolishes it gradually but tracelessly, transforms even its gross form like camphor, to spread light and becomes one with it. Brahma Sūtras is a garland of the flowers of such *śruti* sentences.

८. सत्सु तु वेदान्तवाक्येषु जगतो जन्मादिकारणवादिषु तदर्थग्रहणदाढ्यायि अनु-
मानमपि वेदान्तवाक्य-अविरोधि प्रमाणं भवत् न निवार्यते। श्रुत्यैव च सहायत्वेन
तर्कस्य अभ्युपेतत्वात्। तथा हि “श्रोतव्यो मन्तव्यः” (बृ २.४.५) इति श्रुतिः “पंडितो
मेधावी गन्धारानेव, उपसंपद्येत एवमेव इह आचार्यवान् पुरुषो वेद” (छां ६.१४.२)
इति च पुरुषबुद्धिसाहाय्यम् आत्मनो दर्शयति। न धर्मजिज्ञासायामिव श्रुत्यादय एव
प्रमाणं ब्रह्मजिज्ञासायाम्, किंतु श्रुत्यादयः अनुभवादयश्च। यथासंभवमिह प्रमाणम्
अनुभवावसानत्वात् भूतवस्तुविषयत्वाच्च ब्रह्मज्ञानस्य। कर्तव्ये हि विषये न अनुभवापेक्षा
अस्ति इति श्रुत्यादीनामेव प्रामाण्यं स्यात्। पुरुषाधीनात्मलाभत्वाच्च कर्तव्यस्य कर्तुम्
अकर्तुम् अन्यथा वा कर्तुं शक्यं लौकिकं वैदिकं च कर्म यथा अश्वेन गच्छति, पद्ध्याम्
अन्यथा वा न वा गच्छति इति। तथा “अतिरात्रे षोडशिनं गृह्णाति”, “नातिरात्रे
षोडशिनं गृह्णाति”, “उदिते जुहोति”, “अनुदिते जुहोति” इति विधिप्रतिषेधाश्च अत्र
अर्थवन्तः स्युः। विकल्प-उत्सर्ग-अपवादाश्च। न तु वस्तु “एवं” “नैवम्”,
“अस्ति”, “नास्ति” इति वा विकल्पयते। विकल्पनास्तु पुरुषबुद्ध्यपेक्षाः। न
वस्तुयाथात्मज्ञानं पुरुषबुद्ध्यपेक्षम्। किं तर्हि। वस्तुतन्त्रमेव तत्। न हि स्थाणौ एकस्मिन्
स्थाणुवा पुरुषः अन्यो वा इति तत्त्वज्ञानं भवति। तत्र पुरुषः अन्यो वा इति मिथ्याज्ञानम्।

स्थाणुरेव इति तत्त्वज्ञानम्। वस्तुतन्त्रत्वात्। एवं भूतवस्तु विषयाणां प्रामाण्यं वस्तुतन्त्रम्।
तत्र एवं सति ब्रह्मज्ञानमपि वस्तुतन्त्रमेव, भूतवस्तुविषयत्वात्।

8. In order to confirm the apprehended meaning of the Vedānta Sentences which discuss the creation etc. of the world, an inference unopposed to the Vedānta sentences is not be excluded as a valid *pramāṇa*; for the upaniṣads themselves accept reasoning as a help. “(The self is) to be heard, it is to be thought about” and “a learned intelligent person reaches Gandhāra, in the same way, a man with an *ācārya* understands” show that one is helped by the human intellect. In the discussion of *Brahman*, *śruti* etc are not the only *pramāṇa* as they are on the discussion of *dharma*. But rather, *śruti* etc. and experience etc are *pramāṇa* as occasion arises because, the knowledge of *Brahman* culminates in experience and it (*Brahman*) is an existent object. In the case of *karma* which does not expect experience, *śruti* etc are the only *pramāṇa*. Since coming into existence of *karma* depends on the person, worldly and Vedic *karma* may be done, not done, or done in a different way. For e.g. one goes on horseback or on foot or otherwise or does not go at all. Similarly, “In the *atirātra* he takes the sixteenth cup”, “In the *atirātra* he does not take the sixteenth (cup)”; “As sun rises, he does the oblation”, “Before sunrise he does the oblation”. Prescriptions and prohibitions are meaningful here; also options, general rules and exceptions. But an object does not admit of options like “thus, not thus”, “exists, does not exist”. Options are dependent on human intellect (i.e. subjective). The knowledge of the true nature of an object is not dependent on the human intellect, What then? It depends on the object itself (i.e. objective). In the case of one post, true cognition cannot be as “It is a post or something else or a man”. In this case “a man or something else” is an illusory cognition; “It is certainly a post” is the true cognition, because it depends on the object. Thus, in the case of existent things, the validity of the *pramāṇa* is objective. Therefore, the knowledge of *Brahman* also is objective as it is an existent object.

(8.1) Though inference etc are blamed in this manner, they cannot be rejected because in the process of knowing *Brahman* they too have a role since ultimately,

Brahman too is an existent object to be experienced. Just as in the case of other objects, *Brahman's* knowledge too is objective - to be understood as it is. It is not subjective; i.e., the knower cannot know it as he likes. The example of the stump given by *Bhāṣyakāra* has been discussed in (*Adhyāsa Bhāṣya* 14.4). So, *śruti* etc and experience etc are *pramāṇas* in the discussion of *Brahman* as the occasion arises. *Śruti* etc means *śruti*, *śmṛti*, *purāṇa*, *itihāsa*; and experience etc means experience obtained through other *pramāṇas* and the logic necessary to remove doubts.

(8.2) This is not so in the discussion of *dharma* (*dharma-jijñāsā*). *Karma* taught there is not objective. So, there is room for injunction-prohibition, choice-general rule-exceptions. Unlike *Brahma-jijñāsā*, experience is not a criterion in the discussion of *dharma*.

(8.3) After rejecting inference etc for *Brahman's* experience, if it is said that they also have a role besides *śruti*, the question arises 'When are other *pramāṇas* also acceptable? Why? When are they not acceptable? Why?' In the absence of clear answers to this question, one will not know the method of discussing *Brahman*. One will argue when one should not argue and will not argue when one should argue. These defects will hamper the discussion of *Brahman*. To prevent it, we will take up its examination.

(8.4) Things are of two types: available to the senses and not available. *Pramāṇas* are five: direct perception (*pratyakṣa*), inference (*anumāna*), analogy (*upamāna*), presumption (*arthāpatti*), Vedas (*śruti*). Those available for the senses are objects for the first four, since all of them depend on direct perception. Though inference concerns a thing which is indirect at that particular moment, finally its existence has to be verified only by direct perception; otherwise the concept is rejected. On the other hand, *śruti* speaks only of things that are not perceptible to the senses. *Dharma/adharma* and things beyond *prakṛti* are not available for sense perception; they are topics exclusively for *śruti*. Nevertheless, *dharma/adharma* meant for the prosperity of the *jīvas*, are not unrelated to the objects of perception. So, though the *dharma* part of the Vedas discusses only things beyond perception, it cannot speak against other *pramāṇas*. 'Even if 100 *śrutis* say that fire is cold and without light, they cannot be *pramāṇa*. If *śruti* at all says that 'fire is cold, without light', then another intended meaning has to be conceived. Otherwise, it will not be valid. The conceived meaning should not contradict either the *pramāṇa* in question or *śruti* - 'न

हि श्रुतिशतम् अपि शीतः अग्निः अप्रकाशो वा इति ब्रूवत् प्रामाण्यम् उपैति । यदि ब्रूयात् शीतः अग्निः अप्रकाशो वा इति तथापि अर्थान्तरं श्रुतेः विवक्षितं कल्प्यं प्रामाण्य-अन्यथा-अनुपपत्तेः न तु प्रमाणान्तरविरुद्धं स्ववचनविरुद्धं वा' (G.Bh. 18.66).

(8.5) Next, in *Brahman's* discussion, how can there be room for other *pramāṇas*? *Śruti* itself encourages them because *Brahman* has to be understood only through the perceived world; there is no other way. Therefore, upto the point of conveying the knowledge of *Brahman*, *śruti* uses other *pramāṇas* also and never speaks contradictory to them. 'One *pramāṇa* can never contradict another *pramāṇa*. A *pramāṇa* objectifies only that which is not an object for other *pramāṇas*. Without resorting to the words and objects of the world, even *śruti* cannot convey another unknown thing - 'न च प्रमाणं प्रमाणान्तरेण विरुद्ध्यते, प्रमाणान्तराविषयम् एव हि प्रमाणान्तरं ज्ञापयति । न च लौकिकपदपदार्थश्रयाव्यतिरेकेण आगमेन शक्यम् अज्ञातं वस्त्वन्तरम् अवगमयितुम्' (Br. Bh. 2.1.20). So, there is certainly profit derived from other *pramāṇas* in the process of getting the knowledge of *Brahman*. After getting this knowledge, one crosses the limits of multiplicity and enters into the region of oneness. After this there is no room for other *pramāṇas*, not even for that part of the *śruti* dealing with the prosperity of the *jīvas*.*

Here, *Upaniṣads* are the only *pramāṇa*. Therefore, after learning about *Brahman* through the world, one cannot ask questions in the reverse direction based on inference etc. For e.g., there is no meaning in asking the questions: 'How can the world emerge from a *Brahman* which is alone without a second? How can the immutable *Brahman* handle transactions like creation etc?' Even as the compassionate *Bhāsyakāra* cautions the questioner that these are unusable questions, he simultaneously makes the effort of pacifying him with an appropriate answer as follows: 'It has indeed been said that other *pramāṇas* are also possible of application since *Brahman* is an existent object'. This thought is merely a fancy. *Brahman* is not

***Question:** A *śruti* against *pratyakṣa* is interpreted reconciling both *pramāṇas*. Should the same be done if the *śruti* is against inference?

Answer: No, because: Whether inference or *śruti*, its validity is only by direct experience. In the case of the first five *pramāṇas*, experience is only by *pratyakṣa*. So, the other four *pramāṇas* cannot go against *pratyakṣa*. But in the case of *śruti*, the object to be experienced is not *pratyakṣa*; so it need not conform to *pratyakṣa*. But the validity of *śruti* does hold since the object propounded by it is experienceable - though not by *pratyakṣa*.

available for perception by the senses because it has no form etc. It is not available for inference etc because It has no signs. Like *dharma*, *Brahman* too is to be understood only through *śruti* - 'यत् तु उक्तम् परिनिष्पन्नत्वात् ब्रह्मणि प्रमाणान्तराणि संभवेयुः इति तदपि मनोरथमात्रम् । रूपाद्यभावाद्धि न अयम् अर्थः प्रत्यक्षस्य गोचरः । लिङ्गाद्यभावात् च न अनुमानादीनाम् । आगममात्रसमधिगम्य एव तु अयम् अर्थः धर्मवत्' । (Sū. Bh. 2.1.6).

One has to carefully examine the phrase 'like *dharma*, to be understood only by *śruti*' in the above quotation and the sentence '*śruti* etc are not the only *pramāṇa* in the discussion of *Brahman* as in the discussion of *dharma*' in the *bhāṣya* text section being discussed presently. Questions raised above in the reverse direction belong to the former category. They are answered by a logic not contradictory to the *śruti* as follows: 'Waking and dreaming states come and go, leaving the *prājñā* untouched. In deep sleep he is the worldless *Ātman* because he leaves the world and merges in *Brahman*; the world is a product of *Brahman* and so non-different from *Brahman* by the law of non-difference of effect-cause - 'श्रुत्यनुगृहीत एवं तर्कः अनुभवाङ्गत्वेन आश्रीयते । स्वज्ञान्तबुद्धान्तयोः उभयोः इतरेतरव्यभिचारात् आत्मनः अनन्वागतत्वम्, संप्रसादे च प्रपञ्चपरित्यागेन सदात्मना संपत्तेः निष्प्रपञ्चसदात्मत्वम्, प्रपञ्चस्य ब्रह्मप्रभवत्वात् कार्यकारणानन्यन्यायेन ब्रह्माव्यतिरेक इति एवं जातीयकः' । (Sū. Bh. 2.1.6).

९. ननु भूतवस्तुत्वे ब्रह्मणः प्रमाणान्तरविषयत्वमेव इति वेदान्तवाक्यविचारणा अनथिकैव प्राप्ता? न। इंद्रियअविषयत्वेन संबंधाग्रहणात्। स्वभावतो विषयविषयाणि इंद्रियाणि न ब्रह्मविषयाणि। सति हि इंद्रियविषयत्वे ब्रह्मणः इदं ब्रह्मणा संबद्धं कार्यमिति गृह्णेत। कार्यमात्रमेव तु गृह्णामाणं किं ब्रह्मणा संबद्धं किमन्येन केनचिद्वा संबद्धमिति न शक्यं निश्चेतुम्। तस्मात् जन्मादि सूत्रं नानुमानोपन्यासार्थम्, किं तर्हि? वेदान्तवाक्यप्रदर्शनार्थम्।

9. 'If *Brahman* is an existing thing, it would be an object for other *pramāṇas* and so would it not become meaningless to investigate Vedānta sentences to know *Brahman*?' No, because, as It is not an object for the senses the connection cannot be known. Senses by nature cognize things and cannot cognize *Brahman*. If It were cognizable by the senses, then, Its connection with this effect (world) could be grasped. When effect alone is being grasped, it is not possible to determine whether it (the effect) is connected with *Brahman* or with something else. Therefore, the *sūtra* 'creation etc' could not be speaking of inference. 'What then?' It is conveying the meaning of the Vedānta sentences.

(9.1) By the law of non-difference of effect-cause, ‘the world, which is an effect, is one with its cause, which is *Brahman*’ (Sū. Bh. 2.2.38) - this is the former part of the law. But *Brahman* is different from the world - this is the latter part of the law. Śruti discusses the former part through the examples of clay-pot etc and thereby teaches about *Brahman*. During this step, it uses a logic not in disagreement with other *pramāṇas*. But in the region of the latter part, apart from superimposing (*adhyāropa*) of causeness of the world on *Brahman*, it does not say anything more. Indeed no theory, professing to discuss the issue, tells us anything more than this, because it is just not possible. This becomes obvious when one has understood *Brahman*. Nevertheless common people, who are influenced by other *pramāṇas*, do ask the unaskable question ‘How is it possible that from *Brahman*, who is ‘merely existence’ (*sanmātra*), the world could be produced?’ It is to clear this doubt that the *bhāṣya* uses the rope-snake example. ‘Though this appears as snake, it is rope only. Similarly, though it appears like the world, it is *Brahman* only. There is *Brahman* alone. There is nothing like a world different from *Brahman*’. Therefore factually, there is no scope for this question. This is the logic, uncontradictory to śruti, which is employed by the *bhāṣya* to answer the above question.

In this way, while explaining *Brahman* through the world, the clay-pot examples are used and after teaching, to remove doubts about the understood *Brahman*, the example of snake and rope is given. But those who are stuck firmly to the illusoriness (*jagat-mithyātva*) of the world, caused by the blunder of associating ‘*asmat-pratyaya-gocara*’, the very first word of *Adhyāsa Bhāṣya* with the fourth Ātman - not bothering to investigate the roles of the extremely dissimilar examples of clay-pot and rope-snake - ditch the example of clay-pot which shows the cause-effect relation - hold on firmly to the rope-snake example which does not show the cause-effect relation - cook up the word *vivartopādāna* whatever it is, to explain the cause-effect relation of *Brahman* and the world. If they are ascribing *vivartopādānaness* to *Brahman* to reconcile the creation of the world with the immutability of *Brahman* - it is unnecessary, because the clay-pot example itself reconciles it since ‘clay alone is immutable - ‘मृत्तिकेत्येव सत्य’’. But the effort of their ‘logic’ is aimed at proving that the world is non-existent. This is discardable outright. No one who has studied the ‘pot-*bhāṣya*’ of Brhadāraṇyaka Upanisad (Br. Bh. 1.2.1) will accept that the world is non-existent. This section of the *bhāṣya* is also not convenient for these illusionists. It is like this: In the rope-snake example, both the rope and the snake are objects for

the eyes. Though a snake is being seen, on examining the rope with the same eyes one realises 'this is not a snake, it is a rope'. But in the case of *Brahman-jagat*, only the *jagat* is an object for the eyes and not *Brahman*, which is the cause of *jagat* (world). Therefore, *Brahman* cannot be taught through the world by saying that 'the support - *adhiṣṭhāna* - of this illusory world is *Brahman*'.

१०. किं पुनस्तद्वेदान्तवाक्यं यत् सूत्रेण इह लिलक्षयिषितम्? “भृगुर्वै वारुणः। वरुणं पितरमुपसासार। अधीहि भगवो ब्रह्मेति” इत्युपक्रम्य आह “यतो वा इमानि भूतानि जायन्ते। येन जातानि जीवन्ति। यत् प्रयन्त्यभिसंविशन्ति। तद्विजिज्ञासस्व। तद्ब्रह्मेति” (तै. ३.१) तस्य च निर्णयवाक्यम् “आनन्दाद्वयेव खल्विमानि भूतानि जायन्ते। आनन्देन जातानि जीवन्ति। आनन्दं प्रयन्त्यभिसंविशन्ति” (तै. ३.६) इति। अन्यान्यपि एवं जातीयकानि नित्यशुद्धबुद्धमुक्तस्वभाव-सर्वज्ञस्वरूप-कारणविषयाणि उदाहर्तव्यानि।

10. 'Which then is the Vedānta Sentence which this *sūtra* draws attention to?' Beginning with "Bṛhgu, the son of Varuṇa, approached his father and asked, 'Teach me *Brahman*, venerable one'", the reply was "That from which these beings originate, being originated they live, that to which they return. Discuss that. That is *Brahman*". And the answer settling the question is "Verily from bliss alone these beings originate. Unto bliss do they return". There are to be quoted other sentences too of this nature, which speak of the cause which is eternally pure, enlightened, free and omniscient.

(10.1) Here, Vedanta sentences considered in *janmādi sūtra* are quoted which teach the cause *Brahman*. As already mentioned, the world contains both *kṣetra* and *kṣetrajña*. The sentence quoted above teaches us *Brahman* through *kṣetrajña*. Just as the characteristics changelessness (*satya*), *jñāna* and limitlessness (*ananta*) of *Brahman* were separated from the inert world of change and limitedness, the *ānanda* characteristic is to be separated from the material pleasures of *kṣetrajña*. These pleasures are really not related with materials at all. The *ānanda* of deep sleep of the adjunctless *kṣetrajña* appears as material pleasure due to the *adhyāsa* in wakeful state. Śruti says 'यथा प्रियया संपरिष्वक्तो न बाह्यं किंचन वेदनान्तरं' - (Man) embraced by woman not knowing anything inside or outside (Br. 4.3.23). Further, Bliss of deep sleep

itself is the bliss characteristic of *Brahman* - 'एषोऽस्य परम आनन्दः' (Br. 4.3.32). That is why anyone getting up from deep sleep describes his experience by saying 'I did not know anything' from his mind's point of view and but from the point of view of his inherent nature of *ānanda* he says 'I slept happily'. Other sentences of *śruti* which teach *Brahman* through *kṣetrajña* are 'सत्यं ज्ञानम् अनन्तं ब्रह्म.....तस्मात् वा एतस्मात् आत्मनः आकाशः सम्भूतः' - Immutable, *jñāna*, limitless is *Brahman*. From that this *Ātman*, *ākāśa* was created (Tai. 2.1), 'सदेव सोम्येदमग्र आसीत् एकमेव अद्वितीयम्.....तदैक्षत बहुस्यां प्रजायेयेति, तत्त्वेजोऽसृजत्' - Somya, previously this was the second-less only one *sat*. That reflected 'I will become many, I will be born.' It created fire (Cā. 6.2.1-3). 'दिव्यो हि अमूर्तः पुरुषः.... अप्राणो ह्यमना: शुभः.....एतस्मात् जायते प्राणः मनः सर्वेन्द्रियाणि च' - The lustrous formless *Puruṣa*, without *prāṇa*, without mind, clean. from him are born *prāṇa*, mind, all *indriyas* (sense and motor 'organs') (Mu. 2.1,2-3), 'आत्मा वा इदमेक एवाग्र आसीत्.....स इमाल्लोकानसृजत्' - Previously this was *Ātman* alone.. He created these worlds (Ai. 1.1.1-2) etc. After fixing the nature of *Brahman* starting from the world, *śruti* gives the final message that it is the inherent nature of *jīva*. Since this results in his inherent *ānanda*, *Brahman*'s sentence is quoted mainly and the other sentences have been included in 'others'.

शास्त्रयोनित्वाधिकरणम्

Śāstrayonitvādhikaraṇam

१. जगत्कारणत्वप्रदर्शनेन सर्वज्ञं ब्रह्म इति उपक्षिप्तम्। तदेव द्रढयन् आह।

1. Demonstrating that *Brahman* is the cause of the universe, Its omniscience was indicated. To strengthen this itself, it is said:

शास्त्रयोनित्वात् (सू. १.१.३)

Śāstrayonitvāt = Of the śāstra, It is the cause (So, *Brahman* is omniscient).

Bhāṣyakāra has written two commentaries for this sūtra. This is the first one:

(1.1) The śāstra is omniscient since it teaches *varṇa/āśrama*, *dharma/adharma* necessary for the prosperity of the *jīvas*, the lessons necessary for their *mokṣa*, the inherent nature of *kṣetra/ kṣetrajña* and so on. Only the Vedas can tell us about the methods to be followed for prosperity/*mokṣa* for all types of people of all times; humans cannot tell it because they cannot decide them. In order to make the meaning of the Vedas clear, many disciplines magnify the Vedas. These are the *purāṇas*, *mimāṃsā*, *dharmaśāstras*, logic, and the six limbs of Veda (*śādāṅga*).^{*} The creation of such an omniscient Veda is possible only by the omniscient (*sarvajña*) Īśvara and not by the *jīvas* who know but little (*alpajña*). This means that the Vedas are *apauruṣeya* - not of human origin.

(1.2) **Question:** The Vedas are eternal. The writer of the Brahma Sūtras himself says so later (1.3.29). Then what is the meaning of saying 'the creation of the Vedas'?

Answer: 'Creation' is a formal way of saying 'manifestation'. In this aspect, there is no difference between the creation of the world and the Vedas: Before creation, this world was *Brahman* only - 'सदेव सोम्येदमग्रासीत्' (Cā. 6.2.1), *Jīvas* were earlier unmanifest, became manifest in the middle and became unmanifest after death - 'अव्यक्तादीनि भूतानि व्यक्त मध्यानि भारत, अव्यक्तनिधानि एव' (Gītā. 2.28). The world

*viz., rules of recitation, details of *karma*, grammar, dictionary, meter and astronomy.

dissolves retaining its potential and is reborn from that potential - 'प्रलीयमानमपि च इदं जगत् शक्त्यवशेषम् एव प्रलीयते । शक्तिमूलम् एव च प्रभवति' (Sū. Bh. 1.3.30) etc speak of eternity with the same meaning, even for the world of *kṣetra-kṣetrajña*.

Uttered Veda is also like this. This does not mean that even during *pralaya* it retains its wordness. If it were so, it is not *pralaya* at all; it would also violate the śruti 'Only one without a second - 'एकमेवाद्वितीय'. So it means that during *pralaya*, world or Veda is one with *Brahman* and in creation It manifests without leaving Its Brahmanness. With the grace of Īśwara, Veda enters into the mind of the seers and manifests itself in sound-tone-word-sentence-form (Tai. Bh. 2.3). Indeed, the world itself manifests starting from Vedic sound. 'Prajāpati created *devatās* with the word *ayte*, men with *asṛgram*, manes with *indavah*, *grahas* with *tirapavitram*, stotra with *āsvah*, *sāstra* with *viśvāni* and other beings with *abhisoubhaga'*—'एते इति वै प्रजापतिः देवानसृजत, असृग्रमिति मनुष्यान्, इन्दव इति पितृन्, तिरःपवित्रमिति ग्रहान्, आशव इति स्तोत्रं, विश्वानि इति शस्त्रम्, अभिसौभगेति अन्याः प्रजाः' (Tāṇḍya Brahman 6.9.15). Just because manifestation happens through Prajāpati, no one says that the world is man-made. Similarly Veda too. 'This creation (of Veda) is just the continuation of the tradition, because, no other sort of creation is possible for the Veda which has no beginning or end - 'उत्सर्गः अपि अयं वाचः संप्रदायप्रवर्तनात्मकः द्रष्टव्यः अनादि निधनायाः अन्यादृशस्य उत्सर्गस्य असम्भवात्' (Sū. Bh. 1.3.28). 'One who first creates Brahma, then communicates the Veda to him, who reveals the knowledge of Ātman - to Him I surrender (Św. 6.18), i.e., *Brahman* makes use of Brahma for the manifestation of Veda. It is just like *Brahman* entering into the *jīva*, creating the world through him. If *Brahman* is not exhausted by creating the universe and whirling it from beginning to the end of *kalpa*, does it get exhausted by entering into *jīva*? No. It creates the Veda effortlessly. Therefore, It is omniscient and omnipotent.

(1.3) Some say that omniscience and omnipotence appear in the *Paramātman* due to the beginingless *avidyā*. Some say that transactions of omniscience and omnipotence are imagined in Him due to *avidyā*. They say so because, in their concept, omniscience and omnipotence cannot exist in the adjunctless *Brahman*. But these concepts are wrong, which has been mentioned (*janmādi* 4.4-5). Adjunctless *Brahman* Itself is indeed omniscient (Sū. Bh. 1.1.5). Further, Even though *jīva* has features equal to Īśwara's, they are covered due to his defects of *avidyā* etc - 'जीवस्यईश्वर समानधर्मत्वं.....विद्यमानम् अपि, तत् तिरोहितम् अविद्यादि व्यवधानात्' (Sū. Bh. 3.2.5), Since

Īśwara is eternally free from *avidyā* - 'ईश्वरस्य नित्यनिवृत्ताविद्यत्वात्' (Sū. Bh. 3.2.9). So, their concepts that omniscience and omnipotence appear in *Īśwara* due to the beginningless *avidyā* or due to *jīva's* *avidyā*, are plainly contradictory to *bhāṣya*. They do not know that omniscience etc which are in *Brahman* express themselves as a transaction due to the adjunct of *māyā* in *Īśwara*; so they entertain these concepts. Omniscience etc are not due to *avidyā*, but their transactions are due to *avidyā* because these transactions are not in adjunctless *Brahman*. Actually, even transactions appear due to *avidyā* only when they are viewed independently; when viewed from the point of view of a cause, even they are true.

(1.4) Question: What is the difference between human literature and the Vedas?

Answer: An author writes books according to his mental make up and ability. He picks up only a few aspects of the world and discusses them. His books are like small lamps illuminating only a few nearby items. They could contain errors, confusion and even half truths. If not these defects, they at least have the defect of incompleteness. The Veda is unlike this. Its sphere is the entire creation of the inanimate and animate and their cause. Indeed, the inherent nature of Veda is *Brahman*. 'इमे वेदाः यदयमात्मा— These Vedas are *Ātman* only' (Br. 2.4.6). Since Veda discusses the entire creation without leaving its inherent nature, it is complete and faultless. It is a dazzling light illuminating everything. This is its omniscience. So, its cause *Brahman* has to be omniscient too.

(1.5) Question: The omniscience of *Īśwara* has already been established in the previous *sūtra*; why then does it need to be confirmed here?

Answer: The *Mīmāṃsakās*, interpreting the eternity of the world and the Veda in their own way, deny an omniscient creator. The first commentary of the *sūtra* is intended to show that their concepts are contradictory to *śruti*.

२. महतः ऋग्वेदादेः शास्त्रस्य अनेकविद्यास्थानोपबृंहितस्य प्रदीपवत् सर्वथाविद्योतिनः
सर्वज्ञकल्पस्य योनिः कारणं ब्रह्म। न हि ईदृशस्य शास्त्रस्य ऋग्वेदादि लक्षणस्य सर्वज्ञ
गुणान्वितस्य सर्वज्ञात् अन्यतः संभवोऽस्ति। यद्यद् विस्तरार्थं शास्त्रं यस्मात् पुरुषविशेषात्
संभवति, यथा व्याकरणादि पाणिन्यादेः ज्ञेयैकदेशार्थमपि, स ततोऽपि अधिकतरविज्ञानः
इति प्रसिद्धं लोके, किमु वक्तव्यम् अनेकशाखाभेदभिन्नस्य देवतिर्यङ्गमनुष्ठवर्णाश्रिमादि
प्रविभागहेतोः ऋग्वेदाद्याख्यस्य सर्वज्ञानाकरस्य अप्रयत्नेनैव लीलान्यायेन पुरुषनिः-

श्वासवद् यस्मात् महतो भूताद्योनेः संभवः “अस्य महतो भूतस्य निःश्वसितमेतद्यद्
ऋग्वेदः”(बृ. ४.५.११) इत्यादि श्रुतेः, तस्य महतो भूतस्य निरतिशयं सर्वज्ञत्वं
सर्वशक्तिमत्त्वं च इति।

2. *Brahman* is the *yoni*—cause of the greatest *sāstra* comprising of RgVeda etc, elaborated by many disciplines, which illuminates many topics like a powerful torch and is omniscient. Nothing but an omniscient being could be the cause for such a *sāstra* comprising of the RgVeda etc with omniscient features. For it is a well recognized fact in the world that the person, from whom scriptures expanding upon various subjects emerge, has more extensive knowledge than the scripture itself. For example, Pāṇini (has more knowledge) than his scripture on grammar. What then to say that the great Being has absolute omniscience and omnipotence, since from him emerge the RgVeda etc.—which is divided into many branches, which is the cause of such distinctions like gods, lower animals, men, castes and orders of life, which is the ocean of all knowledge—has originated from that great Being effortlessly like sport, like human breath. The śruti says “Of that great Being is this breath, which is the RgVeda”.

The second commentary on this *sūtra* is as follows:

Śāstrayonitvāt = Only Veda—being *yoni* (*pramāṇa*)

(*Brahman* has to be understood only through the Veda)

३. अथवा यथोक्तं ऋग्वेदादि शास्त्रं योनिः कारणं प्रमाणम् अस्य ब्रह्मणः यथावत्
स्वरूपाधिगमे। शास्त्रादेव प्रमाणात् जगतो जन्मादिकारणं ब्रह्म अधिगम्यते इत्यभिप्रायः।
शास्त्रम् उदाहृतं पूर्वसूत्रे “यतो वा इमानि भूतानि जायन्ते” (तै. ३.१) इत्यादि।

किमर्थं तर्हि इदं सूत्रं, यावता पूर्वसूत्रे एव एवं जातीयकं शास्त्रम् उदाहरता शास्त्रयोनित्वं
ब्रह्मणो दर्शितम्? उच्यते। तत्र पूर्वसूत्राक्षरेण स्पष्टं शास्त्रस्य अनुपादानात् जन्मादि केवलं
अनुमानम् उपन्यस्तम् इत्याशङ्कयेत ताम् आशङ्कां निवर्तयितुम् इदं सूत्रं प्रवकृते शास्त्रयोनित्वाद्
इति ॥

3. Or, the *sāstra* comprising of the RgVeda etc as described above, is the

yoni—i.e. the *pramāṇa* for understanding the nature of *Brahman* as it is. The intended meaning is: It is only from the scripture as *pramāṇa* that *Brahman* which is the cause of the creation etc. of the *jagat*, is to be understood. The *śāstra* cited in the previous *sūtra* is “From which these beings originate”. ‘What is the purpose of the present *sūtra* when *śāstra* of the same class has been cited in the previous *sūtra* itself, to show that *Brahman* is to be understood only through *śāstra* as *pramāṇa*?’ There, the *śāstra* is not stated in clear words of the *sūtra*. So, it could be doubted that in the *sūtra* only inference is said. This *sūtra* ‘only Veda being *yoni* (*pramāṇa*)’ intends to remove such a doubt.

(3.1) Question: In the previous *sūtra*, it was said that ‘*śruti* etc and experience etc are *pramāṇa* for *Brahman*’s causeness of the world’. Here it is said that ‘*śāstra* is the only *pramāṇa*’. How are the two to be reconciled?

Answer: When understanding *Brahman*’s causeness from *śruti*s like ‘Earlier all this was *Brahman*’, it becomes necessary to depend on experience etc because ‘*idam* - this world’ is a matter of *pratyakṣa* etc. So, *śruti* cannot give up other *pramāṇas*. But in the *śruti* quoted here ‘from where these creatures are taking birth’, the *swarūpa* of *Brahman* is *ānanda*. That *ānanda* is the cause of the world is not a matter for other *pramāṇas* or logic; it is a matter for *śruti* only. So, in this context, *śruti* is the only *pramāṇa*. If one doubts whether this could also be handled by inference, this *sūtra* is intended to remove that doubt. Therefore, this *śruti* sentence, though already quoted there, is quoted again here.



समन्वयाधिकरणम्

Samanvayādhikaraṇam

In this way, *Brahman* is established from *śāstra pramāṇa*. This *Brahman* is totally unrelated with *karma*. So *Mīmāṃsakās*, who speak only of *karma*, oppose this. The following *sūtra* is intended to refute these arguments. For an understanding of the *bhāṣya* on it, a knowledge of some of the issues of *pūrvamīmāṃsā* is necessary; a brief summary is presented here.

(S1) An objection of *pūrvamīmāṃsaka* is that Vedic sentences unrelated to *karma* are meaningless. Answering it, the *mīmāṃsā śāstra* says that apparently meaningless sentences are to be understood only after being reconciled with *karma*. For e.g., ‘वायव्यं श्वेतमालभेत् भूतिकामः’ - One desirous of prosperity should sacrifice a male-goat to the god *Vāyu* (Tai. Sam. 2.1.1), is an injunction sentence (*vidhi-vākyā*). Following it, there is another sentence about *Vāyu* ‘वायुर्वै क्षेपिष्ठा देवता वायुमेव स्वेन भागथेयेनोपधावति स एवैनं भूतिं गमयति’ - *Vāyu* is the fastest god. With portion of his *karma* (the person) reaches *Vāyu* himself. (*Vāyu*) himself gets him prosperity (Tai. Sam. 2.1.1). If one says, ‘this sentence is unrelated to the injunctive sentence quoted earlier. It is meaningless and so not valid’, how to establish its validity?

Reply: It is valid when you view it as praising the injunction and the relation is seen. Such sentences in praise of the injunction are called *arthavāda*. In the same way, passages in denigration of prohibition (of an act) are also *arthavāda*. For e.g., ‘सोऽरोदीत् यदरोदीत् तद्रुद्रस्य रुद्रत्वम्’ - He cried; because he cried, he became Rudra (Tai. Sam. 1.5.1) is a sentence. In a situation, it appears, Rudra cried. His tears which fell on the earth became silver. This sentence is apparently meaningless when viewed independently, i.e. unrelated to *karma*. But by context, this is interpreted as a denigrating passage to prohibit the gifting of silver in *barhiyāga*. In this way does the passage get its validity. The summary is: *Arthavāda* appear meaningless when not related to *karma*. Taking *arthavāda* sentences together with injunction/prohibition as passages in praise/denigration respectively, they become meaningful and so get their validity (Jai. Sū. 1.2.7).

Arthavāda is of three kinds: *anuvāda*, *guṇavāda*, *bhūtarthavāda*. ‘अग्नः हिमस्य भेषजम्’ - Fire is the cure for cold weather is a matter verifiable by another *pramāṇa*, namely direct perception. Such an *arthavāda*, which can be verified by another *pramāṇa*, is called *anuvāda*.

An example of *guṇavāda* is as follows: *Yūpa* is a wooden stump cut with eight faces. ‘आदित्यो यूपः’ - *Yūpah* is the sun is a sentence contrary to direct perception. However, when we take its meaning as ‘*Yūpa* is lustrous like the sun’ it becomes a valid sentence. Such an *arthavāda* - contrary to another *pramāṇa* - but reconciled with another meaning, is called *guṇavāda*.

Finally, an *arthavāda*, which is neither a matter for nor contradictory to other *pramāṇas*, is called *bhūtarthavāda*. For e.g., Vedic statements which say that: ‘gods have forms’. It is unreasonable to question the validity of such statements on the basis of any other *pramāṇa*. So, Vaidikas accept them as they are (Sū. Bh. 1.3.33).

(S2) There are *mantras* which speak of an act or a *devatā*. The discussion is about their intended meaning. For e.g., a branch of a particular tree is cut for use in the *darśapūrnamāsayāga*. While cutting it, the *mantra* ‘इषेत्वा’ - for strength you is to be uttered. By context - the word ‘छिन्निच्छा’ - I will cut is to be added to it. Consequently, ‘इषेत्वा छिन्निच्छा’ - for strength I will cut you is the meaning of the *mantra*. It might be that it is only an instruction to cut the branch; it is not necessary to utter it while thinking about its meaning. ‘Is the meaning of the *mantra* intended or not during the action of cutting?’ is the question. *Mīmāṁsā śāstra* answers it like this: The action is to be performed thinking about the meaning because, it has an unseen (*adr̥ṣṭa*) fruit. Similarly, in *mantras* like ‘agnirmūrdhā’ etc, the intended meaning of the *mantra* is the *devatā* - which is an instrument of action. Uttering while thinking about its meaning has an unseen fruit. In summary: just as *arthavāda* gets its validity through praise/denigration of injunction/prohibition, *mantras* get their validity only through speaking of an action or an instrument of action. Otherwise, they have no meaning (as per the *Mīmāṁsakas*).

(S3) Injunctive and prohibitory (*vidhi* and *nिशेध*) sentences are of two types: *Ajñātajñāpaka* are those sentences which teach unknown matters. These teach details of *karma* and the means for it. The sentences which prompt those who are not prompted into *karma* are known as *apravṛttapratipravartaka*. Such sentences motivate the unmotivated by describing the attractive fruits of the *karma*. The former kind of

passages, unaccompanied by the latter, are meaningless; they will have no validity. They are valid only when they are together, because, only then do they serve the purpose of man.

The following passage is the preface of the Bhāṣyakāra to the discussion of the next *sūtra*.

१. कथं पुनर्ब्रह्मणः शास्त्रप्रमाणकत्वमुच्यते यावता “आम्नायस्य क्रियार्थत्वात् आनर्थक्यम् अतदर्थनाम्” (जै. सू. १.२.१) इति क्रियापरत्वं शास्त्रस्य प्रदर्शितम्? अतः वेदान्तानाम् आनर्थक्यम्। अक्रियार्थत्वात्। कर्तृदेवतादि प्रकाशनार्थत्वेन वा क्रियाविधिशेषत्वम्। उपासनादि क्रियान्तर विधानार्थं वा। न हि परिनिष्ठितवस्तुप्रतिपादनं संभवति। प्रत्यक्षादि विषयत्वात् परिनिष्ठितवस्तुनः। तत्प्रतिपादने च हेयोपादेयरहिते पुरुषार्थाभावात्। अत एव “सोऽरोदीत्” (तै. सं. ५.१.१) इत्येवमादीनाम् आनर्थक्यं मा भूत् इति “विधिनात्वेकवाक्यत्वात् स्तुत्यर्थेन विधीनं स्युः” (जै. सू. १.२.७) इति स्तावकत्वेन अर्थवत्त्वमुक्तम्। मन्त्राणां च “इषे त्वा” (तै. सं. १.१.१) इत्यादीनां क्रियातत्साधनाभिधायित्वेन कर्मसमवायित्वम् उक्तम्। न क्वचिदपि वेदवाक्यानां विधिसंस्पर्शमन्तरेण अर्थवित्ता दृष्टा उपपन्ना वा। न च परिनिष्ठिते वस्तुस्वरूपे विधिः संभवति। क्रियाविषयत्वात् विधेः। तस्मात् कमपिक्षित कर्तृस्वरूप देवतादि प्रकाशनेन क्रियाविधिशेषत्वं वेदान्तानाम्। अथ प्रकरणान्तरभ्यात् नैतत् अभ्युपगम्यते, तथापि, स्ववाक्यगत-उपासनादि-कर्मपरत्वम्। तस्मात् न ब्रह्मणः शास्त्रयोनित्वम् इति प्राप्ते उच्यते।

1. “How again can it be said that *Brahman* is to be understood through *śāstra* when *śāstra* shows it implies action as in ‘Since *śāstra* is for the purpose of action, (sentences) not conveying that meaning are futile?’” Therefore, futile are Vedāntas since they do not speak action. Or else, they could be subsidiaries to the injunction of action with the purpose of telling about the doer, deity etc, or presenting other actions like *upāsanā*—meditation etc. (Just) narration of existent things cannot happen (in Veda) because, existent things are objects for the senses. There is no human purpose served in such a narration because, there is no rejecting or taking. Therefore, to prevent futility in cases like ‘He cried’ etc, they are stated to be meaningful as praise: ‘But by syntactical unity with injunction, they have the meaning of praising the injunction’. *Mantras*

like “you for strength” etc are said to be related to *karma* because they tell action and the instruments therefor. Meaningfulness of the Vedic Sentences without connection with injunction is not seen anywhere, nor is it reasonable. Injunction cannot be related with the nature of an existent thing, because injunction is a matter of action. Therefore, by enlightening the nature of the doer, the deity (*devatā*) etc, Vedānta sentences are only subsidiary to acts of injunction. If this is not accepted for fear of being different, even then, they have the purport of the act of *upāsanā* present in their own sentences. Therefore, the *sāstra* cannot be the *pramāṇa* for knowing *Brahman*”. When confronted like this the reply is:-

(1) The implications of the first sentence here are summarised in (S1) above. Stating the opposition view viz, ‘Sentences unrelated to action are futile’, *pūrvamīmāṃsā* demonstrates that *sāstra* has content only in action. *Brahman* taught in Vedānta is unrelated to action. So, the *mīmāṃsakā*’s objection is this: ‘Sentences in Vedānta are unrelated to action and hence futile. At least, had they said something about the doer, *devatā* etc, which are the means of action, it would have been purposeful. It does not do that either. It does not speak even of the action of *upāsanā*. It just speaks of an existent thing, which serves no purpose. Such an object, being an object for other *pramāṇas*, the Veda need not speak about it. It does not have any injunction or prohibition; so, it is of no use (S2). Therefore, Vedānta sentences are futile’. The Vedāntin may say: ‘This is the *jñāna* portion of the Veda. So, it is not right to apply the arguments of the *karma* portion here.’ To this the *Mīmāṃsaka* replies: ‘The *jñāna* portion viz, the Upaniṣads, do talk of *upāsanā*. So, these sentences must be speaking of *upāsanā*, which is a mental *karma*. Otherwise, they cannot have any validity. So, *sāstra* is not *pramāṇa* for *Brahman*’. Now it is replied:

तत्तु समन्वयात् (१.१.४)

Tu—But, Tat - Brahman (knowledge is through sāstra because of), Samanvayāt—perfect agreement.

२. तु शब्दः पूर्वपक्षव्यावृत्त्यर्थः। तद् ब्रह्म सर्वज्ञ सर्वशक्ति जगदुत्पत्तिस्थितिलयकारणं वेदान्तशास्त्रादेव अवगम्यते। कथम्? समन्वयात्। सर्वेषु हि वेदान्तेषु वाक्यानि तात्पर्येण

एतस्यार्थस्य प्रतिपादकत्वेन समनुगतानि “सदेव सोम्येदमग्रासीत् एकमेवाद्वितीयम्” (छा. ६. २. १), “आत्मा वा इदमेक एवाग्र आसीत्” (ऐ. १. १. १), “तदेतद् ब्रह्म अपूर्वम् अनपरम् अनन्तरम् अबाह्यम् अयमात्मा ब्रह्म सर्वानुभूः” (बृ. २. ५. १९), “ब्रह्मैवेदम् अमृतं पुरस्तात्” (मु. २. २. १२) इत्यादीनि। न च तद्वानां पदानां ब्रह्मस्वरूपविषये निश्चिते समन्वये अवगम्यमाने अर्थान्तरकल्पना युक्ता। श्रुतहान्यश्रुतकल्पना प्रसङ्गात्।

2. The word ‘but’ is to refute the *pūrvapakṣa* (the opposite view). *Brahman*, the omniscient, omnipotent cause of the creation, existence and destruction of the universe is understood from Vedic scripture alone. How? Because of the *samanvaya*—(i.e., all the Vedānta Sentences closely follow this same meaning in the assertion of the summary)—as in: “This was *Sat*—Being-only—in the beginning”, “One alone without a second”, “This was the one Ātman alone in the beginning”, “That this *Brahman* is uncaused, devoid of effect, without an interior, without an exterior”, “This Self is *Brahman*, the experience of all”, “*Brahman* alone, the immortal in front” etc. When the *samanvaya* of the words in these sentences is clearly being understood in fixing the nature of *Brahman*, it is not proper to imagine other meanings because it would result (in the fault of) giving up what is heard and imagining the unheard.

(2) In the *sūtra*, ‘tat’ stands for *Brahman*. Which *Brahman*? The omniscient, omnipotent cause for the creation, sustenance and destruction of the universe established in the janmādi *sūtra*. This is *śāstrayoni* - ‘श्रुत्यवगाह्यम् एव इदम् अतिगम्भीरं ब्रह्म, न तर्कावगाह्यम्’ - To be understood only through *śruti*, not by logic (Sū. Bh. 2.1.31). The sentences in all the Upaniṣads and their words are perfectly reconciling in this *Brahman* only. To substantiate this, one sentence is quoted from each of the four Vedas.

‘सदेव सोम्य.....’ is from Chāndogya of Sāma Veda. Its summary is: ‘*Brahman* - the one alone without a second - is standing in the form of the universe of *kṣetra* - the observable, and the *kṣetrajña* - the observer *kṣetrajña* is *Brahman*.’

‘आत्मा वा इदम्.....’ is from the Aitareya of Rg Veda. Its summary is: Earlier, there was Ātman alone. He created the whole universe and entered into the bodies of beings in the form of individual souls. All this is Himself. This is *Prajñānam Brahma* -which is mere *jñāna*’.

‘तदेतद् ब्रह्म’ - is from the Brhadāraṇyaka of Śukla Yajurveda. Its summary is: ‘To let us know its inherent nature, Brahman has stood as the universe of countless forms. It is experiencing everything through the jīvas - the individual souls. This Ātman is that Brahman’.

‘ब्रह्मैवेदममृतं.....’ is from Mundaka of the Atharva Veda. ‘Everything noticed in front in the forms of the universe and the jīva are Brahman only. One who realises it becomes Brahman’ is its summary.

These sentences and their words are unambiguously proclaiming Brahman and Brahman-Ātman oneness. When such perfect reconciliation of the message is directly visible, to imagine unheard meanings damaging the heard ones is wrong.

३. न च तेषां कर्तृस्वरूपप्रतिपादनपरता अवसीयते। “तत्केन कं पश्येत्” (बृ. २. ४. १३) इत्यादि क्रियाकारकफल-निराकरण श्रुतेः। न च परिनिष्ठितवस्तुस्वरूपत्वेऽपि प्रत्यक्षादि विषयत्वं ब्रह्मणः। “तत्त्वमसि” (छां. ६. ८. ७) इति ब्रह्मात्मभावस्य शास्त्र-मन्तरेण अनवगम्यमानत्वात्। यत्तु हेयोपादेय रहितत्वात् उपदेशानर्थक्यमिति, नैष दोषः। हेयोपादेयशून्य-ब्रह्मात्मता-अवगमादेव सर्वक्लेशप्रहाणात् पुरुषार्थसिद्धेः। देवतादि प्रतिपादनस्य तु स्ववाक्यगत-उपासनार्थत्वेऽपि न कश्चिद्द्विरोधः। न तु तथा ब्रह्मणः उपासना विधिशेषत्वं संभवति। एकत्वे हेयोपादेय शून्यतया क्रियाकारकादि द्वैतविज्ञान-उपमर्दोपपत्तेः। न हि एकत्वे विज्ञानेन उन्मथितस्य द्वैतविज्ञानस्य पुनः संभवोऽस्ति येन उपासना-विधिशेषत्वं ब्रह्मणः प्रतिपद्येत। यद्यपि अन्यत्र वेदवाक्यानां विधिसंस्पर्शमिन्तरेण प्रमाणत्वं न दृष्टम्, तथापि-आत्मविज्ञानस्य फलपर्यन्तत्वात् न तद्विषयस्य शास्त्रस्य प्रामाण्यं शक्यं प्रत्याख्यातुम्। न च अनुमानगम्यं शास्त्रप्रामाण्यम्, येन अन्यत्रदृष्टं निर्दर्शनम् अपेक्षेत। तस्मात् सिद्धं ब्रह्मणः शास्त्रप्रामाणकत्वम्।

3. Nor is their purport to teach the nature of the doer, the deity etc because, there are śrutis like “Then by what, whom could one see?” etc which refute action, instrument of action and fruit of action. Though of the nature of an existent thing, Brahman is not an object for perception etc, because that Brahman is the Self—“That you are” which cannot be understood by any means except by śāstra. What was said that being devoid of rejection and acceptance the teaching is futile, this is no defect, because, the realization of Self as Brahman

which is devoid of rejection and acceptance results in the destruction of all suffering—which is attainment of human goal. There is nothing objectionable even in telling about the deity etc for the sake of *upāsanā* in its own sentences. But it cannot be subsidiary to the injunction of *upāsanā* in the case of *Brahman* because being one and devoid of rejection and acceptance, the sense of duality such as action, instrument etc is annihilated. The cognition of duality once destroyed by the knowledge of the oneness of *Brahman* cannot return; (if it could) *Brahman* could be taught as subsidiary to the injunction of *upāsanā*. Though in other places Vedic sentences are not seen to be *pramāṇa* except in conjunction with injunction, the *pramāṇa* nature of the *śāstra* in that topic cannot be denied since the knowledge of *Ātman* culminates in the fruit. The *pramāṇa* nature of the *śāstra* is not to be concluded by inference, because, that would need an example seen elsewhere. Therefore, it is established that the scripture (*śāstra*) is the *pramāṇa* for *Brahman*.

(3.1) The reason for the absence of any connection to *karma* in *Brahman*--*Ātman* oneness is being explained here. *Karma* is possible only in the presence of the duality of the doer, instruments of doing etc; it is impossible in their absence. Doership in *Brahman*-*Ātman* oneness is rejected by the *śruti* saying ‘यत्र सर्वम् आत्मा एव अभूत् तत् केन कं पश्येत्, तत् केन कं शृणुयात्’ - One who has himself become everything, with what can he see and whom can he see? With what can he hear and whom can he hear? etc. How can there be any possibility of *karma* in him?

‘In saying about the deity etc’: It is true that *upāsanā* has been said in the Upaniṣads. But later they say that the Self of the *upāsaka* (one who does *upāsanā*) is *Brahman*. Therefore, *Brahman* cannot be subsidiary to the injunction of *upāsanā*, because *upāsanā* is also based on duality. But *Brahman* is one alone without a second. ‘Though in other places Vedic sentences etc’: In the portion dealing with *karma*, there is no validity for sentences unrelated to injunction. But it is not so in portions dealing with *jñāna*. Here, the *Brahman*-*Ātman* oneness told by *śruti* is directly experienced in *susupti*. Based on this experience, when the enquirer gets into the meditation of staying in this ultimate *jñāna*, it ends in the fruit of *Ātman*’s realization. This demonstrates the validity of the Upaniṣadic sentences. Validity of a *pramāṇa* is indeed established only by experience. Therefore, one need not conceive of the

validity of the Upanisads by the inference of extending the logic of the *karma*-portion to them.

(3.2) Based on the *Brahman-Ātman* oneness resulting from *Brahman* realisation, relation of *Brahman* with action - either of *karma* or *upāsanā* - was refuted above. But some oppose this by arguing that *Brahman* is taught by *śruti* not for showing the oneness of *Brahman* and *Ātman* but as a subsidiary to *upāsanā*. Their arguments are as follows:

४. अत्र अपरे प्रत्यवतिष्ठन्ते। यद्यपि शास्त्रप्रमाणकं ब्रह्म, तथापि प्रतिपत्तिविधि विषय-
तथैव शास्त्रेण ब्रह्म समप्तिः। यथा यूप-आहवनीयादीनि अलौकिकान्यपि विधिशेषतया
शास्त्रेण समप्तिः, तद्वत्। कुत एतत्? प्रवृत्तिनिवृत्तिप्रयोजनपरत्वात् शास्त्रस्य। तथा हि
शास्त्रतात्पर्यविदः आहुः “दृष्टो हि तस्यार्थः कर्मावबोधनम्” (शा.भा. १.१.१) इति।
“चोदनेति क्रियायाः प्रवर्तकं वचनम्” (शा. भा. १.१.२), “तस्य ज्ञानमुपदेशः...”
(शा. भा. १.१.२), “तद्वूतानां क्रियार्थेन समामायः” (जै. सू. १.१.२५), “आमा-
यस्य क्रियार्थत्वात् आनर्थक्यम् अतदर्थनाम्....” (जै. सू. १.२.१) इति च। अतः
पुरुषः क्वचित् विषयविशेषे प्रवर्तयत् कुतश्चित् विषयविशेषात् निवर्तयच्च अर्थवत्
शास्त्रम्। तच्छेषतया च अन्यत् उपयुक्तम्। तत्सामान्यात् वेदान्तानामपि तथैव अर्थवत्त्वं
स्यात्। सति च विधिपरत्वे यथा स्वर्गादि कामस्य अग्निहोत्रादि साधनं विधीयते एवम्
अमृतत्वकामस्य ब्रह्मज्ञानं विधीयते इति युक्तम्।

4. Here some others confront (like this): Though *śāstra* is the *pramāṇa* for *Brahman*, yet *Brahman* is taught only as an object for the injunction of *upāsanā*, just as the *yūpa*—sacrificial post, the *āhavanīya* (fire) etc. unknown to common people are intimated by the *śāstra* only as subsidiary to injunction. Why so? Because the purport of the *śāstra* is to instigate to act or to restrain from it. So, those who know the purport of the *śāstra* say “Its purport is seen to be knowledge of action”, “*Codana* means (Vedic) Sentence urging action”, “Its (dharma’s) knowledge comes from injunction”, “Words denoting things to be attained should be connected with those denoting action”, “Purport of Veda being action, passages without it are meaningless”. Therefore, *śāstra* is purposeful either in prompting a person to do something or in refraining him

from doing something else. If the purport is injunction, then it would be correct to say that, just as *agnihotra* etc are prescribed as means desirous of heaven, similarly, knowledge of *Brahman* is prescribed for one desiring immortality.

(4) *Pratipatti* means *upāsanā*. *Śāstra* teaches *Brahman* for *upāsanā*. Just as the unknown *yūpa*, *āhvaniya* etc are taught in the karma portion as instruments of karma, unknown *Brahman* in the *jñāna* part of the Vedas is also taught for the sake of *upāsanā*; because, the very purpose of the Vedas is to teach *karma*. *Codana* is a sentence of *śruti* asking one to do *karma*. ‘Its knowledge comes from’: *Tasya jñānam* knowledge, i.e. Veda teaches *dharma* i.e., *karma*. For e.g., one desirous of heaven should perform *jyotiṣṭoma- yajña*. *Upadeśa* is any injunctive sentence. When the two go together, sentences of *śāstra* become valid. ‘Words denoting things’: Unknown things are made known by the Veda using words and objects which are known. Why? For the sake of action. ‘*Āmnāyasya*’ etc: Raising the question of the purposelessness of *śruti* sentences not talking about *karma*, *śāstra* answered by saying that those sentences are to be understood in relation to action. The gist of these sentences is: Injunction and prohibition are the principals. Other sentences are either praise and denigration or subsidiary to injunction. The same rule applies to *Vedānta* also because *Upaniṣads* are part of Veda only. So, knowledge of *Brahman* is a part of the *upāsanā* of *Brahman*. Other sentences concerning *Brahman* are subsidiary to this injunction. Later on, the *Mīmāṃsaka* replies to a counterargument of the *Vedāntin*, and extends his arguments of the same nature.

५. नन्विह जिज्ञास्यवैलक्षण्यम् उत्कम् कर्मकांडे भव्यो धर्मो जिज्ञास्यः, इह तु भूतं नित्यनिर्वत्तं ब्रह्मजिज्ञास्यमिति? तत्र धर्मज्ञानफलात् अनुष्ठानापेक्षात् विलक्षणं ब्रह्मज्ञान-फलं भवितुमहर्ति। नार्हत्येवं भवितुम्। कार्यविधिप्रयुक्तस्यैव ब्रह्मणः प्रतिपाद्यमानत्वात् “आत्मा वा अरे द्रष्टव्यः” (बृ. २.४.५) इति। ‘‘य आत्मा अपहतपाप्मा सोऽन्वेष्टव्यः स विजिज्ञासितव्यः’’ (छां. ८.७.१), ‘‘आत्मेत्येवोपासीत’’ (बृ. १.४.७), ‘‘आत्मानमेव लोकमुपासीत’’ (बृ. १.४.१५), ‘‘ब्रह्मवेद ब्रह्मैव भवति’’ (मुं. ३.२.९) इत्यादि विधानेषु सत्सु कोऽसौ आत्मा? किं तद् ब्रह्म? इत्याकांक्षायां तत्स्वरूप समर्पणेन सर्वे वेदान्ता उपयुक्ताः ‘‘नित्यः सर्वज्ञः सर्वगतः नित्यतृप्तः नित्यशुद्धबुद्धमुक्त-स्वभावः’’, ‘‘विज्ञानमानन्दं ब्रह्म’’ इत्येवमादयः। तदुपासनाच्च शास्त्रदृष्टोऽदृष्टः मोक्षः फलं भविष्यतीति।

5. (Vedāntin's counter argument): Was it not said that the topics of discussion are different: viz. the topic in *karmakānda* is dharma which is yet to happen, but here (in *jñānakānda*) the topic is existent eternal *Brahman*? Of these, should not the fruit of the knowledge of *Brahman* be different from the fruit of the knowledge of dharma which requires observance? (*Mīmāṃsaka* says) It cannot be that.. *Brahman* is taught only for injunction: “*Ātman* is to be seen”, “That *Ātman* which is free from sin is to be sought for and discussed”, “Meditate on it as *Ātman*”, “Meditate on the world as *Ātman*”, “Knower of *Brahman* becomes *Brahman* Itself”, etc. When there are such injunctions, there will arise a desire to know ‘Who is *Ātman*?’ ‘What is that *Brahman*?’. All Vedāntas are useful in intimating Its nature as “Eternal, omniscient, all pervasive, eternally contented, eternally pure and enlightened and free by nature, knowledge, bliss” and so on. From that *upāsanā* will result the unseen fruit of *mokṣa* shown in the *śāstra*.

(5) **Vedāntin's Question:** The topics discussed in the *karma* / *jñāna* parts of the Veda are *dharma* / *Brahman* respectively. In this part, *dharma* is yet to happen, since it needs performance of *karma*. But *Brahman* is eternal. This has already been said. Therefore, their fruits should also be different. Is it not?

Mīmāṃsaka's Reply: No. In the *karma* part, first comes the knowledge of *karma*, then its performance and finally the fruit. So also in the *jñāna* part: first is knowledge of *Brahman*, then *upāsanā* and finally the unseen (*adṛṣṭa*) fruit of *mokṣa*. After clearly stating the injunction for *upāsanā* ‘Meditate on it as *Ātman*’, as subsidiary to it, *śruti* says: ‘He is unhit by *pāpa*, free from old age, death, grief, hunger thirst etc’, ‘*Brahman* is pure *jñāna*’ describing *Brahman* which is to be meditated upon. In this way, adjusting the meaning of Upaniṣadic sentences to the act of *upāsanā*, the *Mīmāṃsaka* takes his objection further by saying that the narration of an existing thing unrelated to action is futile.

६. कर्तव्यविधननुप्रवेशे वस्तुमात्रकथने हानोपादान असंभवात् “सप्तद्वीपा वसुमती”, “राजासौ गच्छति” इत्यादि वाक्यवत् वेदान्तवाक्यानाम् आनर्थक्यमेव स्यात्। ननु वस्तु-मात्रकथनेऽपि “रज्जुरियं नायं सर्पः” इत्यादौ भ्रान्तिजनितभीतिनिवत्तनेन अर्थवत्त्वं दृष्टम्? तथा इहापि असंसार्यात्मवस्तुकथनेन संसारित्वभ्रान्तिनिवत्तने अर्थवत्त्वं स्यात्। स्यादेतदेवं

यदि रज्जु स्वरूपश्रवणे इव सर्पभान्तिः संसारित्वभ्रान्तिः ब्रह्मस्वरूप श्रवणमात्रेण निवर्तेत्। न तु निवर्तते। श्रुतब्रह्मणोऽपि यथापूर्वं सुखदुःखादि संसारिधर्म दर्शनात्। “श्रोतव्यो मनव्यो निदिध्यासितव्यः” (बृ. २.४.५) इति च श्रवणोत्तरकालयोः मनननिदिध्यासनयोःविधिदर्शनात्। तस्मात् प्रतिपत्तिविधिविषयतया एव शास्त्रप्रमाणकं ब्रह्म अभ्युपगन्तव्यमिति।

6. Disallowing injunction of duty, (and making a) mere statement of a thing where there is no give and take, the Vedānta Sentences too will be meaningless like the sentences “The earth has seven islands”, “There goes the king” etc. (Vedāntin intervenes): Even the case of a mere statement of fact as in “This is a rope, this is not a snake” etc, meaningfulness is seen because of the removal of fear generated by delusion. So also here, the statement of the fact that *Ātman* is not a *samsārī*, could be meaningful through the removal of the delusion of his being a *samsārī*. (*Mīmāṃsaka* retorts): This would be so, if the delusion of his *samsārī*'s nature is removed by merely hearing about the nature of *Brahman*, like the delusion of snake by merely hearing about the nature of the rope. But it is not removed. Even in him who has heard of *Brahman*, the attributes of a *samsārī* like happiness and grief are found as before. That is why subsequent to hearing, the injunction of reflection and meditation are found (in *śāstra*) as in ‘He is to be heard, reflected and meditated upon’. Therefore, it must concluded that *śāstra* is *pramāṇa* for *Brahman* only as the object on the injunction of *upāsanā*.

(6.1)‘This is a rope, this is not a snake’ etc (Doubt): The fear generated by the snake goes only with the knowledge of the rope and not just by saying ‘this is a rope, not a snake’. How can this be a counter objection?

(Reply): True. After listening to that statement, the listener has to examine the rope and get its true knowledge to get out of fear. But what happens by the teacher, is only the narration ‘this is rope, not snake’. Similarly, after listening to *śruti*'s narration of the nature of *Brahman*, those specially intelligent who are free from ignorance, doubt and wrong knowledge may experience the meaning of the sentence You are That - ‘येषां पुनः निपुणमतीनां न अज्ञानसंशयविपर्ययलक्षणः पदार्थविषयः प्रतिबन्धः अस्ति ते शक्नुवन्ति सकृत् उक्तम् एव तत्त्वमसिवाक्यार्थम् अनुभवितुम्’ (Sū. Bh. 4.1.2). But the less intelligent

have to do thinking and meditation. We will reserve to a later part the discussion whether they are injunctions are not. For the present, according to the opposite opinion, 'Just listening to the message is fruitless. The *Brahman* listened to should be meditated on for fruit. So, thinking and meditation told by *śruti* are injunctions for *upāsanā*. In this way, *sāstra* is *pramāṇa* for *Brahman*'s knowledge only as subsidiary to the injunction of *upāsanā*'.

(6.2) Next, each of *Mīmāṃsaka*'s objections are refuted and the final verdict is given. This is the list of objections: (1) The rules of argument for fixing the meaning should be the same in both parts of *karma* and *jñāna*, because both are parts of *Veda* only. (2) Such an application is possible through the injunction of *upāsanā* (3) *Upaniṣads* have indeed spoken of *upāsanā*. (4) *Mokṣa* is the unseen fruit of *upāsanā*. (5). Mere narration of an existent thing is purposeless. (6) Worldly activity is seen even after the knowledge of *Brahman*; it is not lost.

७. अत्राभिधीयते न। कर्मब्रह्म-विद्याफलयोः॒वैलक्षण्यात्। शारीरं वाचिकं मानसं
च कर्म श्रुतिस्मृतिसिद्धं धर्माख्यम्, यद्विषया जिज्ञासा “अथातो धर्मजिज्ञासा” (जै. सू.
१.१.१) इति सूत्रिता। अधर्मोऽपि हिंसादिः प्रतिषेधचोदना लक्षणत्वात् जिज्ञास्यः -
परिहाराय। तयोः चोदनालक्षणयोः अर्थानर्थयोः धर्माधर्मयोः फले प्रत्यक्षे सुखदुःखे
शारीरवाङ्मनोभिरेव उपभुज्यमाने विषयेन्द्रियसंयोगजन्ये ब्रह्मादिषु स्थावरान्तेषु प्रसिद्धे।
मनुष्यत्वादारभ्य ब्रह्मान्तेषु देहवत्सु सुखतारतम्यम् अनुश्रूयते। ततश्च तद्वेतोर्धर्मस्य
तारतम्यं गम्यते। धर्मतारतम्यात् अधिकारतारतम्यम्। प्रसिद्धं च अर्थित्वं सामर्थ्यादि
कृतम् अधिकारितारतम्यम्। तथा च यागाद्यनुष्ठायिनामेव विद्यासमाधिविशेषात् उत्तरेण
पथागमनम्, केवलैः इष्टापूर्तदत्तसाधनैः धूमादि क्रमेण दक्षिणेन पथागमनम्, तत्रापि
सुखतारतम्यं तत्साधनतारतम्यं च शास्त्रात् “यावत्संपातमुषित्वा” (छां. ५.१०.५)
इत्यस्मात् गम्यते। तथा मनुष्यादिषु नारकस्थावरान्तेषु सुखलवः चोदनालक्षणधर्मसाध्य
एव इति गम्यते तारतम्येन वर्तमानः। तथा ऊर्ध्वगतेषु अधोगतेषु च देहवत्सु दुःख-
तारतम्यदर्शनात् तद्वेतोर्धर्मस्य प्रतिषेधचोदनालक्षणस्य तदनुष्ठायिनां च तारतम्यं
गम्यते। एवम् अविद्यादि दोषवतां धर्माधर्मतारतम्यनिमित्तं शारीरोपादानपूर्वकं सुख-
दुःखतारतम्यं अनित्यं संसाररूपं श्रुतिस्मृतिन्यायप्रसिद्धम्। तथा च श्रुतिः “न ह वै
सशारीरस्य सतः प्रियाप्रिययोः अपहतिरस्ति” (छां. ८.१२.१) इति यथावर्णितं
संसाररूपम् अनुवदति।

7. Here is the reply: No, because there is difference in the fruits of knowledge of *karma* and knowledge of *Brahman*. *Karma* performed by body speech and mind is well-known as *dharma* in *śruti* and *smṛti*. The discussion of which is in the *sūtra* “Then, therefore, the discussion of *dharma*”. *Adharma* too, like killing etc, are to be discussed for rejection. Directly noticeable happiness/grief—resulting from good/evil (acts)—which are fruits of *dharma/adharma* as defined by Vedic Sentences are born out of object/sense contact and are felt by body, speech, mind; this is well-known in (beings) right down from *Hiraṇyagarbha* to the unmoving (plants). A gradation of happiness is heard (in scriptures) in all embodied beings starting from man to *Brahmā* (*Hiraṇyagarbha*). And therefrom can be understood the gradation of its cause *dharma*. From the gradation of *dharma* follows the well-known gradation of eligible persons brought about by the desire for fruit, capacity, learning etc. Thus, only those who perform *yāga* etc can go by the Northern Path on account of the excellence of knowledge and mental poise. Through only *iṣṭa* (*agnihotra* etc), *pūrta* (like constructing water tank etc which bring happiness to others and eventually to oneself), *datta* (giving away wealth to appropriate people), persons go by the Southern Path through smoke etc. Here too the gradation of the means for that are understood from *śāstra* “Living there till the fruit of *karma* is expended”. Similarly, it is understood that the gradation in the little bit of happiness is possible for beings starting from man down to those in *naraka* (hell) and plants only due to *dharma* defined by *śāstra*. In the same way, the gradation of grief for embodied beings who go upwards or downwards show a gradation in its cause viz *adharma* defined by prohibitory injunctions and also in those who committed them. In this way, those who have defects of *avidyā* etc experience by embodiment the gradations of happiness/grief due to gradations of *dharma/adharma* in impermanent worldly life. This is well-known from *śruti*, *smṛti* and logic. Following this “For the embodied person there cannot be the destruction of pleasure/displeasure” says the *śruti* about the worldly life described above.

(7) There is a great difference between the fruits of *karma* and the knowledge of *Brahman*. Details of the fruits of *karma* are given here. *Karma* happens through body, speech and mind. *Śruti* defines good/bad *karma* as *dharma/adharma*. Their fruits are directly experienced as happiness/grief - through body, speech and mind. They have gradations. There is also gradation in the eligibility for doing *karma*.

The reason is: The eligible person must have desire, knowledge, ability and be unprohibited by the *sāstra* - 'अर्थी समर्थः विद्वान् शास्त्रेण अविपर्युदस्तः' - There is certainly a gradation in desire, knowledge and ability. In this way, there cannot be the destruction of pleasure/displeasure. Here, *saśarīrī* means the one embodied - one who has *adhyāsa* in the *śarīra* (body). It is he who does karma and experiences its fruits. He is never free from pleasure/displeasure.

८. “अशरीरं वावसन्तं न प्रियाप्रिये स्पृशतः” (छ. ८.१ २.१) इति प्रियाप्रिय-स्पर्शनप्रतिषेधात् चोदनालक्षणधर्मकार्यत्वं मोक्षाख्यस्य अशरीरत्वस्य प्रतिषिध्यते इति गम्यते। धर्मकार्यत्वे हि प्रियाप्रियस्पर्शनप्रतिषेधो नोपपद्यते। अशरीरत्वमेव धर्मकार्यमिति चेत्? न। तस्य स्वाभाविकत्वात् “अशरीरं शरीरेषु अनवस्थेष्ववस्थितम्। महान्तं विभुमात्पानं मत्वा धीरो न शोचति” (क. १.२.२), “अप्राणोह्यमनाः शुभ्रः” (मु. २.१.२), “असंगोह्ययं पुरुषः” (बृ. ४.३.१५) इत्यादि श्रुतिभ्यः। अत एव अनुष्ठेय कर्मफलविलक्षणं मोक्षाख्यम् अशरीरत्वं नित्यमिति सिद्धम्।

8. On the other hand “Pleasure/displeasure do not touch the unembodied.” That this unembodiment, called *mokṣa*, is not an effect of dharma defined by injunction, is confirmed by this denial of contact of pleasure/displeasure with the unembodied. If it were an effect of dharma, the denial of contact of pleasure/displeasure is not reconciled. (Question) ‘If it is said that unembodiment is the effect of dharma?’ No, because, it is natural. *Śruti* says “Knowing *Ātman* which is unembodied residing in the changing bodies, great, all-pervasive—the wise man does not grieve”, “He is indeed without *prāṇa*, without mind, pure”, “This person indeed is unattached”. Therefore, unembodiment called *mokṣa*, which is distinct from the fruit of performed *karma*, is established to be eternal.

(8) In the previous section it was said that 'for the embodied person there cannot be destruction of pleasure/displeasure'. Therefore, the word 'unembodied' here cannot mean 'when the body is lost, i.e. after death', because, these sentences are comparing unliberated and liberated *jīvas*. Also, others cannot know whether there is displeasure/pleasure after death. Not only that, unembodiment is not the fruit of the observance of *dharma* because, *dharma* does generate the fruit of pleasure. Further, it is clear from the quoted *śruti* sentences that unembodiment is indeed *mokṣa*. So, *mokṣa* is not unseen fruit - nor something that is got after death, Further, it is eternal too; because, if it were to decrease with experience like the fruit of karma, grief should come back. But the Katha *śruti* which is quoted rules out grief for the liberated.

९. तत्र किंचित् परिणामिनित्यं यस्मिन् विक्रियमापेऽपि तदेवेदमिति बुद्धिः न विहन्यते। यथा पृथिव्यादि जगन्नित्यत्ववादीनाम्। यथा च सांख्यानां गुणाः। इदं तु पारमार्थिकं कूटस्थनित्यं व्योमवत् सर्वव्यापि सर्वविक्रियारहितं नित्यतृप्तं निरवयवं स्वयं-ज्योतिः स्वभावम्। यत्र धर्माधर्मौ सहकार्येण कालत्रयं च नोपावर्तेते। तदेतत् अशरीरत्वं मोक्षाख्यम्। “अन्यत्र धर्मात् अन्यत्राधर्मात् अन्यत्रास्मात् कृताकृतात्। अन्यत्र भूताच्च भव्याच्च” (क. १.२.१४) इत्यादि श्रुतिभ्यः। अतः तद् ब्रह्म यस्य इयं जिज्ञासा प्रस्तुता। तद्यदि कर्तव्यशेषत्वेन उपदिश्येत, तेन च कर्तव्येन साध्यश्चेत् मोक्षो अभ्युपगम्येत, अनित्य एव स्यात्। तत्र एवं सतिः यथोक्तकर्मफलेष्वेव तारतम्यावस्थितेषु अनित्येषु कक्षित् अतिशयो मोक्षः इति प्रसज्येत। नित्यश्च मोक्षः सर्वैः मोक्षवादिभिः अभ्युपगम्यते। अतः न कर्तव्यशेषत्वेन ब्रह्मोपदेशो युक्तः।

9. Of these, some are eternal though changing; i.e. though subject to change, the cognition 'This is but that' is not destroyed: like earth etc for those believers in the eternality of the universe, or as the *guṇas* for the Sāṃkhyas. This (*mokṣa*) however is absolute without change, all-pervasive like *ākāśa*, devoid of all modifications, eternally contented, without parts, self-luminous by nature, where *dharma/adharma* with action do not apply in the three times (past, present and future). This is unembodiment called *mokṣa* because *śrutis* say 'Different from *dharma*, different from *adharma*, different from effect (and) cause, different from what has been and what has to be.' Therefore, such is

Brahman whose discussion is presented (here). If that be taught as subsidiary to duty, if *mokṣa* is agreed to be a result of duty, it would amount to *mokṣa* being only something special among the graded non-eternal fruits of *karma* described above. But *mokṣa* is accepted to be eternal by all who discuss about *mokṣa*. Therefore, (to say that) the teaching of *Brahman* is subsidiary to duty is not correct.

(9) In this section, *Bhāṣyakāra* is speaking about the nature of the eternity of *mokṣa*. The river, for example, is eternal though changing i.e., though the water is different in each place, the cognition of the sameness of the river - its eternity - is not lost. *Mokṣa* is not like that. It is eternal without change. Like *ākāśa*, it is all pervading and is the same anywhere at any time etc. These being precisely the features of *Brahman*, *mokṣa* is *Brahman*. Had *Brahman* been subsidiary to *karma* or *upāsanā* and *mokṣa* were their fruit, it would be transient like the fruit of *karma*. Therefore, knowledge of *Brahman* can never be subsidiary to any type of action.

१०. अपि च “ब्रह्मवेद ब्रह्मैव भवति” (मु. ३.२.९), “क्षीयन्ते चास्य कर्मणि तस्मिन् दृष्टे परावरे” (मु. २.२.९), “आनन्दं ब्रह्मणो विद्वान् न बिभेति कुतश्चन” (तै. २.९), “अभयं वै जनक प्राप्तोऽसि” (बृ. ४.२.४), “तदात्मानमेवावेत् अहं ब्रह्मास्मीति, तस्मात्त्सर्वमभवत्” (बृ. १.४.१०), “तत्र को मोहः कः शोकः एकत्वमनुपश्यतः” (ई. ७) इत्येवमाद्याः श्रुतयः ब्रह्मविद्यानन्तरं मोक्षं दर्शयन्त्यः मध्ये कार्यान्तरं वारयन्ति। तथा “तद्वैतत् पश्यन् ऋषिवर्मिदेवः प्रतिपेदे अहं मनुरभवं सूर्यश्च” (बृ. १.४.१०) इति ब्रह्मदर्शन-सर्वात्मभावयोर्ध्ये कर्तव्यान्तरं वारणाय उदाहार्यम्। यथा “तिष्ठन् गायति” इति तिष्ठति गायत्योर्ध्ये तत्कर्तुं नास्तीति गम्यते।

10. Further, there are *śrutis* showing that *mokṣa* follows the knowledge of *Brahman*, precluding any other action to be done in between: “He who knows *Brahman* becomes *Brahman* Itself,” “His *karma* perishes when He—the higher cause and the lower (effect) is seen”, “He who knows the *ānanda* of *Brahman* has no fear from anywhere”, “Verily, Oh Janaka you have obtained fearlessness”, “It understood itself as ‘I am *Brahman*’ and so it became everything”, “What delusion is there and what grief for one who has seen oneness” etc.

Similarly, “R̄ṣi Vāmadeva seeing It realized, ‘I am Manu and also the Sun’” would also be quoted to preclude some other action between realizing *Brahman* and the oneness of the Self with all—just as in “He sings standing”, there is nothing else for him to do between standing and singing.

(10) After explaining that the knowledge of *Brahman* is not subsidiary to duty, *Bhāṣyakāra* is establishing to make it firm that *mokṣa* results immediately with the knowledge of *Brahman* and between the two there is nothing to be done. But the *upāsaka* cannot become *Brahman* by Its *upāsanā*. When by ‘*kṣiyante (karmas) perish*’, the *śruti* is clearly speaking of the complete destruction of all *karma*, how can there be scope for *karma* at all? In the sentence, ‘knower of the ānanda of *Brahman* has no fear’, the destruction of fear is for the *jñānī* who is alive. In the sentence ‘Oh Janaka, you have obtained fearlessness’ says that fearlessness is obtained immediately with realization; it does not say ‘*prāpsyasi* - you will obtain (in the future)’. Similarly in other sentences also, refutation of any duty between knowledge and *mokṣa* is clear.

११. “त्वं हि नः पिता योऽस्माकमविद्यायाः परं पारं तारयसि” (प्र. ६.८), “श्रुतं होव मे भगवददृशेभ्यः तरति शोकमात्मविदिति, सोऽहं भगवः शोचामि तं मा भगवान् शोकस्य पारं तारयतु” (छ. ७.१.३), “तस्मै मृदितकषायाय तमसः पारं दर्शयति भगवान् सनत्कुमारः” (छ. ७.२६.२) इति चैवमाद्याः श्रुतयः मोक्षप्रतिबंध-निवृत्तिमात्रमेव आत्मज्ञानस्य फलं दर्शयन्ति। तथा च आचार्यप्रणीतं न्यायोपबृहितं सूत्रम् “दुःख-जन्म-प्रवृत्ति-दोष-मिथ्याज्ञानानाम् उत्तरोत्तरापाये तदनन्तरापायात् अपवर्गः” (न्या.सू. १.१.२) इति। मिथ्याज्ञानापायश्च ब्रह्मात्मैकत्वविज्ञानात् भवति।

11. “You are indeed our father who carries us to the other side of *avidyā*”, “I have heard from those like your reverence that knower of the Ātman crosses grief. Your reverence I am in grief. You should take me across grief”, “The revered Sanatkumāra shows the other side of darkness to him whose sins are destroyed”—these and such other *śrutis* show that the fruit of Ātmajñāna is only the removal of the obstacles to *mokṣa*. There is also one *sūtra* written by the *ācārya* supported by reason: “Grief, birth, motivation, defect and illusory cognition—(is the sequence in which) the destruction of the subsequent, causes

the destruction of earlier one, resulting in *mokṣa*”. And destruction of illusory cognition results only from the knowledge of the oneness of *Brahman* and *Ātman*.

(11.1) After refuting duty in between knowledge and *mokṣa* in the previous section, how exactly *mokṣa* results directly from the knowledge of *Brahman* is being said here. The sentence ‘you carry us to the other side of *avidyā*’ makes it clear that *avidyā* - lack of the knowledge of *Brahman* is the only obstruction for *mokṣa* and so, knowing *Brahman* is itself *mokṣa*. That ‘Sanatkumāra taught Nārada’ etc also means the same thing. Gautama, the teacher of logic, tells us the sequence of the steps of *mokṣa* in the *sūtra*: The ignorance of one’s nature is the cause of wrong knowledge about oneself; wrong knowledge leads to the defects of love and hate; these defects cause motivation for *karma*; from that results birth and consequently grief. Therefore, destruction of *avidyā* leads to destruction of wrong knowledge and in that sequence the destruction of defects, of motivation, of birth and grief, leading to *mokṣa*.

Question: The Gautam *sūtra* is saying that the destruction of birth leads to destruction of grief; does it mean that *mokṣa* results only after death?

Answer: Not like that. The destruction of *adhyāsa* equals destruction of birth because, the body of the knower of *Brahman* is already ‘dead like the slough of a snake which is cast off on the ant-hill’ (Br. 4.4.7). So, *mokṣa* is even while alive.

१२. न च इदं ब्रह्मात्मैकत्वविज्ञानं संपद्गूपम्। यथा “अनन्तं वै मनोऽनन्ता विश्वेदेवा अनन्तमेव स तेन लोकं जयति” (बृ. ३.१.९) इति। न च अध्यासरूपम् यथा “मनो ब्रह्मेत्युपासीत” (छां. ३.१८.१), “आदित्यो ब्रह्मेत्यादेशः” (छां. ३.१९.१) इति च मन आदित्यादिषु ब्रह्मदृष्ट्यध्यासः। नापि विशिष्टक्रियायोगनिमित्तम् “वायुर्वाव संवर्गः” (छां. ४.३.१) “प्राणो वाव संवर्गः” (छां. ४.३.३) इतिवत्। नापि आज्यावेक्षणादि कर्मांगसंस्काररूपम्। संपदादिरूपे हि ब्रह्मात्मैकत्व विज्ञाने अभ्युपगम्यमाने “तत्त्वमसि” (छां. ६.८.७), “अहं ब्रह्मास्मि” (बृ. १.४.१०), “अयामात्मा ब्रह्म” (बृ. २.५.१९) इत्येवमादीनां वाक्यानां ब्रह्मात्मैकत्व वस्तुप्रतिपादनपरः पदसमन्वयः पीड्येत। “भिद्यते हृदयग्रंथिः छिद्यन्ते सर्वसंशयाः” (मुं. २.२.८) इति चैवमादीनि अविद्यानिवृत्तिफलश्रवणानि उपरुद्धेरन्। “ब्रह्मवेद ब्रह्मैव भवति” (मुं.

३. २.९) इति चैवमादीनि तद्वावाप्तिवचनानि संपदादि पक्षे न सामञ्जस्येन उपपद्येत्।
तस्मात् न संपदादिरूपं ब्रह्मात्मैकत्वविज्ञानम्।

12. This cognition of *Brahman-Ātman* oneness is not of the nature of *sampadrūpa* (*śāstra* imposed identification) as in the case of “Mind is indeed infinite, the *viśwedevatās* (gods of this name) are infinite. (Meditating on this identification) he conquers an infinite world”. Nor is it of the nature of superimposition (done by *śāstra*) as in “Meditate (on the identity that) the mind is *Brahman*”, “The sun is *Brahman*, this is the teaching” in which contemplation involves in viewing mind, sun etc as *Brahman*. Nor is it (an identification) with a distinctive action as in “*Vāyu* (air) is the devourer” “*Prāṇa* is the devourer”. It is also not of the nature of a subsidiary act of purification like looking at the ghee. If the knowledge of the *Brahman- Ātman* oneness is admitted to be of the form of *sampadrūpa* etc, it would violate the syntactical relation of words in sentences like “That you are”, “I am *Brahman*”, “This Self is *Brahman*” etc which assert the oneness of *Brahman* and *Ātman*. It would contradict (scriptural passages) like “The knot of the heart is cut, all doubts are cleared”, which declare the fruit of the removal of *avidyā*. If it were of *sampadrūpa* etc, the statements of (*jñānī*) becoming *Brahman* in “He who knows *Brahman* becomes *Brahman* Itself” would not satisfactorily reconcile. Therefore, the knowledge *Brahman-Ātman* oneness is not of the nature of *sampadrūpa* etc.

(12) Another Point: Though Bhāṣyakāra is quoting a *sutra* of logic for *mokṣa*, the theses of logicians and Vedānta are very different. According to the logicians, knowing *Ātman* as unatman is wrong knowledge and separating the two is right knowledge. If here, by *Ātman* is meant the *kṣetrajña* who is *prājña* and *unātman* is the body and the rest of the world, their indiscrimination is certainly wrong knowledge. This is made explicit in the *Adhyāsa Bhāṣyā*. However, this *Ātman* is getting separated from ‘*unātman*’ everyday in deep sleep; this is everyone’s experience. But no enlightenment has dawned. Wrong knowledge is returning as soon as one gets up. So ‘*Ātman-unātman*’ discrimination in the logician’s thesis is not the knowledge that Vedānta speaks of. Discrimination arises because of not

knowing *Brahman*. Both '*Ātman*' and '*unātman*' are *Brahman*. So, the moment one realizes the *Brahman-Ātman* oneness, *avidyā* is lost and there arises the realisation that '*unātman*' is not different from me, but I am different from '*unātman*'. This is *sarvātmabhāva* which is *mokṣa* - already spoken of in a previous section (Sūtra 1.1.1, sec 11-14). *Sarvātmabhāva* is *sarva-ātma-bhāva* - the realisation that everything is '*Ātman*'. This does not, however, involve the multiplicity of the world; it is sublated. This is called *prapañca-vilaya*. Therefore, it is not different from the inherent non-dual oneness of *Ātman*.

(12) That knowledge of *Brahman-Ātman* oneness destroys wrong knowledge - this has already been explained. Now it is shown that this knowledge is not a mental action. Mental action can be of four types: *sampadrūpa*, *adhyāsarūpa*, *kriyayogarūpa*, *samskārarūpa*.

Details of *Sampadrūpa*: There is similarity between the inferior mind and the superior *viśwedevatās*; both are infinite. On this basis, mind is meditated upon as *viśwedevatās*.

Adhyāsarūpa: Thinking of the mind or the sun as *Brahman* and meditating on them. This is not wrong knowledge born out of indiscrimination. The difference between the mind or the sun and *Brahman* is known.

Kriyayogarūpa: In *suṣupti* (deep sleep), speech etc of one's self are devoured by *prāṇa*; in *pralaya* i.e., dissolution of the world, the presiding deities of speech etc viz., *Agni* - i.e., fire etc are devoured by *Vāyu*. Based on the similarity of this special action, *śāstra* prescribes meditation on the presumed oneness of *prāṇa*; and *Vāyu*.

Samskārarūpa: By looking at it, the wife purifies the ghee to be used in the *yāga* as a subsidiary act. But knowledge of *Brahman-Ātman* oneness is not any of these types of mental actions, because there is duality in all of them till the end.

१३. अतः न पुरुषव्यापारतन्त्रा ब्रह्मविद्या। किं तर्हि? प्रत्यक्षादिप्रमाणविषयवस्तु-ज्ञानवत् वस्तुतन्त्रा। एवंभूतस्य ब्रह्मणः तज्जानस्य च न कयाचित् युक्त्या शक्यः कार्यानुप्रवेशः कल्पयितुम्। न च विदिक्रियाकर्मत्वेन कार्यानुप्रवेशो ब्रह्मणः। “अन्यदेव तद्विदितादथो अविदितादधि” (के. १.४) इति विदिक्रियाकर्मत्वं प्रतिषेधात्, “येनेदं सर्वं विजानाति तं केन विजानीयात्” (बृ. २.४.१४) इति च। तथा उपास्ति क्रिया-कर्मत्वप्रतिषेधोऽपि भवति यद्वाचाऽनुभ्युदितं येन वागभ्युद्यते (के. १.५) इत्यविषयत्वं

ब्रह्मण उपन्यस्य “तदेव ब्रह्मत्वं विद्धि नेदं यदिदमुपासते” (के. १.५) इति। अविषयत्वे ब्रह्मणः शास्त्रयोनित्वानुपपत्तिरिति चेत्। न। अविद्याकल्पित-भेदनिवृत्तिपरत्वात् शास्त्रस्य। न हि शास्त्रम् इदंतया विषयभूतं ब्रह्म प्रतिपिपादयिषति। किं तर्हि? प्रत्यगात्मत्वेन अविषयतया प्रतिपादयत् अविद्याकल्पितं वेद्य-वेदितृवेदनादि भेदमपनयति। तथा च शास्त्रम् “यस्यामतं तस्य मतं मतं यस्य न वेद सः। अविज्ञातं विज्ञानतां विज्ञातम-विज्ञानताम्” (के. २.३), “न दृष्टेद्र्ष्टारं पश्येः न विज्ञातेर्विज्ञातारं विज्ञानीयाः” (बृ. ३.४.२) इति चैवमादि। अतः अविद्याकल्पितसंसारित्वनिवर्तनेन नित्यमुक्तात्मस्वरूप-समर्पणात् न मोक्षस्य अनित्यत्वं दोषः।

13. Therefore, the knowledge of *Brahman* is not subjective. What then is it? It is objective like the knowledge of the objects of the sense perception etc. Imagining the allowance of action in such *Brahman* or Its knowledge is impossible by any reasoning. *Brahman* cannot be deemed to come into the field of action though It is an object for the act of cognition, because of the denial of Its being an object of knowing in “It is different from the known and also the unknown”, “By whom one knows all this, by what one can know Him?” Similarly, there is also the denial of Its being an object of the act of *upāsanā*: after telling the non-objectness of *Brahman* in “That which is not expressed by speech, that by which speech is expressed” *śāstra* says “Know then that alone is *Brahman* (and) not as ‘this’ whose *upāsanā* is done”. (Objection) ‘If it be said that *Brahman* is not an object, (then) *śāstra* cannot be the source (for its knowledge)?’ No, for *śāstra* has the purport of removing the difference imagined by *avidyā*. Indeed, the *śāstra* does not intend to propound *Brahman* as an object like ‘this’. What then? It propounds *Brahman* as the non-object inner self and removes the differences like known-knower and knowledge imagined in the inner self by *avidyā*. Thus says the *śāstra*: “By whom It is not known, for him It is known, by whom It is known , for him It is not known. (It is) not known to them who know, known to them who do not know”, “You cannot see the seer of sight, cannot know the knower of the knower”, etc. Because of the restoration of *Ātman*'s nature of eternal freedom through the

removal (in this way) of *samsāra* imagined (in Him) due to *avidyā*, *mokṣa* is free from the fault of non-eternity.

(13.1) All the *sampadrūpa* etc actions are dependent on the one who has to perform them, i.e., they are subjective. Unlike them, knowing *Brahman* is objective, i.e., dependent on the object, which has to be understood as it is - just as in understanding a pot only as a pot. 'Is knowing also not a mental act?' In the case of *Brahman*, it is not even that because, It is different from the known and the unknown. It is not an object for the mind to understand. Since It is the inherent nature of the knower, It cannot be an object for knowing. Kenopaniṣad clearly states that It cannot be an object for *upāsanā* either. 'Then what is meant when it is said that *śāstra* is the *pramāṇa* for knowing It?' Indeed, even *śāstra* cannot teach *Brahman* directly. *Śāstra*'s validity is only up to the point of telling one that *Brahman* is not that which one is seeing. Knowledge of *Brahman* is to be obtained only in this manner. The seeker first searches for *Brahman* in something which It is not. In this action of searching there is multiplicity of the known-knower-knowledge. This difference is seen due to *avidyā*. *Śāstra* only prevents him from entertaining this illusory difference and provokes him to look at himself. Since the ever-present Ātman is *Brahman*, *mokṣa* is eternal.

(13.2) The sentence, 'अविद्याकल्पितं वैद्यवेदितृवेदनादिभेदम् अपनयति' - Which removes the differences like known-knower-knowledge imagined in the inner self by *avidyā*, needs a closer look. None among the three is imagined due to *avidyā*; only the difference seen in them is due to *avidyā*. The ignorant person, only looking at the forms, sees differences and understands only what he sees. The jñānī will also see the differences with his senses, but he understands the oneness permeating all of them which is himself. The seeker takes support of Ātman to remove the sense of difference in outside forms - 'ब्रह्माकारभेदबुद्धिनिवृत्तिः एव आत्मस्वरूपालभ्वनकारणम्'। (Gitā Bh. 18.50). In this way, *sarvātmabhāva* itself is *mokṣa*.

१४. यस्य तु उत्पाद्यो मोक्षः तस्य मानसं वाचिकं कायिकं वा कार्यमपेक्षते इति युक्तम्। तथा विकार्यत्वे च। तयोः पक्षयोः मोक्षस्य ध्रुवम् अनित्यत्वम्। न हि दध्यादि विकार्यम् उत्पाद्य वा घटादि नित्यं दृष्टं लोके। न च आप्यत्वेनापि कायपिक्षा। स्वात्मरूपत्वे सति अनाप्यत्वात्। स्वरूपव्यतिरिक्तत्वेऽपि ब्रह्मणो नाप्यत्वम्। सर्वगतत्वेन नित्याप्त-स्वरूपत्वात् सर्वेण ब्रह्मणः आकाशस्येव। नापि संस्कार्यो मोक्षः येन व्यापारम् अपेक्षते।

संस्कारो हि नाम संस्कारस्य गुणाधानेन वा स्यात्, दोषापनयनेन वा। न तावत् गुणाधानेन संभवति, अनाधेय अतिशय ब्रह्मस्वरूपत्वात् मोक्षस्य। नापि दोषापनयनेन, नित्यशुद्धब्रह्मस्वरूपत्वात् मोक्षस्य।

14. For him (who says) *mokṣa* is produced, it is reasonable that for him, there is the need for mental, verbal or physical action. So also, if it be a modification. (But) for these two views, the non-eternality of *mokṣa* is certain. Neither modifications like curd etc, nor things produced like pot etc are found to be eternal in the world. Even for attainability (of *mokṣa*), there is no need for action, because, it is of the nature of one's own Self. Even if it is different from one's own nature, *Brahman* is not what is to be attained because, being all-pervasive, *Brahman* by nature is ever-attained by all like *ākāśa*. Nor is *mokṣa* (a result of) purification in which case it expects an activity. Indeed, what is called purification may be either of merit or by subtraction of defect. It cannot be addition of merit since *mokṣa* is the unsurpassed excellence of *Brahman* to which no merit can be added; nor by the removal of defect, since *mokṣa* is of the nature of eternally pure *Brahman*.

(14) Fruit of *karma* is of four types: Obtained by producing, modifying, attaining or purifying. *Mokṣa* is like none of them. It is not produced like a pot. If it were, it should be absent earlier and lost later and so non-eternal. *Mokṣa* being eternal, it is not produced. It is not modified like milk into curd. The *Mīmāṃsakas* say that *karma*/*upāsanā* modify to the form of *apūrva* - something unseen, and are then experienced as fruit in due course. This is also non-eternal. So *mokṣa* is not of this type. It is not something to be attained either, like *swarga* (heaven). It being one's own inherent nature, it is not attained. Even granting it is different, it is still not attainable because *Brahman* is all-pervading. *Mokṣa* is not something to be purified. Purification means adding a merit or removing a demerit. But *Brahman*, which is of unsurpassed excellence, is faultless. So, *mokṣa* is not a result of purification. Next is a long analysis of this last feature.

१५. स्वात्मधर्म एव सन् तिरोभूतो मोक्षः क्रियया आत्मनि संस्क्रयमाणे अभिव्यज्यते। यथा आदर्शे निघर्षणक्रियया संस्क्रयमाणे भास्वरत्वं धर्मः इति चेत्? न।

क्रियाश्रयत्वं अनुपपत्तेः आत्मनः। यदाश्रया क्रिया तम् अविकुर्वती नैव आत्मानं लभते। यदि आत्मा क्रिया विक्रियेत, अनित्यत्वम् आत्मनः प्रसज्येत। “अविकार्योऽयमुच्यते” (गी. २.२५) इति चैवमादीनि वाक्यानि बाध्येरन्। तच्च अनिष्टम्। तस्मात् न स्वाश्रया क्रिया आत्मनः संभवति। अन्याश्रयायास्तु क्रियायाः अविषयत्वात् न तया आत्मा संस्क्रयते। ननु देहाश्रयया स्नान-आचमन-यज्ञोपवीतादिकथा क्रियया देही संस्क्रयमाणो दृष्टः? न। देहादि संहतस्यैव अविद्यागृहीतस्य आत्मनः संस्क्रयमाणत्वात्। प्रत्यक्षं हि स्नानाचमनादेः देहसमवायित्वम्। तया देहाश्रयया तत्संहत एव कश्चित् अविद्यया आत्मत्वेन परिगृहीतः संस्क्रयते इति युक्तम्। यथा देहाश्रयचिकित्सानिमित्तेन धातु साम्येन तत्संहतस्य तदभिमानिन आरोग्यफलम् “अहमरोगः” इति यत्र बुद्धिरुत्पद्यते। एवं स्नान-आचमन-यज्ञोपवीतादिना अहं शुद्धः संस्कृतः इति यत्र बुद्धिः उत्पद्यते संस्क्रयते। स च देहेन संहत एव। तेनैव हि अहंकर्त्रा अहंप्रत्ययविषयेण प्रत्ययिना सर्वाः क्रियाः निर्वर्त्यन्ते। तत्फलं च स एव अश्नाति। “तयोरन्यः पिप्पलं स्वाद्वत्ति अनश्नन्नन्यो अभिचाकशीति” (मु. ३.१.१) इतिमन्त्रवर्णात्, “आत्मेन्द्रियमनोयुक्तं भोक्तेत्याहुर्मनीषिणः” (क. १.३.४) इति च। तथा च “एको देवः सर्वभूतेषु गूढः सर्वव्यापी सर्वभूतान्तरात्मा, कर्माध्यक्षः सर्वभूताधिवासः साक्षी चेता केवलो निर्गुणश्च” (श्व. ६.११) इति। “स पर्यगात् शुक्रमकायमव्रणम् अस्नाविरं शुद्धमपापविद्धम्” (ई. ८) इति चैतौ मन्त्रौ अनाधेय अतिशयतां नित्यशुद्धतां च ब्रह्मणो दर्शयतः। ब्रह्मभावश्च मोक्षः। तस्मात् न संस्कार्योऽपि मोक्षः। अतोऽन्यन् मोक्षं प्रति क्रियानुप्रवेश-द्वारं न शक्यं केनचित् दर्शयितुम्। तस्मात् ज्ञानमेकं मुक्त्वा क्रियाया गंधमात्रस्यापि अनुप्रवेशः इह नोपपद्यते।

15. ‘If it be said that *mokṣa*, though being one’s own nature, yet being obscured is manifested by a purification act, just as the luster of a mirror purified by the act of scrubbing?’ No; because, (saying that) the Self is an object of action—is irreconcilable. An action which does not modify its object cannot exist. If *Ātman* is modifiable by action, its results in non-eternity of *Ātman*. Sentences like “This is spoken of as non-modifiable” would be affected. That is unacceptable. Therefore, *Ātman* being an object of action is not possible. If something else is the object of action, *Ātman* is not purified since it is not the

object (for purification). (Details:) ‘Is not the embodied seen to be purified by body-based acts such as bathing, *ācamana* (sipping of water) and wearing *yajñopavīta* (the sacred thread etc)?’ No. Only that *Ātman* is purified which is associated with the body etc under the grip of *avidyā*. Indeed, it is clearly seen that bathing, *ācamana* etc inhere in the body. It stands to reason that what is purified by the body-based act is something that is associated with it and is accepted as the Self due to *avidyā*. It is like this: With equilibrium of the humours brought about by the body based treatment, there is fruit of health for him who is associated with the body and has the conceit of it as himself; in him arises the feeling “I am free from disease”. Similarly, he who gets the feeling ‘I am clean, purified’ through bathing, *ācamana*, wearing of the *yajñopavīta* etc, is purified. He is certainly associated with the body. It is only by him who has the conceit ‘I am the doer’, who is the object of the concept ‘I’ and supporter of all thoughts—that all actions are performed. Their fruit he alone enjoys, because *mantra* passage says “One of them eats the fruit, the other looks on, not eating” and also “One associated with the body, senses and the mind is called the enjoyer by wise men”. Similarly, “The one God concealed in all beings and pervading all beings, the watcher of actions, living in all beings, the witness, the intelligent, alone and free from all qualities”, “He pervades all, is effulgent, unembodied, free from wounds, free from nerves, pure and unafflicted by sin”. These two *mantras* show that *Brahman* cannot have anything (excellence) added to It and that It is eternally pure. Becoming *Brahman* is *mokṣa*. Therefore, *mokṣa* is not one to be purified. Other than these (four) no one can show a door for action to enter into *mokṣa*. Therefore, apart from (this) one knowledge, there cannot be an entrance here even for a smell of action.

(15) Objection: Can the inherent nature of *Ātman* which is eternal *mokṣa* be revealed by purification, just like the mirror which when scrubbed shows its shine?

Answer: No; because scrubbing modifies the mirror. If *Ātman* is modified like that by *karma*, He becomes non-eternal.

Further Objection: ‘What if by scrubbing we mean the wiping of the mirror?’

Answer: In that case, the purification is not of the mirror. Similarly, purification is there by bathing and *ācamana* for one who has *adhyāsa* in the body. He is *prājña* who is the object of the *aham-pratyaya* and is the witness of all *pratyayas*. It is he who, with the adjuncts of body mind etc, does all the actions in wakeful and dreaming states and experiences their fruit. But the *Ātman* who is his witness is untouched by these purification processes. Really speaking, even *prājña* is untouched by them. Since *prājña*, due to *avidyā*, does not know that he is *Ātman*, he appears to get purified. This *avidyā* is the only obstruction to *mokṣa* and is not lost by any purificatory action. *Avidyā* is lost only by *vidyā* - knowledge.

१६. ननु ज्ञानं नाम मानसी क्रिया? न, वैलक्षण्यात्। क्रिया हि नाम सा यत्र वस्तुनिरपेक्षैव चोद्यते, पुरुष चित्तव्यापाराधीना च। यथा “यस्यै देवतायै हविः गृहीतं स्यात्तां मनसा ध्यायेद्वषट्करिष्यन्” (ऐ. ब्रा. ३.१.८), “सन्ध्यां मनसा ध्यायेत्” इति चैवमादिषु। ध्यानं चिन्तनं यद्यपि मानसं, तथापि पुरुषेण कर्तुमकर्तुम् अन्यथा वा कर्तुम् शक्यम्। पुरुषतन्त्रत्वात्। ज्ञानं तु प्रमाणजन्यम्। प्रमाणं च यथाभूतवस्तुविषयम्। अतः ज्ञानं कर्तुमकर्तुम् अन्यथा वा कर्तुमशक्यम्। केवलं वस्तुतन्त्रमेव तत्। न चोदनातन्त्रम्, नापि पुरुषतन्त्रम्। तस्मात् मानसत्वेऽपि ज्ञानस्य महद्वैलक्षण्यम्। यथा च “पुरुषो वाव गौतमाग्निः” (छां. ५.७.१) “योषा वाव गौतमाग्निः” (छां. ५.८.१) इत्यत्र योषित्पुरुषयोः अग्निबुद्धिर्मानसी भवति। केवल चोदनाजन्यत्वात् क्रियैव सा पुरुषतन्त्रा च। या तु प्रसिद्धे अग्नौ अग्निबुद्धिः, न सा चोदनातन्त्रा नापि पुरुषतन्त्रा किं तर्हि? प्रत्यक्षविषयवस्तुतन्त्रैव इति ज्ञानमेवैतत्, न क्रिया। एवं सर्वप्रमाण-विषय-वस्तुषु वेदितव्यम्। तत्रैवं सति यथाभूत ब्रह्मात्मविषयमपि ज्ञानं न चोदनातन्त्रम्। तद्विषये लिङादयः श्रूयमाणा अपि अनियोज्य-विषयत्वात् कुण्ठी भवन्ति, उपलादिषु प्रयुक्तक्षुरतैक्ष्यादिवत्। अहेय-अनुपादेय वस्तुविषयत्वात्।

16. ‘Is not knowledge a mental act?’ No, because of difference. An act is that which is enjoined without regard to the nature of the thing and dependent on mental activity. For example: “That deity for whom oblation is to be offered, should be contemplated in mind and then should be uttered, the word *vasat*”, “The evening (deity) should be contemplated in the mind” etc. Contemplation, viz. thinking about, is mental; it may be done or not done or done in a different

way by the person since it is subjective. Knowledge, on the other hand, is generated by *pramāṇa* i.e. valid means of knowledge. *Pramāṇa* objectifies the thing as it is. Therefore, knowledge—though mental—is very different in nature (from an act). In cases like “Man is fire, oh Gautama”, “Woman is fire, oh Gautama”, there arises the cognition of fire in man and in woman. This however, is an act generated solely by injunction and subjective. But the cognition of the well-known fire is not dependent on imagination nor is it subjective. What then? It is knowledge only, not an act, because, it is objective (knowledge) of an object of perception. The same is to be understood in respect of all things which are objects of *pramāṇa*. This being the case, even knowledge of *Brahman* which is the Self as it is, is not dependent on Vedic injunction. Hence, although imperative etc referring to the knowledge of *Brahman* are found in the Vedic texts, yet they are ineffective because they refer to something which cannot be enjoined, just as the edge of a razor becomes blunt when it is applied to a stone. The reason is that It is a thing where there is no giving and taking.

(16) That *jñāna* is not a mental act is being demonstrated in this section. Action is injunctory - prescribed independent of the nature of the object and dependent on the mind. For e.g., the meditation prescribed in the sentence ‘after meditating in the mind on the *devatā*, when the *hotā* shouts ‘*vaṣṭ*’, the *adhvaryu* should offer the oblation to the *devatā*’ is subjective.

Doubt: Quoting the same *mantra* ‘the deity for whom.’ etc the *Bhāṣyakāra* has said ‘Injunctions prescribing the oblations expect Indra etc *devatās* to have an inherent form. *Devatās* like Indra etc cannot be grasped by the mind if they don’t have a form - ‘विधिभिः एव इन्द्रादि दैवत्यानि हवीषिं चोदयद्विभिः अपेक्षितम् इन्द्रादीनां स्वरूपम्। न हि स्वरूपरहिता इन्द्रादयः चेतसि आरोपयितुं शक्यन्ते’। (Sū. Bh. 1.3.33). Since the mental form during meditation has to be similar to the inherent form of the *devatā*, is it not *jñāna* - knowledge of the *devatā*? If it is *jñāna*, it cannot be an injunction. Therefore, what does it mean to say that ‘injunction is prescribed independent of the nature of the object?’

Answer: Not like that. In the sentence above, the meditation implies a mental form similar to the inherent form of the *devatā*. But the *adhyāsarīpa* meditation (see sec. 12) is dissimilar to the form of the object. Therefore, meditation could be similar

or dissimilar to the form of the object. This is the implication when it is said that the injunction of meditation is without regard to the nature of the object of meditation. Therefore, meditation is not *jñāna*. The *jñāna* that is produced when the *devatā* is actually seen is not subjective. But the meditation of remembering the *devatā* not in front, is subjective.

Doubt: When seeing the pot, its mental form that is produced is subject to change. Therefore, isn't knowing the pot also an action?

Answer: No; because there is no effort on part of the knower in knowing the pot. Production of the mental form of the object as a consequence of the object-sense contact is the nature of the *kṣetra*. This is subject to change. The one who notices it is the knower. Knowing is not his action; it is his nature.

Doubt: Let not *jñāna* of sense perception be an act. Is not effort involved in knowing things by inference and Veda?

Answer: It is not so. Whatever may be the *pramāṇa*, *jñāna* obtained has to be right knowledge. But effort is needed, while knowing things beyond perception, to remove the doubts obstructing right knowledge. But this does not mean that *jñāna* is produced by this effort; because the object of the effort is not *jñāna*, but the removal of doubt. One who does not distinguish the role of *pramāṇa* in this way, may imagine that *jñāna* is obtained by effort like cooking. This is not correct. If one remembers that the knower is *prājña* who is adjunctless, it is easy to understand the *jñāna* is not his action, but his nature. Therefore, *Brahman-Ātman jñāna* also is neither injunctive nor subjective.

१७. किमर्थानि तर्हि “आत्मा वा अरे द्रष्टव्यः श्रोतव्यः” (बृ. २.४.५) इत्यादीनि विधिच्छायानि वचनानि? स्वाभाविक-प्रवृत्तिविषय-विमुखीकरणार्थानि इति ब्रूमः। योहि बहिर्मुखः प्रवर्तते पुरुषः इष्टं मे भूयात्, अनिष्टं मा भूदिति, न च तत्र आत्यन्तिकं पुरुषार्थं लभते, तम् आत्यन्तिकपुरुषार्थवाज्ञिनं स्वाभाविक-कार्यकरणसंघातप्रवृत्तिगोचरात् विमुखीकृत्य प्रत्यगात्मस्तोतस्तथा प्रवर्तयन्ति “आत्मा वा अरे द्रष्टव्यः” इत्यादीनि। तस्य आत्मान्वेषणाय प्रवृत्तस्य अहेयमनुपादेयं च आत्मतत्त्वम् उपदिश्यते “इदं सर्वं यदयमात्मा” (बृ. २.४.६), “यत्र त्वस्य सर्वमात्मैवाभूत् तत्केन कं पश्येत् केन कं विजानीयात्”, “विज्ञातारमरे केन विजानीयात्” (बृ. ४.५.१५), “अयमात्मा ब्रह्म” (बृ. २.५.१) इत्यादिभिः।

17. 'What then are the meanings of passages like "Ātman should be seen, should be heard about" etc which have the shade of injunctions?' We say, they are intended to turn back (the mind) from objects of natural inclination. The person who is inclined outwards (thinks) 'Let me have desirable things, let me not have undesirable things' but does not attain the final goal there. (When the same person) desires the final goal, passages like "Ātman is to be seen" etc turn him away from the objects of natural inclination which attract the union of the body and the senses and make his (attention) flow towards the inner Ātman in a continuous current. For him who engages himself in the quest of Ātman, śruti teaches the true nature of Ātman which is free from any giving and taking: "All this is Ātman", "Where all of this is only Ātman, by what whom can see ? By what whom can one know!" "By what one can the knower?" "This Ātman is Brahman" etc.

(17) Which have the shade of injunctions etc: Should be done, to be done, must be done have injunctory meaning. Though the word 'to be seen, to be heard, to be thought about, to be meditated on' are injunctions, they cannot be injunctions when used in the case of Ātman. 'Then what is their purpose?' It is this: Man by nature is extrovert in trying to get happiness and getting rid of grief. One who is in search of Ātman knows that the ultimate happiness is not obtained from outside. Nevertheless, his mind is frequently pushed outside due to the power of the impressions acquired from previous lives. His mind is to be withdrawn from outside and turned inwards towards the Ātman. Who is this Ātman? It is he who is all this. Therefore, when he comes to know that he is the all pervading Ātman, the mind stops going outside. These injunctive words are used to turn his attention towards the Ātman. Rest of the discussion in this connection is in the end section.

१८. यदपि अकर्तव्यप्रधानम् आत्मज्ञानं हानाय उपादानाय वा न भवति इति, तत् तथैव अभ्युपगम्यते। अलंकारो ह्यम् अस्माकं यत् ब्रह्मात्मावगतौ सत्यां सर्वकर्तव्यता हानिः कृतकृत्यता च इति। तथा च श्रुतिः "आत्मानं चेद्विजानीयात् अयमस्मीति पूरुषः, किमिच्छन् कस्य कामाय शरीरमनुसंज्वरेत्" (बृ. ४.४.१२) इति। "एतद् बुद्ध्वा बुद्धिमान् स्यात् कृतकृत्यश्च भारत" (गी. १५.२०) इति स्मृतिः। तस्मात् न प्रतिपत्ति-विधिविषयतया ब्रह्मणः समर्पणम्।

18. (As for the objection that) the knowledge of *Ātman* which is free from action does not have any giving and taking—we accept it as it is. This indeed constitutes our glory that with the realization of *Ātman* as *Brahman*, there is the destruction of all duties and the accomplishment of everything that is to be accomplished. So too says śruti: “If man realizes that *Ātman* is himself (then), desiring what for who’s sake will he suffer in sympathy with the body?” *smṛti* also says “Knowing that, one becomes intelligent and would have accomplished all that is to be accomplished, oh Bhārata”. Therefore, *Brahman* is not said as subsidiary to *upāsanā*.

(18) That there is no giving and taking in the knowledge of *Brahman-Ātman* oneness, is not a defect; it is our glory. We accept this feature of the realisation of *Ātman* as it is because, what give and take could be there in that bliss whose tiny fractions are the happiness of beings starting from man upto the supermost *devatā* Brahma? (Tai. 2.8; Br. 4.3.33). With this, all duties come to an end and all the work is over. That there is no higher bliss is indicated even to the unrealised in blissful and griefless deep sleep where connection with outside world is completely snapped. Therefore, it is obvious that the realised one has no connection with either *karma* or *upāsanā*.

१९. यदपि केचिदाहुः प्रवृत्तिनिवृत्तिविधितच्छेषव्यतिरेकेण केवल वस्तुभागे नास्तीति, तत्र। औपनिषदस्य पुरुषस्य अनन्यशेषत्वात्। योऽसौ उपनिषत्स्वेव अधिगतः पुरुषः असंसारी ब्रह्म उत्पाद्यादि-चतुर्विध-द्रव्यविलक्षणः स्वप्रकरणस्थः अनन्यशेषः नासौ नास्ति नाधिगम्यते इति वा शक्यं वदितुम्। “स एष नेति नेत्यात्मा” (बृ. ३.९.२६) इति आत्मशब्दात्। आत्मनश्च प्रत्याख्यातुं अशक्यत्वात्। य एष निराकर्ता तस्यैव आत्मत्वात्। ननु आत्मा अहंप्रत्ययविषयत्वात् उपनिषत्स्वेव विज्ञायते इति अनुपपन्नम्? न, तत्साक्षित्वेन प्रत्युक्तत्वात्। न हि अहंप्रत्यय विषयकर्तृव्यतिरेकेण तत्साक्षी सर्वभूतस्थः समः एकः कूटस्थनित्यः पुरुषः विधिकांडे तर्कसमये वा केनचित् अधिगतः सर्वस्य आत्मा। अतः स न केनचित् प्रत्याख्यातुं शक्यः विधिशेषत्वं वा नेतुम्। आत्मत्वादेव च सर्वेषां न हेयः नापि उपादेयः। सर्वं हि विनश्यत विकारजातं पुरुषान्तं विनश्यति। पुरुषो विनाशहेत्वभावात् अविनाशी। विक्रियाहेत्वभावाच्च कूटस्थनित्यः, अत एव नित्यशुद्धबुद्धमुक्तस्वभावः। तस्मात् “पुरुषान्नपरं किंचित् सा काष्ठा सा

परागतिः” (क. १.३.११), “तं त्वौपनिषदं पुरुषं पृच्छामि” (बृ. ३.९.२६) इति च औपनिषदत्वविशेषणं पुरुषस्य उपनिषत्सु प्राधान्येन प्रकाशयमानत्वे उपपद्यते। अतः भूतवस्तुपरो वेदभागो नास्तीति वचनं साहसमात्रम्।

19. Some say, there is no portion of the Veda telling about mere things different from injunctions which motivate and demotivate and what is subsidiary to them. That is not so because, the Person (*Ātman*) propounded in the Upaniṣads is not subsidiary to anything else. This Person is understood from the Upaniṣads alone; He is not *samsārī*; He is of the nature of *Brahman*, who is distinct from the four kinds of substances which are produced etc, Who occurs in a topic of His own, not subsidiary to another. It cannot be said that such a one does not exist or that He cannot be known, because there is the word ‘*Ātman*’ in “That *Ātman* is not like this, not like this” and it is not possible to deny *Ātman*, for he who denies is himself *Ātman*. (Objection) ‘Since (it has been said) that *Ātman* is the object of ‘I-thought’, is it not wrong to say that He is to be understood from the Upaniṣads alone?’ No, because, it has been said that He is the witness of the *Ātman* grasped as ‘I’. As distinct from the doer *Ātman* grasped as ‘I’, His witness who is present in all, equal, one, immutably eternal, the Person who is the self of all, is not known by anyone either in the injunctive part (of the Veda) or in the system of logic. Therefore, He cannot be refuted by anyone, nor link (him) as subsidiary to injunction. Being the *Ātman* of all, He is not something either to be given up or taken up. All the produced effects perish leaving this Person. This Person is imperishable because, there is nothing in Him to perish. He is immutably eternal because, there is nothing to be modified (in Him). For this reason, He is by nature eternally pure, enlightened and free. Therefore, in (sentences like) “There is nothing higher than this Person: that is the limit, that is the highest goal”, “But I ask about the Person propounded in the Upanishads”,—the qualification ‘propounded in the Upaniṣads’ predominantly speak about this Person. Therefore, the statement that there is no part of the Veda dealing with existing things is mere rashness.

(19) It is wrong to say that the Vedas do not teach anything which has no

connection with *karma*; Upaniṣads do teach of such a soul. In this section it is shown with evidence that He is to be taught only by the Upaniṣads because, He is not related to *karma*. The sentence since Ātman is the subject of the *aham-pratyaya* - 'ननु आत्मा अहंप्रत्ययविषयत्वात्...' has already been discussed in *Adhyāsa Bhāṣya* (25.1).

Doubt: Till now it has been said that the inner self is the subject of the I-thought (*aham-pratyaya*) and is well-known in everyone's experience. Now suddenly it is being said that 'उपनिषत्सु एव विज्ञायते' - He is to be understood only through the Upaniṣads. How is it?

Answer: Not like that. The inner Self, spoken of previously, is *kṣetrajña-prājña* -doer-enjoyer - who could be purified by action - discussed in logic and also the part of the Vedas dealing with *karma*. He is not one; he is different in each body. The one being said by the Upaniṣads is the same in everyone, the President without attributes and the witness to all *karma*. Therefore, it is wrong to say that the Vedas do not speak of existent things*.

२०. यदपि शास्त्रात्पर्यविदाम् अनुक्रमणम् “दृष्टो हि तस्यार्थः कर्मावबोधनम्” (शा. भा. १.१.१) इत्येवमादि, तत् धर्मजिज्ञासाविषयत्वात् विधिप्रतिषेधशास्त्राभिप्रायं द्रष्टव्यम्। अपि च “आम्नायस्य क्रियार्थत्वादानर्थक्यम् अतदर्थानाम्” (जै. सू. १.२.१) इत्येतत् एकान्तेन अभ्युपगच्छतां भूतोपदेश आनर्थक्य प्रसंगः। प्रवृत्तिनिवृत्तिविधिव्यतिरेकेण भूतं चेत् वस्तु उपदिशति भव्यार्थत्वेन, कूटस्थं नित्यं भूतं नोपदिशति इति को हेतुः? न हि भूतम् उपदिश्यमानं क्रिया भवति। अक्रियात्वेऽपि भूतस्य क्रियासाधनत्वात् क्रियार्थ एव भूतोपदेशः इति चेत्? नैष दोषः। क्रियार्थत्वेऽपि क्रियानिर्वर्तनं शक्तिमद् वस्तु उपदिष्टमेव। क्रियार्थत्वं तु प्रयोजनं तस्य। न च एतावता वस्तु अनुपदिष्टं भवति। यदि नाम उपदिष्टं किं तव तेन स्यादिति? उच्यते। अनवगत-आत्मवस्तूपदेशश्च तथैव भवितुमर्हति। तदवगत्या मिथ्याज्ञानस्य संसारहेतोः निवृत्तिः प्रयोजनं क्रियते इति अविशिष्टम् अर्थवत्त्वं क्रियासाधनवस्तूपदेशेन।

20. (The sayings of) those who know the purport of the *sāstra* viz, "The visible use of Veda is the teaching of action" etc refer to the discussion of

*The sentence 'ननु आत्मा अहंप्रत्ययविषयत्वात्... प्रत्युक्तत्वात्' - Makes it crystal clear that 'अस्मत्प्रत्ययगोचर' - the first word in the *Adhyāsa Bhāṣya* refers only to *kṣetrajña* and not to his witness, the fourth Ātman.

dharma. Therefore, they have to be understood as the opinion of the *śāstra* of prescriptions and prohibitions. Further, for those who accept unexceptionally (the statement) "Since the purpose of the Veda is action, (sentences) not conveying that meaning are futile", the teaching of existents become futile. If it teaches existent things different from injunctions for motivation and demotivation for the sake of dharma which is yet to occur, what is the reason for saying that it does not teach the immutable eternal existent? The existent that is taught is not an act. 'If it is said that though the existent itself is not an act, its teaching is for the sake of an act, because it is instrumental to an act?' This is not a defect. Though for the sake of an act—the thing which has the capacity to perform an act is certainly taught; that it is for the sake of an act is its usefulness. Just because of that, the thing does not turn out to be untaught. 'Agreeing it is taught, what do you gain from it?' We will say: The teaching of the unknown *Ātman* is also of the same kind. By its knowledge the use would be the removal of the wrong knowledge which is the cause of *samsāra*. Hence, it is the same as the teaching of objects that are instrumental to an act in respect of its usefulness.

(20) That the Vedas do not speak of existent things was rejected in the previous section. Now it is being shown, using the *Mīmāṃsaka*'s arguments, that the Vedas do speak of about things unrelated to *karma*. Do they not speak of *yūpa*, *āhvaniya* etc? 'They do, but for the sake of action'. Though its usefulness is in action, it is an existent. So, the teaching of an existent object without use could be meaningless; not if it has use. 'Then what is the use for teaching about *Ātman*?' It is that Its knowledge destroys the *adhyāsa* which is responsible for all evil.

२१. अपि च “ब्राह्मणो न हन्तव्यः” इत्येवमाद्या निवृत्तिः उपदिश्यते। न च सा क्रिया, नापि क्रियासाधनम्। अक्रियार्थनामुपदेशः अनर्थकश्चेत् “ब्राह्मणो न हन्तव्यः” इत्यादि निवृत्युपदेशानाम् आनर्थक्यं प्राप्तम्। तच्च अनिष्टम्। न च स्वभावप्राप्त-हन्त्यर्थ-अनुरागेण नजः शक्यम् अप्राप्तक्रियार्थत्वं कल्पयितुं हनन-क्रियानिवृत्ति-औदासीन्य व्यतिरेकेण। नजश्च एष स्वभावः यत् स्वसंबंधिनोऽभावं बोधयति इति। अभावबुद्धिश्च औदासीन्यकारणम्। सा च दग्धेन्धनाग्निवत् स्वयमेव उपशाम्यति।

तस्मात् प्रसक्तक्रियानिवृत्ति- औदासीन्यमेव “ब्राह्मणो न हन्तव्यः” इत्यादिषु प्रतिषेधार्थं मन्यामहे अन्यत्र प्रजापतिव्रतादिभ्यः। तस्मात् पुरुषार्थ- अनुपयोगि- उपाख्यानादि- भूतार्थ- वाद विषयम् आनर्थक्याभिधानं द्रष्टव्यम्।

21. Further, “A *brāhmaṇa* is not to be killed” etc teach desisting from action. This is not an act or even a means to act. If the teaching of not acting is futile, then the teachings of desisting from activity like “A *brāhmaṇa* is not to be killed” would also be futile. That is not desirable. The word ‘not’ related to the act of killing which is naturally inherent (in one), makes (him) desist from killing and (eventually) generates (only) a passivity in him. Therefore, imagining a meaning of non-existent act (for the word ‘not’) is not possible. The nature of the word ‘not’ is that it teaches the non-existence to which it is related. The cognition of non-existence is the cause of passivity. That subsides on its own accord like the fire whose fuel has been consumed. Therefore we think that the passivity generated by desisting from the act for which there is scope, is the meaning of the prohibition “A *brāhmaṇa* is not to be killed” etc, in all cases other than the *Prajāpati* - vow etc. Therefore, the claim of futility must be understood in the case of legends which are praises of the existent not serving the human goal.

(21) That sentences unrelated to action are futile is the opponent’s view in the sūtra ‘Since śāstra is for the purpose of action’. The counter question of the Vedāntin is this: Right. It is true in the case of injunctory sentences intended to motivate person to action. What about prohibitory sentences intended to demotivate?

Opponent: Even in the prohibitory sentences, connection with action is implied. For e.g., in *Prajāpati* vow, the *brahmacārin* is prohibited to see the sun while it is setting or rising. *Purāṇas* prohibit seeing the moon on a certain day of the year. In these prohibitions, effort is needed by the person not to see the sun or the moon.

Vedāntin: What about the prohibitory sentence ‘A *brāhmaṇa* should not be killed’? It is neither action nor an implement for action.

Opponent: No; there is the action of effort not to kill.

Vedāntin: But this sentence is not an injunction for making that effort. The

only use of the sentence is to produce the awareness of not killing. Later on, even this awareness ends up in being passive. As for e.g., if the intention of killing is the fuel, then this awareness is fire. Just like fire gets extinguished after burning the fuel, this awareness also ends up in passivity after removing the motivation to kill. This means that there are Vedic passages which are useful things not related with action. Similarly, sentences about *Brahman* have the use of removing *adhyāsa* which is responsible for all worldly problems.

२२. यदप्युक्तम् कर्तव्यविध्यनुप्रवेशम् अन्तरेण वस्तुमात्रमुच्यमानम् अनर्थकं स्यात् “सप्तद्वीपा वसुमती” इत्यादिवत् इति, तत्परिहृतम्। “रज्जुरियं नायं सर्पः” इति वस्तुमात्रकथनेऽपि प्रयोजनस्य दृष्टत्वात्। ननु श्रुतब्रह्माणोऽपि यथापूर्वं संसारित्वदर्शनात् न रज्जुस्वरूपकथनवत् अर्थवत्त्वमित्युक्तम्? अत्रोच्यते। न अवगत-ब्रह्मात्मभावस्य यथा-पूर्वं संसारित्वं शक्यं दर्शयितुम्, वेदप्रमाणजनितब्रह्मात्मभावविरोधात्। न हि शरीराद्यात्माभिमानिनः दुःखभयादिमत्त्वं दृष्टमिति तस्यै वेदप्रमाणजनित-ब्रह्मात्मावगमे तदभिमान निवृत्तौ तदेव मिथ्याज्ञाननिमित्तं दुःखभयादिमत्त्वं भवतीति शक्यं कल्पयि-तुम्। न हि धनिनो गृहस्थस्य धनाभिमानिनः धनापहारनिमित्तं दुःखं दृष्टमिति तस्यैव प्रब्रजितस्य धनाभिमानरहितस्य तदेव धनापहारनिमित्तं भवति। न च कुंडलिनः कुंडलि-त्वाभिमाननिमित्तं सुखं दृष्टमिति तस्यैव कुंडलवियुक्तस्य कुंडलित्वाभिमानरहितस्य तदेव कुंडलित्वाभिमाननिमित्तं सुखं भवति। तदुक्तं श्रुत्या “अशरीरं वावसन्तं न प्रियाप्रिये स्पृशतः” (छ. ८.१२.१)।

22. It was said that the speaking of a bare thing without entry of injunction is futile like (saying) “The earth has seven islands” etc. This has been refuted; because, use is seen even in the narration of a bare objection like “This is rope, this is not a snake”. (Opponent)—‘Even in him who has heard about *Brahman*, the features of a *samsārī* (worldly person) is seen as before; therefore, it is not purposeful as in the narration of the nature of the rope.’ Here we say: It is not possible to show features of *samsārī* as before in one who has realization of *Brahman* as himself; because it is opposed to the realization of *Brahman*—*Ātman* identification generated by *Veda pramāṇa*. In a man with the conceit of self in the body etc, association with grief, fear etc are found. Because of that, it is not

possible to imagine in the man the association of grief, fear etc caused by illusory knowledge, after the *Brahman- Ātman* realization produced by Veda *pramāṇa* (and so) the conceit is removed. The grief of theft of wealth is found in the rich house-holder with the conceit of wealth; the same grief caused by the theft of wealth is not produced in the same man when he renounces and becomes freed from the conceit of wealth. Happiness is seen in one having earrings who has the conceit of having earrings; for the same person, the happiness in having earrings is not there, when he gives up the earrings and is freed from the conceit of having earrings. This is declared by śruti: 'Him who is unembodied, pleasure and displeasure do not touch.'

(22) Earlier the objection was raised that the narration of an existent thing is useless, like the sentence 'The earth has seven islands'. Countering it, the Vedāntin said that the narration of the rope has the use of removing the fear of the serpent (see the same *adhikarana*, sec. 6). Continuing it, the effect of the realisation of *Brahman- Ātman* oneness on the *jñānī* is being discussed. A detailed commentary on this has already been made in the *Adhyāsa Bhāṣya* (21.1-3). The gist is: 'शरीराभकस्य कर्मणो नियतफलत्वात् सम्यग्ज्ञानप्राप्तौ अपि अवश्यम्भाविनी प्रवृत्तिः वाऽमनःकायानाम् लब्धवृत्तेः कर्मणो बलीयस्त्वात् मुक्तेष्वादिप्रवृत्तिवत्' (Br. Bh. 1.4.7). Though activity takes place in body, speech, mind etc, one with this realisation is aware that he is unrelated to it. There is no meaning in others finding a contradiction in it. Since there is no *adhyāsa* in him, pleasure/ displeasure do not touch him even when the body is alive. The objection of the opponent who does not agree with this and the Vedāntin's answer to it is as follows:

२३. शरीरे पतिते अशरीरत्वं स्यात् न जीवतः इति चेत्? न, सशरीरत्वस्य मिथ्याज्ञाननिमित्तत्वात्। न हि आत्मनः शरीरात्माभिमानलक्षणं मिथ्याज्ञानं मुक्त्वा अन्यतः सशरीरत्वं शक्यं कल्पयितुम्। नित्यं अशरीरत्वं अकर्मनिमित्तत्वादिति अवोचाम। तत्कृत धर्मधर्मनिमित्तं सशरीरत्वमिति चेत्? न, शरीरसंबंधस्य असिद्धत्वात् धर्माधर्मयोः आत्म-कृतत्वासिद्धेः। शरीरसंबंधस्य धर्माधर्मयोः तत्कृतस्य च इतरेतराश्रयत्वप्रसंगात् अन्य-परंपरा एषा अनादित्वकल्पना। क्रियासमवायाभावाच्च आत्मनः कर्तृत्वानुपपत्तेः। सन्निधानमात्रेण राजप्रभृतीनां दृष्टं कर्तृत्वम्, इति चेत्? न, धनदानादि-उपार्जित भृत्यसंबंधित्वात् तेषां कर्तृत्वोपपत्तेः। न तु आत्मनः धनदानादिवत् शरीरादिभिः स्वस्वामि-

संबंधनिमित्तं किंचित् शक्यं कल्पयितुम्। मिथ्याभिमानस्तु प्रत्यक्षः संबंधहेतुः। एतेन यजमानत्वम् आत्मनः व्याख्यातम्।

23. 'If it is said that unembodiment happens when the body is lost (and) not when alive?' No, because, embodiment is due to illusory knowledge. It is not possible to imagine embodiment for *Ātman* in any other way than through illusory knowledge of the conceit of *Ātman* as the body. We have already said that unembodiment is eternal since it is not caused by action. 'If it is said that embodiment is due to *dharma* and *adharma* acquired by him?' No. That *dharma* and *adharma* are acquired by him is not established because, his relation with the body is not established. (To avoid this difficulty) assuming beginninglessness (of the relation between body and *dharma* / *adharma*) is (like) a chain of blind men, because there is mutual dependence between the relation with the body, and the acquisition of *dharma* and *adharma* by him. *Ātman*'s doership is also irreconcilable since he has no *samavāya* relation - with action. 'Is not mere proximity seen as causing doership in kingly persons?' No; their doership comes through their relationship with the servants procured through gifting of money etc. It is not possible to conceive of any relation produced by gifting of money which could produce master-servant relationship between *Ātman* and the body etc. It is directly seen that illusory conceit is the cause of relation. With this is also explained the doership of *Ātman* in sacrifice.

(23) The opponent's view is that unembodiment is only after death and not while alive. But this is wrong. Whether *Ātman* has pleasure/displeasure after the fall of the body or not, cannot be determined by others; only the Vedas can tell it. The Vedas say that after death *jīva* goes to heaven/hell. This means that even after death there is no freedom from pleasure/displeasure. Therefore, the opponent's view is not correct. But it is the direct experience of everybody that in *suṣupti* one is untouched by pleasure/displeasure. The reason for this feature is that *jīva* is one with *Brahman* at that time. *Śruti* says - 'सता तदा सम्पन्नो भवति स्वमपीतो भवति' - He is one with *Brahman*, he is dissolved in his *Ātman* (Cā. 6.8.1). 'पर आत्मनि संग्रातिष्ठते' - He is one with *paramātman* (Pr. 4.7). Therefore, it is clear that the embodiment experienced in the wakeful state is only because of wrong knowledge.

Opponent: There is another way to reconcile embodiment; we say, it is the result of *dharma/adharma*.

Vedantin: That is not possible; because, body is caused by *dharma/adharma* and *dharma/adharma* are caused by the body. This mutual dependence prevents us from deciding which of them is the cause which is the effect. You cannot also overcome this difficulty by saying that this mutual relationship is beginningless like that of seed and tree; that would be like a chain of blind men: One blind man says that 'milk is white' to another blind man. When the latter asks for *pramāṇa*, he is told that 'another blind man told me'. This cannot prove that embodiment is due to *dharma/adharma*. But in *susupti* there is neither body nor *dharma/adharma*. If one remembers the reason for this given by the *śruti* quoted above, it is conclusively proved that the embodiment of *Ātman* is only because of *mithyā-jñāna*.

Doubt: Is it not possible that *karma* can happen by the mere presence of *Atman*?

Answer: No. *Śruti* trumpets that the *Ātman* is non-doer. Indeed, non-doership experienced in *susupti* is due to his oneness with *Brahman* at that time. But it reappears the moment he gets back to wakefulness. It is because of *adhyāsa* that *Ātman* gets doership in a sacrifice.

२४. अत्राहुः देहादिव्यतिरिक्तस्य आत्मनः आत्मीये देहादौ अभिमानः गौणः, न मिथ्या इति। तत्र, प्रसिद्धवस्तुभेदस्य गौणत्वमुख्यत्वप्रसिद्धेः। यस्य हि प्रसिद्धो वस्तु-भेदः यथा केसरादिमान् आकृतिविशेषः अन्वयव्यतिरेकाभ्यां सिंहशब्दप्रत्ययभाक् मुख्यः अन्यः प्रसिद्धः ततश्च अन्यः पुरुषः प्रायिकैः क्रौर्यशौर्यादिभिः सिंहगुणैः संपन्नः सिद्धः तस्य पुरुषे सिंहशब्दप्रत्ययौ गौणौ भवतः, न अप्रसिद्धवस्तुभेदस्य। तस्य तु अन्यत्र अन्यशब्दप्रत्ययौ भ्रान्तिनिमित्तावेव भवतः, न गौणौ। यथा मन्दान्धकारे स्थाणुरयमिति अगृह्यमाण विशेषे पुरुषशब्दप्रत्ययौ स्थाणुविषयौ। यथा वा शुक्तिकायाम् अकस्मात् रजतमिति निश्चितौ शब्दप्रत्ययौ। तद्वत् देहादिसंघाते अहमिति निरुपचारेण शब्दप्रत्ययौ आत्मानात्माविवेकेन उत्पद्यमानौ कथं गौणौ शक्यौ वदितुम्? आत्मानात्मविवेकिनामपि पंडितानाम् अजाविपालामिव अविविक्तौ शब्दप्रत्ययौ भवतः। तस्मात् देहादिव्यतिरिक्त आत्मास्तित्ववादिनां देहादौ अहंप्रत्ययो मिथ्यैव, न गौणः।

24. Here it is said 'The conceit of 'I' in his own body etc. of *Ātman* which is different from the body etc, is secondary (and) not illusory.' No. It is well-

known that secondariness and primariness are (only) for him to whom the difference between the things is well-known. For example: A particular form with mane etc known through—*anvaya-vyatireka*—co-presence and co-absence, as the meaning of the word and concept ‘lion’ is *mukhya*—primary; and as different from that is a man possessing mostly lionine qualities of cruelty, courage etc. For this latter one, however, the word and concept of one (thing) in place of (the word and concept) of another (thing) is only due to delusion, not secondary. In twilight, when it is not clearly grasped as ‘This is a post’, the word and concept of ‘man’ in the post or the word and the concept of silver occurring accidentally in shell—are illusory. In the same way, how can the non-figurative use of the word and concept of ‘I’ in the bundle of the body etc, born out of indiscrimination of *Ātman* and *un-Ātman*, use the word and concept indiscriminately just like goatherds? Therefore, for those who agree that *Ātman* is distinct from the body etc, the concept of ‘I’ in the body etc is illusory and not secondary.

(24) *Mīmāṃsakas*, who disagree with this conclusion about the cause of embodiment, object like this: ‘As the śāstras speak about heaven/hell after death, *Ātman* has to be different from the body. Even a common man does not say ‘I am eyes, I am legs’. He says only ‘my eyes, my legs’. Therefore, the use of ‘I-ness’ in the body is in the secondary sense, it is not wrong knowledge.’ This is not correct. If one looks into the situation where the secondary usage is employed, it will be clear that the ‘I’ description of the body is not secondary. For e.g, looking at a man with cruelty and courage similar to that of a lion, he is addressed as ‘lion’. One who uses this word is fully aware of the differences between the man and lion. Here the word ‘lion’ is in secondary sense because of the similarities of the qualities in him. This is a figurative usage. But while calling a stump as a man or a shell as silver, the person will not be knowing the difference between stump/man and shell/silver. Therefore, that usage is not secondary, it is clearly wrong knowledge. Similarly, not knowing the difference between the Self and the body when one says ‘I am a man’, it is wrong knowledge only. Even intelligent persons who know about *prājña*-body difference talk like this. Therefore, it can never be in the secondary sense.

२५. तस्मात् मिथ्याप्रत्ययनिमित्तत्वात् सशारीरत्वस्य सिद्धं जीवतोऽपि विदुषः अशारीरत्वम्। तथा च ब्रह्मविद्विषया श्रुतिः “तद्यथा हि निर्व्ययनी वल्मीके मृता प्रत्यस्ता शयीत एवमेव इदं शरीरं शेते। अत अयमशरीरोऽमृतः प्राणो ब्रह्मैव तेज एव” (बृ. ४.४.७) इति, “सचक्षुरचक्षुरिव सकर्णोऽकर्ण इव सवागवागिव समना अमना इव सप्राणोऽप्राण इव” इति च। स्मृतिरपि “स्थितप्रज्ञस्य का भाषा” (गी. २.५४) इत्याद्या स्थितप्रज्ञलक्षणानि आचक्षाणा विदुषः सर्वप्रवृत्त्यसंबंधं दर्शयति। तस्मात् न अवगत-ब्रह्मात्मभावस्य यथापूर्वं संसारित्वम् यस्य तु यथापूर्वं संसारित्वम्, नासौ अवगतब्रह्मात्म-भावः इति अनवद्यम्।

25. Therefore, embodiment being due to illusory knowledge, it is established that for the *jñānī*, even while alive there is unembodiment. Thus there is *śruti* about the one who knows *Brahman*: ‘Just as the slough of a snake lies dead and cast off on the ant-hill, in the same way lies this body; then that un-embodied is immortal, is *prāṇa*, is *Brahman* alone, is light alone’; ‘Though with eyes, he is like without eyes, though with ears, like without ears; though with speech, like without speech; though with mind, like without mind; though with *prāṇa*, like without *prāṇa*’. Speaking of the features of *sthitaprajña*—one steady in knowledge—*smṛti* also says “What is *sthitaprajña*'s language”? etc, showing that the knower is unconnected with all actions. Therefore, with the realization of *Brahman* as *Ātman*, there is no *samsāra* as before. The one who remains *samsārī* as before has not realized *Brahman* as *Ātman*, Therefore (our stand) is faultless.

(25) As wrong knowledge is destroyed by the realisation of *Brahman-Ātman* oneness, the imagined relation with the body is lost. Even while alive one becomes unembodied. Just as the snake loses relation with the slough after its detachment, the *jñānī* too loses body-relation and becomes *Brahman*. This does not however mean that there was a relation earlier. It was not there even earlier. Therefore, there is no scope for imaginations like 'trace of *avidyā*, true liberation is after death' etc. *Śruti* says - 'ब्रह्मैव सन् ब्रह्माज्ञोति' - Being *Brahman* he merges in *Brahman*. 'Even with eyes, he is like without eyes', i.e. his eyes too see multiplicity like the eyes of an ignorant person; but do not recognise multiplicity and so are like the one without eyes. Some people have interpreted this as 'Though without eyes, he is like with eyes',

i.e., though he is the adjunctless *Ātman*, he appears as if working with adjuncts. The first literal interpretation is the *jñānī*'s personal experience; the second is his appearance for others. These are the features of the *sthitapr̄jña* (*Adhyāsa Bhāṣya* 21.3). One without the realisation of *Brahman-Ātman* sees multiplicity outside and considers himself as observer. The one with realization, though seeing multiplicity with physical eyes, does not understand himself as observer of multiplicity, but as the *Brahman* which is the cause of both, observed and observer. That is, the *jñāna* of multiplicity produced by sense-object contact is the feature of the *kṣetra* - the observable; and *Ātman* is its real nature (*swarūpa*). The feature is not independent of the *swarūpa*; but the *swarūpa* is featureless. Therefore, the adhyasa relation with the *kṣetra* produces motivation for action in the ignorant; with the snapping of the *adhyāsa* relation, motivation drops off in the *jñānī*. *Kṣetra* is not non-existent, it is *Ātman*; *adhyāsa* with it is non-existent, imagined.

२६. यत् पुनरुक्तम् श्रवणात् पराचीनयोः मनननिदिध्यासनयोः दर्शनात् विधिशेषत्वं ब्रह्मणः न स्वरूपपर्यवसायित्वमिति। न, अवगत्यर्थत्वात् मनननिदिध्यासनयोः। यदि हि अवगतं ब्रह्म अन्यत्र विनियुज्येत, भवेत्तदा विधिशेषत्वम्। न तु तदस्ति। मनननिदिध्यासनयोरपि श्रवणवत् अवगत्यर्थत्वात्।

26. Again it was said: 'Since reflection and meditation are seen subsequent to hearing, *Brahman* must be subsidiary to injunction and does not stop with (the teaching of) its nature.' It is not so; because like hearing, reflection and meditation are for the purpose of realization. If the realized *Brahman* were used elsewhere, then there would be subsidiarity to injunction. But it is not so, because like hearing, reflection and meditation are also for the purpose of realization.

(26) In the opinion of the opponent, 'reflection (*manana*) after hearing (*śravaṇa*) is for clear understanding of *Brahman* and *nididhyāsana* is nothing but *upāsanā* (meditation). After death the fruit of *upāsanā*, i.e., *mokṣa* is obtained'. This is not correct; because, after *śravaṇa*, the understood *Brahman* is not used for something else; there is no scope for that either, because, the process yields the realisation of *Brahman-Ātman* oneness and the distinction of meditator-meditated upon is lost. How can *upāsanā* happen? Therefore, reflection and meditation are for realisation only.

२७. तस्मात् न प्रतिपत्तिविधिविषयतया शास्त्रप्रमाणकर्त्वं ब्रह्मणः संभवति। इत्यतः स्वतन्त्रमेव ब्रह्म शास्त्रप्रमाणकं वेदान्तवाक्यसमन्वयात् इति सिद्धम्। एवं च सति “अथातो ब्रह्म जिज्ञासा” इति तद्विषयः पृथक् शास्त्रारंभः उपपद्यते। प्रतिपत्ति-विधि-परत्वे हि “अथातो धर्मजिज्ञासा” इत्येव आरब्धत्वात् न पृथकशास्त्रम् आरभ्येत। आरभ्यमाणं च एवमारभ्येत “अथातः परिशिष्टधर्मजिज्ञासा” इति। “अथातः क्रत्वर्थ पुरुषार्थयोर्जिज्ञासा” (जै. सू. ४.१.१) इतिवत्। ब्रह्मात्मैक्यावगतिस्तु अप्रतिज्ञाता इति तदर्थोर्युक्तः शास्त्रारंभः “अथातो ब्रह्मजिज्ञासा”।

27. Therefore, *śāstra* is not *pramāṇa* for the knowledge of *Brahman* as subsidiary to an injunction of *upāsanā*. So now, that *śāstra* is the *pramāṇa* for *Brahman* independently is established because of the uniformity in the meaning of the Vedānta sentences. This being the case, the commencement of a distinct *śāstra* dealing with that in the form “Then therefore the discussion of *Brahman*” is reconciled. Had it been for an ‘injunction of *upāsanā*, then since this had been already stated in the *sūtra* “then therefore the discussion of *dharma*” a different *śāstra* would not have been commenced. Or if it had been begun, it should have been commenced with “Then therefore the discussion of rest of *dharma*” like “Then, therefore, the discussion of what subserves the purpose of the sacrifice and of the goal of man”. The realization of *Brahman-Ātman* oneness is not propounded (in that *śāstra*); hence it is but right that (another) *śāstra* is begun for that purpose in “Then, therefore, the discussion of *Brahman*”.

(27) ‘Śāstra is not *pramāṇa* for *Brahman* through injunction; it is *pramāṇa* directly’ - this is proved by logic in this section. *Upāsanā* being a mental *karma*, it has to come under the discussion of *dharma*. So, it could have come there as a subsidiary to injunction of *upāsanā*, ‘अथातः परिशिष्ट धर्मजिज्ञासा’ - Another *śāstra* is not needed. Suppose one says ‘No, context being different, *upāsanā* cannot be discussed under *dharma*'. In that case, *upāsanā* being *karma* of a different type, it could have been dealt with in another sub-section within *dharma-jijñāsā*. Instead, a separate *śāstra* has been formulated. Why? Because, *Brahman-Ātman* oneness cannot be discussed in that *śāstra*; that *śāstra* is based on duality.

२८. तस्मात् ‘अहं ब्रह्मास्मि’ इत्येतदवसाना एव सर्वे विधयः सर्वाणि च

इतराणि प्रमाणानि । न हि अहेय-अनुपादेय-अद्वैतात्म-अवगतौ निर्विषयाणि अप्रमातृकाणि च प्रमाणानि भवितुमर्हन्ति । अपि च आहुः ॥

28. Therefore all the injunctions and *pramāṇas* terminate with (the realization) "I am *Brahman*". With the realization of non-dual *Ātman* where there is no rejecting and taking, *pramāṇa* cannot but drop because objects and the knower drop out. Further they say:

(28.1)Therefore, all the injunctions etc: 'The knowledge of *Ātman*'(*Ātma-jñāna*) will become non-eternal if it is a fruit of injunction. Imperative etc used in respect of it become blunt, they have only the shade of injunction' - this shows that *śravana*, *manana* and *nididhyāsana* are not injunctions.

Doubt: But they too drop out after the realization of the oneness of *Ātman* - *Brahman*. In that case, does the first sentence in this section not imply that these three have once again been treated as injunctions?

Answer: It is not explicit here that it is so. The sentence may be referring to injunction of *dharmaśāstra* only. It is because of the word 'vidhi' that this doubt has arisen. So it will be discussed again: Meaning of 'knowledge of *Brahman*' has been explained by saying 'The intellectual knowledge of *Brahman* is the *pramāṇa* through which experience is gained' (see *Jijñāsā-adhikaraṇa*, sec. 11). The end result of experience starts with hearing (*śravana*) of *śāstras*. Experience is not produced immediately after hearing. Svetaketu is an example of this. After *śravana*, reflection (*manana*) of the knowledge of *Brahman* is necessary. In this knowledge obtained after *manana*, *Brahman* is the known and *prajna* is the knower. This is duality. But the *śruti* says '*Prājña* is *Brahman*' and *Ātman* is *prājña*, who is in fact, *Brahman* only. Therefore, the knower (of the wakeful state) should keep his mind continuously flowing towards *Ātman*. This is meditation - *nididhyāsana* - which has to end in experience. How long should one meditate? Till experience is got! Whether the first or the last, whether (meditation is) continuous or discontinuous, the grasp that ends in total removal of the defects of *avidya* etc is experience - 'य एव अविद्यादिदोषनिवृत्तिफलकृत्प्रत्ययः आद्यः अन्त्यः सन्ततो वा स एव विद्या' (Br. Bh. 1.4.10). There is nothing wrong in treating *śravana*, *manana* and *nididhyāsana* as injunctions till then.' This is just like getting the fruit of *karma* according to the injunction of the *karma* part of the Veda.

Doubt: Then why are they described as ‘with shade of injunction? Why not say injunction itself?’

Answer: The reason for not treating it as injunction is this: Injunctive karma and fruit are very different. Here it is not so. *Manana* and *nididhyāsana* do not yield a knowledge different from what was heard. Nevertheless, experience does not come without them. So ‘they have the shade of injunction’.

(28.2) With *Ātman*-experience, knowership of *prājña* drops off. It is wrong to say it drops off because the known (world) ceases to exist due to this experience. It drops off because of the knowledge that the known is not different from the knower. As a result of the teaching of the śāstras by the guru, when one reminds oneself that everything is the unborn *Brahman*, then he ceases to see duality which is its opposite, because such duality is non-existent - ‘अजं ब्रह्म सर्वमित्येतत् शास्त्राचार्योपदेशः अनुसृत्य तद्विपरीतं जातुं नैव तु पश्यति, अभावात्’ (Mā. Kā. 3.43). With the realisation of the non-dual *Ātman*, nothing appears different from oneself. One obtains the world-sublated *sarva-ātma-bhāva*, the experience of everything as himself, while there is no giving or taking. Quoting the songs of the realised souls, this is explained below.

(28.3) Due to the sublation of son, body etc: Here sublation does not mean that son, body etc become invisible, get destroyed. If such a thing happens to the body, the tradition of Vedanta cannot continue. Sublation of the world means the realisation that its inherent nature is *Ātman* itself. In this awareness of *sarva-ātma-bhāva*, son etc are ‘not his’ and body etc are ‘not himself’. Son etc are secondary atmans and body etc are illusory *ātmans*. They are non-existent in *sarva-ātma-bhāva*. Since all actions take place on the premise of secondary and illusory *ātmans* which are absent on realisation, they (actions) cease to exist.

(28.4) Prior to cognition etc: *Ātman* being different from and unknown to the ignorant person He is to be sought, He is to be discussed - ‘सोऽचेष्टव्यः सः विज्ञासितव्यः’ (Cā. 8.7.1); The ignorant person has to search for Him. After He is realised, naturally, knowership of the seeker drops off. Since sin and virtue occur only when there is knowership, they too drop off with *Ātman*'s realization.

(28.5) The cognition of *Ātman* etc: *Pramāṇa* is the base for the knower-known *vyavahāra* of knowing. The validity for *pramāṇa* comes from experience, which is based on identifying the body as the knower, i.e., *adhyāsa*. This is natural only as

long as there is knowership. When this is lost with *Ātman*'s realisation, one comes to know that the validity of the *pramāṇa* and of the activities was illusory.

(28.6) What does it mean to say that the 'validity of *pramāṇa* is illusory?' If *śruti pramāṇa* is illusory, how is it possible to have faith in the transactionless *Ātman* it teaches? Even granting that somehow one gets the knowledge of the *Ātman* taught by *śruti*, how to verify that it is right knowledge? - These are the questions; here are the answers:

Vyavahāra is found only in the effects and not in the cause. And the effect cannot exist without the cause. *Vyavahāras* like 'the pot is big, small, broken' etc are possible only in the pot, not clay. But at the same time, a pot without clay is non-existent - 'न हि निरात्मकं भूतं किंचित् व्यवहाराय अवकल्पते' (G. Bh. 9.4). So, also, the *vyavahāra* of knower-known-knowledge is possible only between *kṣetra* and *kṣetrajña*; not at all in the *Ātman*. *Vyavahāra* is impossible in a *kṣetra* and *kṣetrajña* who are independent of *Ātman*, since they would be non-existent - 'कारण व्यतिरेकेण अभावः कार्यस्य' (Sū. Bh. 2.1.14). When the *pramāṇa*, the eye, comes in contact with the object, the knowledge of the latter is produced in the *buddhi*. All this is *kṣetra dharma*. One who has *adhyāsa* in the body, senses and *buddhi*, feels that he is the knower. Since the knowledge of an object is the same for all knowers, including the one who has realised the *Ātman*, this *vyavahāra* between *kṣetra* and *kṣetrajña* is true - not illusory. What is illusion? 'अन्यस्य च अविद्याकृतत्वे विद्यया अवस्तुत्वदर्शनोपपत्तिः । तद्विद्वितीयस्य चन्द्रस्य असत्त्वं यदतैमिरिकेण चक्षुष्मता न गृह्यते' - Another thing (different from *Ātman*) which is imagined due to *Avidyā*, is non-existent; it can be understood as non-existing by *vidyā*. Is not the second moon, not seen by one without cataract, the non-existent? (Tai. Bh. 2.8). 'If so, what exactly is illusory in the transaction between *kṣetra* and *kṣetrajña*?' - Knowership of *Ātman*. 'Who is this *Ātman*?' *Prājña*, also called *kṣetrajña*. 'Why?' - Because *prājña* is really not *prājña*; he is the *Ātman* without knowership. Therefore, the moment *prājña* realises that he is *Ātman*, all transactions stay bound in the *kṣetra*; in no way do they touch him.

Question: In that case, after one obtains *jñāna*, who handles the activity seen in the inert *kṣetra* of the *jñāni*?

Answer: It is *Īśwara*, who is passive in His *swarūpa*, but active in association with *māyā* - 'परमात्मनस्तु स्वरूपव्यपाश्रयम् औदासीन्यम् । मायाव्यपाश्रयं च प्रवर्तकत्वम्' (Sū. Bh. 2.2.7), who handles the body of the *jñāni* according to his *prārabdha* - which is the *karma* brought with him to be experienced in this life (*Adhyāsa Bhāṣya* 21.1-3).

Question: The *vyavahāra* of creation etc of the world are of *Īśwara*, not of a *jñānī*. Is this not a difference between *jñānī* and *Īśwara*?

Answer: No. The aforesaid answer is given keeping in view the ignorant (*ajñānī*) who sees difference. Actually, *jñānī* is Paramatman only, without any difference. Prior to the realisation of *Ātman*, the creation and destruction of the world, starting from *prāṇa* upto the (objects with) names, were happening by one different from himself. With the realisation of *Ātman*, they were all by himself - In this way, for the *jñānī*, all transactions are by *Ātman* only - 'प्राक् सदात्मविज्ञानात् स्वात्मनः अन्यस्मात् सतः प्राणादेः नामान्तस्योत्पत्तिप्रलयौ अभूताम्। सदात्मविज्ञाने तु सति इदानीं स्वात्मत एव संवृत्तौ। तथा सर्वोऽप्यन्यो व्यवहारः आत्मन एव विदुषः'। (Cā. Bh. 7.26.1).

गौणमिथ्यात्मनोऽसत्त्वे पुत्र देहादि बाधनात्।
 सद्ब्रह्मात्माहमित्येवं बोधे कार्यं कथं भवेत्॥१॥
 अन्वेष्टव्यात्मविज्ञानात् प्राक् प्रमातृत्वमात्मनः।
 अन्विष्टः स्यात् प्रमातैव पाप्मदोषादिवर्जितः॥२॥
 देहात्मप्रत्ययो यद्वत् प्रमाणत्वेन कल्पितः।
 लौकिकं तद्वदेवेदं प्रमाणं त्वात्मनिश्चयात्॥३॥
 इति चतुःसूत्री समाप्ता।

(1) Due to the sublation of son, body etc, the secondary and the illusory *Ātmans* becoming non-existent and with enlightenment 'I am *Brahman* of the nature of sheer existence'—how can there be action?

(2) Prior to the cognition of the '*Ātman* to be known', there is knowership for *Ātman*. After knowing, the knower himself becomes free from sin, defect etc.

(3) The cognition of *Ātman* as the body is imagined to be *pramāṇa*. So also is this wordly (transaction imagined to be) *pramāṇa* until the ascertainment of *Ātman* (as *Brahman*).

Thus ends the catuhṣūtrī
